Finally, Pakistan and the US have signed a memorandum of understanding on the transit of Nato supplies to Afghanistan, thus putting a formal end to the suspension of supplies. Although having application limited to the passage of goods and not touching on any other aspect of the engagement in the war on terror, the agreement in black and white also signals a break in the oral and covert arrangement that President Musharraf had struck about the Islamabad-Washington cooperation in the conduct of war. Described as a “landmark event” by Pakistan’s Defence Secretary Le-General (Retd) Asif Yasin Malik and US Chargé d’Affaires Richard Hoagland, the signing ceremony that took place at Islamabad on Tuesday may well prove to be a turning point in relationship between the two countries that has been marked by distrust, uncertainty and tension even before the Salala tragedy occurred.
But the turnaround in relations is contingent upon both the countries realising that the pursuit of their common objective of eliminating militancy does not make them blind to their own understandable self-interests and compulsions. And here lies the rub! Tuesday’s remark of US Ambassador-designate to Pakistan Richard Olson at the Senate hearing that his priority would be to push Islamabad to act against the Haqqani network, will reopen a debate about the different stratagems of both sides to neutralise the Haqqanis. While the US believes that they are the principal stumbling block to subduing the Afghan insurgency and must be dealt with militarily by the Pakistani army, Pakistan is convinced that those of the tribe making trouble for the allied troops must be negotiated with and bought to the table. It is also simplistic to focus entirely on the Haqqanis, by both Islamabad and Washington. Washington must pay heed to the cross border attacks which are becoming too frequent to be simple blips in security and Islamabad must be convincing in its bid to encourage the Haqqanis to negotiate. The impression that the Haqqanis being criticised, makes Pakistan nervous as though it itself was under scrutiny, must be dispelled. Building the prospects of India’s role in Afghanistan, at the cost of Pakistan’s genuine interests, is another sticking point to evolving a relationship of understanding and trust between the two nations. And over the years, several other points of contention – drones, the nuclear deal with India, for instance – have also emerged.
Here, it would be a real test for diplomacy to get over these problems. The US must appreciate, and hopefully DG ISI Lt-General Zaheerul Islam will make a clear case during his visit to Washington, that drones not only are counterproductive to the very purpose of the war on terror, but also hurt the sensitivities of the entire nation of Pakistan and had better be put an end to. The release of $1.1 billion CSF would not remove the opposition to drones. Even though the supply channel has been reopened, Islamabad must continue to strive for the acceptance of parliamentary conditions to lifting the blockade of goods.