The NRO and the NFC

The PPP government has not yet recovered from the Supreme Court judgement striking down the NRO, which not only affected the Cabinet of which ministers belonging to it and to a coalition partner, were affected, and the public demand for their resignations had not yet come to an end. However, that should not throw any doubt over the one real achievement of the present government, the success of the National Finance Commission in achieving an Award, which was signed on Wednesday, when it also received the Cabinet's approval. Even though the president himself is among those against whom the cases will once again restart because of the striking down of the NRO, his role in the success of the NFC must be acknowledged. Moreover, even though his role is now limited to that of notifying the award, just because he is under the shadow of the NRO should not prevent the award from coming into effect. Indeed, if he were to resign without issuing a notification, his successor's issuance of one would be as efficacious. However, the president, and thus Cabinet members, are not thinking at present of resignation, but of playing the old PPP card of victim's status, even though it has not been very successful before. Both the elections that the PPP contested, under Benazir Bhutto's leadership, on the plank of her unfair dismissal, in 1990 and 1993, were lost. The PPP then vehemently protested, and also claimed that it could not lose an election because it had the votes. This was a harking back to the ideology of the PPP under its founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, that the PPP was really the people's party, and the votes of all deprived groups would go to it and no other party. This claim may have had some validity in 1970, but only in West Pakistan, not East, and did not hold good for the 1977 elections, even though the PPP would probably have won even a fair election, or any election after that. This claim can be related to the PPP's claim of being a vanguard party, to which all belong. This is essentially a socialist idea, and the PPP was once a socialist party. However, under the pressure of its desire to draw close to the USA, it has abandoned socialist rhetoric in favour of populist, raising the idea that its socialism was borrowed, not heartfelt, certainly not by the class of people which constituted the leadership cadres of the PPP. However, one concept that remained was that the PPP was the party of the categories of people who somehow were deprived. Therefore, it seemed perfectly reasonable to base a campaign on what was essentially a PPP problem, that of the dismissal of a Benazir government on charges of corruption. It should be noted that these charges, at least to the extent of the dismissals, were both upheld by the Supreme Court. On both occasions, there was an attempt to play the Sindh card, with it being noted that Benazir was not the only Sindhi to have her government dismissed. The president, her widower, and so fare the only head of state from rural Sindh, is also girding himself to play the same card, even though it is not of very great relevance to the great mass of people, who have found that this government, like previous ones, both PPP and non-PPP, has not solved their problems. Within the context of the federation, the Sindh card is now less relevant than the Baloc-histan card, even though no one seems to be playing it. This is because the danger of Sindh leaving the federation was greatest when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged, but now the primary threat to the federation has been the Baloch separatism. This has been reflected in the NFC Award, but it has not been entirely tackled by it. Therefore, the president may well find that his attempt to play the Sindh card may well do no more than hold the PPP cadres together. However, it seems that the voter, while not yet extracting the full value of his vote, is left unimpressed by claims of victimisation, and is more interested in bread and butter issues. While the claims of conspiracy may impress the hardcore voter, they are less likely to impress the vast mass of voters on whom the PPP depends for its election victories. This posturing for the next election will leave out the NFC Award, which saw two major shifts. First, it saw the provinces get more revenue, and a larger share. Second, it saw the largest province agree to the smaller provinces' demands for a change in the basis of distribution among them, from population alone, to the weighing in of other factors. This has won the Punjab a measure of goodwill, although there is the danger that this will only last until the time comes around for the next award in 2014. The PPP has been intimately connected to the award ever since it had the 1973 constitution passed, even though it did not originate the mechanism, which is to be credited to the British, and which continues in India as well. However, post-1973, the PPP produced the first award, and its government's sacking in 1990 had the failure to appoint an NFC given as a reason. It failed to come up with an award when its next government was dismissed, and the caretaker government made an award. This is thus the first award made at the third attempt. By accepting all the smaller provinces' demands, the NFC may have merely shown that obduracy pays. Thus, the acceptance of the current set of demands may only serve to encourage further demands. However, there is also the lesson that all the provinces must have a demand on an issue for them to be accepted. Another possibility is to further the present demands, one example being the weightage of various factors. Another possibility is the revision downwards of the federal share. So far, the federal share, over the course of the awards since 1975, has declined from 80 percent to 42.5 percent. This is another point at which the provinces may make demands: for a further increase in their share, as they find that the extra money they are getting does not lift them out of poverty. However, the federal government, already poor, may find that its ability to fund core functions, like defence or communications, are compromised. The federal government must therefore look at other measures designed to keep the smaller provinces in the federation. It should put these measures in place now, if it wishes the federation to survive. Like all negotiations, the NFC Award is not a perfect solution. Indeed, apart from the money extracted from a poor people and shared out among their poor provinces, perhaps the most lasting, and most encouraging, lesson, has been that of a successful negotiation. However, in the midst of their NRO tribulations, the PPP's leaders need to consider measures to firm up the NFC's successes, rather than crow too loudly. After all, 2014 will bring something new. E-mail: maniazi@nation.com.pk

The writer is a veteran journalist and founding member as well as Executive Editor of The Nation.

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