WASHINGTON (AFP) - US President George W Bush glossed over differences but generally reflected US intelligence findings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in making the case for a US invasion in 2003, a congressional probe concluded Thursday. But the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation found that separate claims by Bush and others that there was a nexus between Al-Qaeda, Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction were not backed up by intelligence. "In the push to rally public support for the invasion of Iraq, administration officials often failed to accurately portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected about Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security," said Senator John Rockefeller, the Committee Chairman. The Committee released the last two instalments of a politically contentious, long-running investigation into the pre-war intelligence on Iraq, which the invasion exposed as almost entirely wrong about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. One report examined the workings of a controversial Pentagon policy group accused of cherry-picking intelligence. The other compared public statements made in the run-up to the war by Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and other top officials, to the intelligence available at the time. The administration's key rationale for the war was that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, was reviving its nuclear program, and was prepared to give terrorist groups weapons of mass destruction for attacks on the United States. The probe concluded that statements about a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons programme were "generally substantiated by the intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreement that existed in the intelligence community." The administration had cited Iraq's acquisition of aluminium tubes as evidence of a nuclear programme, even though two US agencies thought the tubes were for conventional rocket programs and unsuited for centrifuges. On Iraq's links to terrorism, the report said Bush and then Secretary of State Colin Powell's claims that Iraq and Al-Qaeda had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided Al-Qaeda with weapons training, "were not substantiated by the intelligence." "Statements by the president and the vice-president indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by the available intelligence information," the report said. The probe found that US intelligence had not confirmed claims that September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001. It said the intelligence did back administration statements about "contacts" between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. "However, policymakers' statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of Al-Qaeda," the report said. On the administration's rosy predictions that US troops would be greeted as liberators, the probe found that pre-war statements by Bush and Cheney "did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products." In other findings, the report concluded: - Bush and Cheney's statements about Iraq's chemical weapons production before a October 2002 intelligence assessment "did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing;" - Then Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's claim that Iraq had underground WMD facilities that were invulnerable to conventional airstrikes "was not substantiated by available intelligence information;" - Assertions that Iraq was developing unmanned aircraft to deliver chemical or biological warheads were generally supported by the intelligence "but did not convey the substantial disagreements or evolving views ... in the intelligence community."