ON the intensely complex question of adopting a strategy that could somehow break the current stalemate in Afghanistan and reverse the almost certain prospects of defeat for the US-led forces, the Obama administration has, in the fashion of powerful states dealing with weaker allies, decided to use the carrot-and-stick approach towards Pakistan. A letter from President Obama to President Zardari, personally delivered by US National Security Adviser General Jones last week, offers an expanded strategic partnership to Pakistan, including additional military and economic cooperation, but only if it stops hobnobbing with insurgent groups that the US believes it continues to do. The General is supposed to have bluntly told his interlocutors that if Pakistan could not deliver the US would be impelled to use any means it considered suitable to rout insurgents along the border with Afghanistan. This indeed is a dangerous threat that most likely refers to the US administration's perception of Taliban's safe haven in Quetta. The US must be told in unequivocal terms that violation of its sovereignty would not be acceptable. In the letter, there is also the bait of reduced tension (not necessarily the resolution of Kashmir) between India and Pakistan, greater military and economic efforts to bring normalcy in Afghanistan and assurance to stay long enough there, unlike the previous practice of abandoning the region in haste. The gist of the letter that became public, courtesy the American media, and observations of unnamed US officials provide an interesting insight about how the policymakers in Washington view Islamabad's significance and role in the anti-terrorism war and the difficulty in dealing with Pakistan. The view, "We can't succeed without Pakistan," is a strategic reality as seen by a senior administration official, contains food for thought for Pakistani leaders, if they had not grasped the point earlier. They should drive the bargain hard and be prepared with a list of demands about what Islamabad would regard as "expanded strategic partnership" enough to compensate for the unstinted cooperation it has been showing in this dangerous enterprise. The Obama administration should break the mould of the Bush era thinking that denied Pakistan the civilian nuclear technology it so generously offered to India, while the lack of conventional resources to undo the power scarcity was a problem for both, and Pakistan being its partner and a frontline state in the war on terror deserved preferential treatment. It should also adequately address Islamabad's complaint not only of slow reimbursement of dues but also about the niggardly supply of the required military equipment. Access to the American market and settlement of the Kashmir dispute should also figure prominently on our agenda.