In the latest round of Track-II diplomacy, a group of senior opinion-makers from both countries, who met in Bangkok in the latest round of their efforts, have called for the two secretaries, who will meet on the sidelines of the SAARC meeting in Thimphu, to include Kashmir on the agenda of their talks. The Bangkok meeting included retired ambassadors, foreign secretaries, intelligence chiefs, army chiefs, academics, political leaders and strategic policy analysts. The immediate query that arises is why the Indians among these did not use their positions, while they were still in service, to have the Kashmir issue placed on the agenda of the talks. The question that arises about the Pakistani participants is whether they developed any sense, during the times they enjoyed the positions they did, of the obduracy of the Indians, especially with reference to placing the Kashmir issue on the agenda of any talks. India seems to have placed a true valuation on Track II, and does not mind the inclusion or otherwise of the Kashmir issue there, so long as it does not form part of the substantive talks. Track II diplomats must not forget that keeping the Kashmir issue off the table has been the sum total of Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan for decades. This has been despite the fact that India itself, under Pandit Nehru, has agreed that the people of Kashmir must be given the right of self-determination, which they would exercise through a UN-supervised plebiscite. Instead of using Track II diplomacy to push this eminently sensible solution, it would be better to concentrate energy on persuading the capitals of the world, through normal diplomatic means, to bring pressure on India to obey the solemn commitments it had itself made to the international community. The tendency of both countries to talk to the other only when they face American pressure should not be encouraged. Pakistan must be particularly cautious now that the USA has more or less come out in the open about its support to India, which it wishes to use as a counterweight to China in the region. It must be particularly wary of Track II diplomacy, as well as the CBMs which the Bangkok moot so strongly supported. Both Track II diplomacy and CBMs have been promoted strongly by the Americans, and not just as whims, but over the long haul. Peace in the region, on Indian terms, involving the continuation of the illegal occupation of Kashmir, is the American goal, and Pakistan must not supinely allow its legitimate interests to be thus thrown aside. The Kashmir issue deserves to be at the head of any Indo-Pak agenda, and does not depend on any track to be included.