The nomination of two Indian firms, Goel Scientific Glass Works and Garg Scientific Glass Industries, as clandestine suppliers of prohibited material to Syrian Scientific Research Centre (SSRC), has resurrected the issue of involvement of Indian entities in the proliferation of chemical weapons technology. The SSRC is known to be Syrias focal point for developing chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The revelations made in a WikiLeaks classified cable initiated by the US Secretary of State in 2009 confirm that the Americans were cognizant of the lax Indian export control mechanism, which had been routinely circumvented by the rogue chemical entities. The items in question - glass lined chemical reactor vessels, heat exchangers and pumps - are dual-use controlled items mentioned on Indias Special Chemicals Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) list for ban on exports without a licence, for fear that they might be used in developing chemical weapons. Vastly outstripped by nuclear weapons in their destructive potential, chemical weapons, classified within the bracket of WMD, have acquired much attraction among countries outmatched by adversaries brandishing nuclear weapons or enjoying overwhelming conventional offensive capability. The trend is particularly visible in the Middle East where Israels military dominance and undeclared nuclear capability have made chemical weapons an attainable alternative, packing a potent deterrent punch. It is against the backdrop of this scenario that India, with a highly developed chemical industry, has become the epicentre of chemical weapons technologys clandestine proliferation. In India, a number of government-owned and private sector companies produce an array of dual-use chemicals that are chemical weapons precursors and intermediaries. United Phosphorous Ltd, for example, a Bombay-based company, produces a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals that are listed on Schedule 3 of the CWC. Some Indian companies also produce a wide range of dual-use equipment and materials that can be used to produce chemical weapons, including glass lined reactor vessels with a total volume greater than 100 litters, glass lined storage tanks with a total volume greater than 100 litters, and other equipment and technologies associated with chemical weapons development. Such a strong potential for building chemical weapons has remained a forte of the Indian efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. It was only after the maturity of the India nuclear weapons programme in the 90s that the Indians thought of letting go of their chemical weapons stock; but not without their trademark subterfuge at hoodwinking the world. When the Third Disarmament Conference held in 1988 called for halting production of chemical weapons, India responded by claiming that it had no stocks of such weapons. This stance was maintained all along when in 1992 it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and upon its ratification in 1996, the treaty entered into force on April 29, 1997. But it was not until June 26, 1997, that India took a U-turn by declaring that it indeed had a chemical weapons stockpile in excess of 1,000 metric tons of undisclosed chemical agents. It was not until 2009 that India announced the destruction of its declared chemical weapons stocks. Indias recently disclosed Syrian connection is in no way the only attempt at proliferating the chemical weapons technology. United Phosphorous Ltd, for example, producing a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals, had its licence suspended for shipping trimethyl phosphite to Syria in 1992. Transpek Industry Ltd, another Indian company specialising in producing a number of dual-use chemicals, in 1990 won a bid to install and commission a turnkey chemical plant in Iran worth $12.5 million. In 2002, incontrovertible evidence provided by the British and the US intelligence agencies linked NEC, an Indian Engineering Trading Company, to Iraqs clandestine programme for developing chlorine-based chemical weapons and propellants for long-range missiles. Using front companies in three countries, phoney custom declarations and false documents, NEC Engineers Private Limited operating from New Delhi, exported 10 consignments of contraband material, and provided equipment and materials for developing chemical weapons. Inexplicably the Indian government looked aside as the shipments to Iraq, valued at approximately $800,000, took place between 1998 and 2001, the period during which the UNSCOM were not in Iraq to conduct their inspections. The threat of proliferation of chemical weapons technology to the Middle East from India is real. The Goel-Garg affair where the system was circumvented, with possible governmental acquiescence, to benefit Syrias chemical weapons programme, was not the first of its kind; nor is it going to be the last one. US reaction to the violations of the CWC regime by India is symptomatic of its partiality and in marked contrast to its attitude towards Pakistan, where even with a sterling record of maintaining watertight export controls related to the dual-use technology items Pakistan continues to face unrestrained discrimination by the US/West in acquiring access to its legitimate high-tech requirements. The writer is a freelance columnist.