ISLAMABAD - The document of National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-2018 putting a question mark on the capacity of existing national internal security apparatus (NISA) has revealed that country’s internal security is also facing threat of nuclear terrorism , besides other traditional and non-traditional threats.
The 94-page document says that range of internal security threats varies from street crimes to the nuclear terrorism . This threat of nuclear terrorism is addition to the possibility of use of chemical and biological substances by the terrorists described by the policy document. However, the policy document does not explain the kind and extent of threat of nuclear terrorism .
The document says that it is hard to draw lines among traditional threats like organised crime, kidnapping for ransom and non-traditional threats like terrorism , sectarianism, extremism, militancy and insurgency under Taliban and al-Qaeda networks. The NISP explains that Pakistan is a diverse country and the nature of the internal security environment also varies substantially from one part of the contrary to the other. Approach of the terrorists in the country had deepened on the comparative advantage available in the specific location of their operations. In Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan proximity of Afghanistan and presence of Taliban had made them ideal targets and abodes of terrorists.
The national security policy says that the urban areas in all the provinces of the country have been the focus of terrorists for the last many years. Analysis of Ministry of Interior and its National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) indicates that during 2010-2-13, terrorists largely targeted seven agencies of FATA; Karachi of Sindh; Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hangu and Swabi districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Quetta, Dera Bugti, Turbat and Kech districts of Balochistan with 2,820 terrorist incidents. This also defines the locus of terrorism in Pakistan.
In Balochistan, in addition to terrorism , another critical factor is limited influence of anti-state elements in Baloch majority districts, the document states. Amalgamating, sub-national movements with sectarian terrorism , people belonging to the Shiite Sect and the Punjab are targeted along with the security personnel.
The NISP says that Karachi is the locus of urbanised crime and political violence in Sindh and attracts the attentions being the economic hub of Pakistan. In the first eleven months of 2013, the death toll has risen to 2600 in Karachi, which means one person dies in every three hours due to violence in the metropolitan city.
The document explaining the capacity of the National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) of the country says that the total strength of 33 organisations in Pakistan, at provincial and federal level, dealing with internal security exceeds 600,000 and is more than standing army of Pakistan. However, approximately 56000 vacancies are still lying vacant in Police and Civil Armed Forces (CAFs). Pakistan is spending approximately Rs 155 billion on policing every year and this is seventy six percent increase since 2009.
According to the NISP , the Police Rules 1934 describe no ratio between number of police officers assigned for population in rural and urban areas. The situation on the ground in Pakistan is most favourable in ICT (Islamabad Capital Territory) with one policeman for every 114 citizens followed by Balochistan, 1:223; Gilgit-Baltistan, 1:234; KP, 1:411; Azad Jammu & Kashmir, AJK 1:467; Sindh, 1:504; and Punjab, 1:514. The situation is worse in Punjab followed by Sindh and KP. It says that in the 21st century this is not the only yardstick to determine the human resource requirements of a modern police department in Pakistan.
It has been admitted in the document that the armed forces have been successful in ‘clearing’ the captured territories by the terrorists however, the capacity of the forces beyond ‘clear’ remains a major question mark. The security apparatus has been unable to demonstrate other capabilities essential to successful counter-insurgency: hold, build and integrate, it says.
It says that various civil and military intelligence agencies have been working in the domain of internal security however; they don’t follow the same processes for intelligence management and sharing. By far, quality of military intelligence is superior to civilian agencies. There is no integrated mechanism for civil-military intelligence sharing on internal security threats.
The NISP describes that on the top of the internal security environment, the proverbial absence of a consolidated databank and poor analytical base makes the task even more difficult for policy development in any arena. . In the absence of an integrated internal security response, space between the terrorist and the terrorized is continuously shrinking besides fuelling special fault lines. The non-traditional threat , as a consequence, have also inspired insurgency of ethnic, political, economic and sectarian in nature, thus confronting the challenges of war by proxy, subversion and worsening law and order situations.
According to security policy, there is no forum for coordination between NIS operational and intelligence agencies in Pakistan and there has been a deficit at various levels: across provinces, within aw enforcement agencies and among intelligence agencies. Provincial coordination remains non-existent and even interrogation methods vary across each province. Information sharing and analysis remains weak area while some information does gets shared individually, there is no institutionalised mechanism at province or federal level.
Explaining the issue of financing in terrorism , it says that terrorism financing goes unchecked in Pakistan and certain purportedly charitable organizations are a nexus between organized crime and extremists. No major structure, or strategy, of the state exists to undertake this task. In the past, a critical failure has been the inability of the government to plug sources of financial support to the terrorists and extremists. These sources appear as a support system to some public welfare and disaster relief organisations used by extremists.