No significant activity occurred in the North Arabian Sea on the initial day of the 1965 war. Except for a botched attempt and few scattered bombs dropped along Pakistan’s Makran coast, the first raid by the Indian Air Force on Karachi made no impact. In the meantime, intelligence estimates by Pakistan navy indicated the disposition of Indian naval armada. The Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and cruiser INS Delhi were reckoned to be in Bombay harbour, two frigates at Calcutta and cruiser INS Mysore off the Indian East coast heading south on way to reinforce the Indian Fleet along the Western coast. Some smaller Indian naval escorts were also evaluated to be dispersed along the East and West coast of India. In terms of numerical strength while Pakistan navy had one cruiser, one submarine and seven destroyers, Indian navy outnumbered it by one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and nineteen destroyer/frigates. Be that as it may, the impression drawn at the time was that Indian navy was not ready for a full scale war. The war emphatically proved this impression.
On the morning of the 7th September Pakistan navy decided that time is favourable to conduct a major operation along the west coast of India. An operation codenamed ‘Somnath’ that aimed to target port of Dwarka on the Kutch coast was accordingly planned. This port had an airborne early warning radar station. It also housed a bomber guidance beacon that beamed on Karachi and was used by the Indian Air Force to direct bombers. An additional reason in selecting Dwarka for pounding was to draw out the Indian naval forces especially, large combatants like INS Vikrant and cruiser INS Mysore which could thus fall prey to the fearsome predator, PN submarine Ghazi, by then patrolling off Bombay. As luck would have it, PAF carried out a strike on the neighboring Indian airbase at Jamnagar on the 6th of September. From all accounts the raid by PAF was a success and as such not much enemy air activity was anticipated during operation ‘Somanth’.
At 0024 hours past midnight on September 8, a formation of six Pakistan navy destroyers accompanied by cruiser PNS Babur unleashed their deadly arsenal on the pre-selected target roughly 6 miles from the Indian coast. Each ship spewed 50 rounds of ammunition from its main guns to reduce the target to rubble. By 0028 (within four minutes) the operation was over without the slightest resistance. Owing to the swiftness and professional manner in which it was executed, operation ‘Somnath’ became a trend setter- a precedent which continues to inspire the newer generation of Pakistan navy officers to this day. In the subsequent days and till the termination of the war, Pakistan navy held an uncontested supremacy in the North Arabian Sea with Indian navy nowhere in sight. Following ceasefire, the then President of Pakistan commended Pakistan navy in the following words: “Pakistan navy has played a tremendous role in keeping the much larger navy of the enemy away from our shores”.
Why did such a formidable Indian navy with an overwhelming numerical superiority failed so embarrassingly? The answer is provided by a prominent scholar and associate Professor Harsh V. Pant of the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London in one of his works. “Despite a general understanding among Indian political elites that it was the littoral dominance by the European powers that led to their colonial ascendancy in the Indian heartland, the focus on land frontiers led to the dominance of the Indian Army in the national security discourse. Until the end of the Cold War, the maritime dimension of India’s security did not figure adequately in the national consciousness. Indian policy makers did not perceive the advantage of building up the nation’s maritime sinews as the country remained concerned with the north and north western frontiers after partition rather than with her sea frontiers”.
Fifty one years later, Indian navy’s original local sea control and shore defence orientation, which largely focused on preserving the integrity of Indian coastal waters from regional threats, has given way to an ambitious naval posture.
Indian navy is currently the eight largest in the world operating under three different commands. It has a fleet of around 136 major naval combatants. New Delhi aims to increase the existing numbers of warships to 200 within next decade with three aircraft carriers, one each for the three naval commands. This future fleet power will be backed by number of nuclear submarines as well as large amphibious assault ships.
India has also acquired a large tract of land in strategically important Indian Ocean Island of Seychelles. The land is meant to construct a surveillance and naval base. The base will have network of radars and other surveillance equipment. Indian navy’s newly acquired custom manufactured Boeing P8I Poseidon, a variant of US Navy modern P8A Maritime Surveillance Aircraft equipped with cutting edge technology is also likely to operate from here. Located astride some of the world’s most critical sea lines of communications, the base at Seychelles will facilitate India to monitor large swathes of ocean expanse in the western Indian Ocean. It will simultaneously provide operational flexibility to Indian navy. It is worth noting that India is the only country to which United States has sold P8Is. These surveillance aircraft are the foundation of ongoing US naval operations in the South China Sea.
Most recently, India test fired 3,500 Km Arihant based submarine launched ballistic missile, K-4. Once armed, the fleet of Indian nuclear submarines will soon be able to cover entire Pakistan with their ballistic missiles fired from either the eastern or western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s Shaheen III with a range of roughly 2,700 Km cannot reach India’s south. The Indian multi-layered ballistic missile defence shield further compounds the strategic differential between two sides. The strategic balance of power in the Indian Ocean now heavily favours India.
For Pakistan, the answer to the increasing deterrence gap rests in a submerged platform at sea duly armed with ballistic or a cruise missile that could reach India’s key industrial centres or strike in the enemy’s south. In addition, given the projected rise in maritime trade through a fully functional port of Gwadar under CPEC, Pakistan navy’s conventional capability needs to be reinforced. The navy’s current 11-12 percent apportionment from defence share requires a wholesale review. The current inventory of PN surface ships includes four Chinese F-22 P frigates, a collection of four outmoded former Royal navy Type 21 destroyers and one 30 year old US frigate that was stripped of weaponry before being sold to PN some three years back. Though a contract of Chinese submarines was recently signed, two critical issues must be kept in perspective. The impact that CPEC and fully functional Gwadar port may have on future operational needs of Pakistan navy and Indian navy’s phenomenal expansion and strategic alliance with the US Navy. A Logistic Sharing Agreement (LSA) between US and India was also signed during last week of August this year. LSA will allow each side to use each other’s land, air and naval bases for repair, maintenance and resupplies and thus execute joint operations in seamless manner.
While most of Asia is veering towards sea, Pakistan lags behind. Our real “strategic depth”, it must be appreciated, resides in the western Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s revised deterrence policy of “Minimum Credible Deterrence” inclusive of “Full Spectrum Deterrence” will remain incomplete so long as we do not have an answer to the ever widening gap in the Indian Ocean strategic stability. With CPEC now becoming a reality, Pakistan must consider an accord with Beijing similar to US-India LSA. Pakistan Navy’s Jinnah Naval Base should become bedrock of such an accord. PN-PLAN must respond to US-Indian advancing power politics in the western Indian Ocean. The writer is a regular contributor for national dailies. He writes on national security and Indian Ocean related issues.