On the night of March 21, just 48 hours after the coalition air campaign against Muammar Gaddafi began, an F-15 Eagle, crashed in east Libya after suffering what the US military has described as a mechanical failure. As the plane went down, its pilot and weapons officer ejected, opened their parachutes and drifted through the dark sky into the flat, Mediterranean scrubland around 40km southeast of Benghazi, a port city of nearly 700,000 at the heart of the rebellion against Gaddafi. They were deep in friendly territory, and with the help of local residents, both would be rescued within hours. The problem: They didnt know it. Two US warplanes - responding to a call for help from the downed pilot - swooped in and bombed the ground several hundred metres from approaching civilians. According to the UK Telegraph newspaper, as many as eight residents who came to help were shot by Marines sent to recover the stranded airman after the bombing run. The reported civilian casualties havent stirred outrage in Benghazi, where residents are more concerned with the rebels tenuous advance and news of mass killings in western towns such as Misurata and Zintan. But Libyans affection for foreign air strikes depends on their success in routing Gaddafis troops and saving civilian lives. Another mistake like the F-15 rescue, especially if it leaves dead civilians, could reverse the goodwill seen when crowds cheered Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president, in Benghazis main square. Im not gonna hold the French flag and kiss it, said Libyan-American Yaseen Kadura, who returned to Benghazi in late February to stay with his extended family. Because I do know that these countries act in their own interest. But what is the alternative? According to an account given to Al Jazeera by a spokesman for US Africa Command who asked not to be identified by name, the pilot first made contact with the USS Kearsarge, an amphibious assault ship in the Mediterranean, at 11:50pm. After landing, he saw six trucks and men with dogs moving nearby. For the next hour, the pilot snuck southeast, trying to find a place to hide. Local men appeared to have seen the jet crash and were searching the area. They probably didnt know whether the plane belonged to Gaddafi or the coalition. Coalition planes circling above observed the scene but couldnt tell whether the men were friendly rebels or Gaddafis troops, the spokesman said. Right now, in hindsight, we probably think they were friendly, but its difficult to say that at one oclock in the morning, especially for a pilot whos had his airplane fall out from underneath him, he said. Neither the pilot nor the circling jets saw weapons in the group, but the pilot believed he had been spotted by the search party, now one kilometre away. At 12:50am, the pilot requested a show of force from the Kearsarge. Two Harrier ground-attack jets on board the ship took-off in response. Forty minutes later, they reached the pilot and dropped two GBU-12, laser-guided, 500-pound bombs into the brush around 500 metres from the unidentified men, halfway between them and the pilot. No one seemed to be injured in the blasts. The attack was meant as a deterrent and had no lethal intent, the US military spokesman said. Somewhere nearby, the weapons officer suffered a sprained knee in his parachute landing and never had the chance to hide. He was reportedly found immediately by friendly Libyans who greeted him warmly and took him to safety in Benghazi. Meanwhile, two Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft carrying a Marine search-and-rescue from the Kearsarge reached the pilot at 2:30am. According to residents who spoke with the Telegraph, Marines on board the Ospreys sprayed them with gunfire, injuring eight people. Hospital sources told British reporters who arrived on the scene the next day that one man might need his leg amputated. American officers have denied the account, saying no one opened fire. In a rescue scenario, the US spokesman said, the downed pilot typically gets the benefit of the doubt when asking for help, though the responding aircraft ultimately decides whether to fire. In Libya, with Western governments loathe to be seen as aggressors against another Muslim nation, the rules of engagement are reportedly tight. The pilots are under fairly stringent orders that if theres any doubt about the identity of the target, then they break off the attack, the spokesman said, adding, in blunt terms: Its not a free-for-all like Iraq. But in Libya, coalition forces often dont know what theyre looking at. Theres no way of knowing whats friendly territory or not, the spokesman said. Front lines change hour by hour, and the military doesnt receive that information immediately, nor are commanders 100 per cent certain where friendly forces are positioned, he said. The coalitions method of targeting Gaddafis troops seems comparatively unsophisticated, relying not on vehicle markings or on-the-ground intelligence sources but on simple behaviour, a sure sign of intent. First of all, they watch them for a while, they can see [the unit] and observe it, they can see where theyre going and coming from, they can watch tanks if they turn north toward the fighting and fire toward what is known as a civilian target, [we] would attack them, the spokesman said. But its a pretty high burden of truth. In Iraq, US air forces used radio technology to identify whether vehicles were friendly, but in Libya discerning opposing sides is extremely difficult, said David Hartwell, a UK-based Middle East security specialist for Janes Defence Weekly. The problem stems from a lack of education and a fluid battle with ill-defined front lines that leave pockets of opposition and loyalist forces scattered throughout the country, he said. Since the air campaign began only recently, its possible that crews dont fully understand the political attitudes on the ground in Libya. There perhaps hasnt been time for the education process, Hartwell told Al Jazeera. Clearly these pilots, these guys in these situations have to think on their feet, and to some extent youve got be a bit of a diplomat. The militarys default reaction to a downed pilot is to expect the worst and defer to the opinion of the man on the ground, he said, but since the UN resolution was specifically meant to protect Libyans from harm, there is a huge onus on avoiding civilian casualties. Ultimately, the life-or-death choice over the proper response lies in the hands of the responding pilot, improvising his reaction based on information provided by an anxious airman who doesnt speak Arabic and just ejected into unknown territory. Aljazeera