Assuming that the opinion polls consistently revealing Senator Barack Obama's lead in the presidential race are not overturned by the "known unknowns" - the factors that could give a surprise majority vote to a candidate otherwise rated as underdog - an attempt to outline the policy his administration is likely to adopt towards Pakistan would seem to be in order. The country's geographical position as well as ethnic and religious composition have made it a crucial force in Washington's efforts to hit a most elusive and, indeed, menacing target in its foreign policy domain: the elimination of terrorism and extremism for which the region, it believes, serves as the nursery. Hence, we find the election campaigns of both the contestants marked by frequent references to the (less than adequate) role Islamabad is playing in this difficult situation and what the US ought to be doing. Obama's initial utterances on the war on terror where Pakistan inevitably figured in had an aggressive tone and were a source of anxiety and alarm for its politically conscious people. Intrinsically, though, they did not suggest any significant deviation from the policy President Bush had been pursuing for the past three years, but the impression of insensitivity to Pakistan's sense of its sovereign right to deal with militants on its soil, which his open avowal of taking them out through military strikes had created, was quite disturbing. No doubt, the present US administration had off and on been targeting suspected hideouts in Pakistan's territory since its missiles struck Damadola in Bajaur in February 2006 for the first time and has lately stepped up the aerial attacks, but an assertive stance claiming America's prerogative to do so has not been so openly taken. His Republican rival John McCain's stand is not different in substance: only he would not make a public declaration of his plans to bomb the targets located in the territory under Pakistan's jurisdiction. But somehow, even when the other more realistic strands of his policy are taken into consideration, the apprehension of a rather strident US attitude towards Islamabad under the Obama presidency has not completely vanished from the minds of the public. This view is sustained by the common impression that 'Democrats are friends of India, while Republicans are of Pakistan'. Obama's policy when spelled out advocates a holistic approach to defeat the evil of militancy i.e., it underlines the imperative need for developing the tribal region in the economic and social fields. In fact, this aspect would have a significant place on his agenda along with armed action. Some time back, Obama co-sponsored with Joe Biden, now his running mate, the bill for economic aid (to be precise non-military assistance) to Pakistan amounting to $15 billion, tripling the present quantum of US aid to be used for building "schools, roads and clinics" and would be sustained for a decade: $1.5 billion a year. This policy fits in with Islamabad's traditional view of the need for a comprehensive strategy to meet the challenge of extremism and militancy and is now also being recognised by Washington's policymakers as well as military commanders on the ground. At the same time, we should not read too much into his statement, "we should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focussed not on India, but on...militants (in the west)." Obama would at best be somewhat proactive but to imagine that he would pressure New Delhi to settle the issue that takes into account the aspirations of the people of the state would not be logical from the standpoint of US national interests. The power equation in the sub-continent and the US growing economic stakes in India would not admit of that. Obama's efforts to convince Islamabad that terrorism poses greater threat than India, therefore, hardly have much scope for success. The Kashmir dispute generates other issues no less harmful to Pakistan like the blockage of water in the upstream and that on the contrary reinforces the threat perception. Nevertheless, the likelihood of the overall US policy towards Pakistan and the region taking a somewhat different turn cannot be ruled out because of the experiences of Obama and his personality. Having seen bad times, done dedicated service to the downtrodden in younger days, talked feelingly for the sufferings of the poor in his writings, argued his case so rationally before the electorate, forcefully expressed the need for an end to Bush's mindless unilateralism that even the superpower could not sustain for long and advocated a policy based on principles, he inspires the hope that once in the saddle, he would have a different view not only of Pakistan's call for respecting its sovereignty but also the war on terror as a whole. The economic straits to which the hawkish policies of President Bush have led the country cannot be tackled successfully with the continuation of the present posture. A mere shift of focus from Iraq to Afghanistan would not solve the problem in all its manifestations. During his two-year long countrywide exposure, Obama has established the reputation of being a leader guided by a cool-headed approach, analysing the consequences of his moves. One should expect he would rethink the policy towards its key ally and realise the repercussions of violations of its territorial sovereignty. No doubt, he is not the only centre of decision-making in the US, but with his strong personality, he foreshadows playing a pivotal role. The air raids inside Pakistan hurt its pride, create increased insecurity and cannot but dent its resolve to keep the fight on. These realities rather than serving the American interests does them harm. Winning the war on terror, Barack Obama must have understood, calls for reviewing US policies. Apart from firming up the military strength in Afghanistan, he seems to have become conscious of the absolute necessity of socio-economic uplift in the entire region. E-mail: mqkay@yahoo.co.uk