The announcement of the death of Taliban chief Mullah Omar two years ago coincided both with the killing in a police encounter of Malik Muhammad Ishaq, the leading spirit behind the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and eight companions. It was almost as if rivals of the ISIL were being eliminated. That impression was reinforced by the announcement, again belated, of the death of Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder of the Haqqani network. At the same time, it was almost as if the ISI was being deprived of some of its most precious assets, if one accepts that all three were actually controlled by the ISI.
At first glance, the death of Malik Ishaq, a notorious sectarian activist, accused of murdering hundreds of Shia, would appear a potential loss to ISIL, which has made a reputation for a virulent brand of sectarianism, being accused to killing not just non-Muslims but also Shias. However, his very sectarianism, when combined with his refraining from any endorsement of ISIL, would have been debilitating for it. It should be noted that those components of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan which have switched allegiance to ISIL have generally been strongly sectarian. ISIL’s first operation in Pakistan was a sectarian attack on Ismailis in Karachi. Not having Malik Ishaq on board meant a loss in credibility in sectarian circles.
The death of Mullah Omar also tends to strengthen ISIL. Mullah Omar was one of the possible claimants to the Caliphate now claimed by ISIL chief Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Mullah Omar, in his heyday, never claimed the Caliphate. Indeed, when Chechen Islamists offered to give him the bai’a (allegiance) as Caliph, he said that he had an independent Emirate of his own, but he was not a Caliph, and recommended that they establish an independent Emirate of their own. When he lost power, he began to countenance use of the term Amirul Momineen as a title. While the title is traditionally only used by Caliphs, he was also careful to claim only to head an Emirate.
While this was in line with Afghan tradition, where the title of Amir was used for the ruler until the 19th century, without owing any allegiance or obtaining the appointment from the Caliph, who was in Istanbul, it created theological difficulties. The word ‘Amir’ means commander, and was to be applied to any commander. There was only one Commander of the Believers, as all other commanders were subordinate to him. Therefore, anyone calling himself the Amir of Afghanistan would face the entirely valid question “whose Amir?” In short, who was the Caliph who had appointed him? ISIL would require Mullah Omar to offer allegiance to Al-Baghdadi for legitimization as his Amir in Afghanistan.
Indeed, that will be a challenge that will be faced by his successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour. ISIL has already made some progress in Afghanistan, and the question of Mullah Mansour’s bona fides is likely to be raised by ISIL. It is noteworthy that Al-Baghdadi solved a similar dilemma, which he faced when merely head of ISIL, which is still a militant outfit.
The more immediate challenge is whether the Taliban will resume the talks with the Afghan government. The indications are that the Ghani government would like to oil out of the talks. It was the Afghan government, which revealed the death of Mullah Omar, after all, which provided it a chance to postpone the talks. The talks now depend on whether the Afghan government wants to continue with them.
The centrality of particular personalities cannot be denied. The delay in the announcement of the deaths of Mullah Omer and Maulana Haqqani was a reminder of earlier episodes in Islamic history, when the deaths of local rulers were concealed. The concealment was by wives, but the men who had died were also military commanders. The tradition of hereditary succession cropped up among the Taliban, where there was a move to make Mullah Umar’s son Mullah Yaqub his successor, and the family had not given the oath of allegiance to Mullah Mansour. Whereas it was not accepted by the Taliban, the Haqqani Network stuck to it. Maulana Haqqani had already handed over operational control to his son Sirajuddin. As a move to consolidate the links of the Haqqani Network to the Taliban, and to obtain Taliban backing for the Maulana’s succession plan, Sirajuddin became one of the deputies of the new Taliban chief. The Network persists in claiming that the Maulana is alive.
If he is, that would be good news for the ISI, for he was one of its most valuable assets during and after the Afghan jihad. Malik Ishaq was also an asset, for it was the sectarian parties which supplied the ISI with fighters for Kashmir, trained in camps in Afghanistan under Mullah Omar. However, while Haqqani was a prime Pakistani asset, he also drew the wrath of the USA, which suspected that support for the Network indicated an animus against the USA.
The ISI might see itself deprived of valuable assets, but there is a parallel track of obtaining access within ISIL. It is through sectarian forces, which have switched from the TTP to ISIL, that the ISI’s chances are brightest. While the ISI is cooperating with the CIA in the War on Terror, its value to the CIA will continue past it if it manages to obtain a foothold.
Malik Ishaq may well serve as evidence of the adage that those who live by the sword die by the sword, and it is also true that he obtained martyrdom according to his own belief system, something which was denied to Mullah Omar and Haqqani, who died peacefully in bed after having been mujahideen, first against the USSR and then against the USA. In that they differed from Usama Bin Laden, whose killing by a US Navy Seal team gave him martyrdom, but which was also shrouded in mystery. The Taliban had admired Al-Qaeda, and now Mullah Mansour can learn from Dr Ayman Az-Zawahiri about the do’s and don’ts of succeeding a famous founder. Now doubts have been expressed about Dr Al-Zawahiri’s survival.
It is interesting that Malik Ishaq was killed by the police of a US ally, at the time Iran, which is seen by Shias outside its borders as a protector, should have done a deal on nuclear weapons with the USA. It seems too much of a coincidence that prominent Afghan figures would have deaths revealed after prolonged concealment so soon after the US drawdown in Afghanistan. So many questions remain unanswered. Yet it is worth noting that after the killing of Osama, which allowed the USA to claim it had taken revenge for 9/11, Mullah Omar and Maulana Haqqani did not allow it that rather puerile satisfaction, while the gunning down of Malik Ishaq left us all to wrestle with the question of whether human justice can cope with the kind of mass murder he was accused of. Killing a single person is like killing all Mankind, according to the Quran, and that applies also to unproven killers. Only the Almighty can vary punishment according to the number of murders. Men can only take one life in exchange for a thousand.