President Barack Obamas rather desperate call for Pakistani support in the war against terror bears testimony to the fact that the US is finding it hard to go on with the war anymore in Afghanistan. His statement that Islamabad must be working closely with the US to combat terror no doubt has the tone of a diktat, but the tenor of his comments also suggests an underlying vein of anxiety. The reality that the Americans too could be vulnerable to defeat and the danger is now slowly making its presence felt is being articulated widely by the US leadership. Pakistans former COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg got it right when he observed that General McChrystals sacking indicates that the US has lost the war in Afghanistan. He rightly pointed out that his dismissal is also the result of sharp differences between the American militarys top brass and the civilian administration over how the war should be prosecuted. His view that the use of force has only proved to be counterproductive, and that it is high time the Afghan resistance and Taliban were brought to the conference table to find an amicable settlement is the right prescription to the prevailing conundrum. What lends credibility to such a view are reports in the US press pointing a finger of accusation at Washington for messing up the war. There are also reports, which reveal divisions within the Obama Administration. Reportedly, top members of Obamas war team have been squabbling for quite some time; the differences have only intensified with the passage of time. President Obama, these reports maintains, was unable to put an end to this infighting and was getting increasingly frustrated and at last could not help but take strict action when General McChrystal vented his fury publicly against the Administrations big guns. At the end of the day this shows an utter failure of US war objectives and mission in Afghanistan. Given the complexity of the situation, Islamabad must play its cards very wisely. While the offer made by Prime Minister Gilani to train the Afghan army and security forces is no doubt justified, our help should strictly be on a quid pro quo basis, primarily subject to the condition that the Indians must be stopped from poking their nose in Afghan affairs. They cannot be allowed to use Afghan soil as a base to launch acts of violence against Pakistan. Moreover, Islamabads role in terms of political process and Afghan reconciliation should be given more importance, contrary to what the US is aiming to achieve by projecting those groups which have no popular support.