Election arena is barely lukewarm in Afghanistan. Nearly 40 candidates are in the run for the presidential slot. However, indicators point towards a comfortable victory for the incumbent president. If so, the post-elections dispensation would carry the burden of incumbency and, as a corollary, continuity is expected to prevail. Hence no radical shift is expected, at least, in immediate timeframe. Nevertheless, there could be incremental readjustments and realignments to reinforce the implementation of an overall grand strategy of occupation forces, either to facilitate their exit, if they so choose; or to perpetuate their stay through periodic formal requests for extending their tenure by the post-elections Afghan government. As a natural outcome of continuity, there is neither a likelihood of worthwhile enhancement in the credibility of the post-election government nor of a significant expansion in its sphere of influence, unless it transforms itself into a broad-based dispensation. Requisite expansion of base would involve intricate intra-Afghan dialogue. However, in the backdrop of ongoing spate of extremism and terrorism, this may be a wearisome task. Some spadework is presumably underway in this regard. However, due to negative political baggage, not many elements were expected to outrightly endorse the electoral process, prior to elections. Some moderate Taliban groups may, however, opt to support the post-elections government. Another option could be replication of Iraqi model, whereby, sympathetic or say marginalised minorities may be co-opted as petty beneficiaries and accommodated in the form of junior partners in the government. Superimposition of Iraqi model over Afghanistan, per se, would have its limitations. It worked in Iraq on the basis of sectarian affiliations whereas in Afghanistan, the dominant factor is ethnicity. In Iraq majority sect has been marginalised, presumably for the time being. However, a similar attempt to marginalise majority ethnic group (Pushtuns) in Afghanistan would, in all probability, backfire. Iraq's majority sect may be waiting for an opportune time to react; Afghanistan's majority ethnic group is likely to react to such marginalisation, spontaneously and fiercely. This would also have serious repercussions in Pakistan's Pushtun belt. Alternatively, the methodology could be an across the board absorption of moderate Taliban into elected dispensation through negotiations and deal making, cutting across prevalent ethnic and sectarian divides. This would create fissures amongst the existing groups of Taliban and new alignments would come up. Some out of each entity would support or may be joining the new government; others could further harden their stance. Some current allies of the Afghan government may even part ways; and over a period of time, a new confederation of hardened anti-government elements could emerge. At the end of the day, there may not be a significant shift in the overall tally of pro- and anti- government elements. By tacitly sponsoring the incumbent president for his re-election, Americans are likely to end up carrying the onus of endorsing all shortcomings of the present regime, yet for another term. This indicates that they are preparing for a voyage into a close-ended tunnel, with limited options. Foreign forces may stay on, and keep striving to maintain the occupation, albeit with a bleeding nose, for an indefinite time. If elections bring calm in Afghanistan, it would radiate its effects into Pakistan as well. Majority of Afghan refugees would return to their homes and there would be a substantial reduction in the occurrences of violence in Pakistan. Work could start on setting up of ROZs, which would enable economic rehabilitation of those who joined extremist gangs out of economic difficulties, and are willing to break away for exchange of a reasonable socio-economic compensation package. Rehabilitation of such moderate elements would marginalise the hardened cells which could be tackled by force, and defeated. This would provide viable options to the occupation forces for a face saving exit strategy. Region is expected to stay turbulent till the time exodus of extremists from Afghanistan to Pakistan is stopped, India is restrained from interfering into Pakistan's internal matters through her multitude of consulates set-up for this purpose, and the occupation forces give a withdrawal timeframe. With broad-based government in place in Afghanistan, Indian influence may decline. Iranian backing of the post-elections peace process in Afghanistan would generate tremendous synergy, essential for the success of any such initiative. Moreover, in the regional context, there would be a forward movement in the domain of transit trade agreements. Progress is likely to be on quid pro quo basis. Afghanistan is expected to demand enhanced access to and from India, in exchange for Pakistan getting an opening towards Central Asian Republics. Afghan-India transit trade through Pakistan could have fallout in the form of turning Pakistan as a dumping backyard of low quality Indian goods. Due to these complexities, negotiations for transit trade modules are expected to be pretty slow and tiresome. Post-elections mission accomplishment would, indeed, remain conditional upon winning of Afghan hearts by the new government. Acceptance of elections and owning of its results by the people of Afghanistan would be a benchmark for the viability of new government, and its ability to achieve the objective of good governance. In this context, attempts for quick fixes through puppet management are not expected to succeed. Therefore, after the elections, fast track intra-Afghan negotiations should be the starting point, with military option going in the background. All moderate and non-committed elements should be invited to join the post-elections' dispensation, and hence own it. Only a strong government, that is, a broad-based dispensation, represented by all significant elements of the Afghan society, would be able to govern effectively and accrue a withdrawal timeframe from the occupation forces. Afghans as a nation are becoming increasingly weary of foreign occupation. Political freedom and restoration of Afghan sovereignty to its legitimate owners is the need of the hour. Afghans have lost almost a generation while struggling against foreign occupations, they definitely deserve enduring calm The writer is a retired air officer of the PAF. E-mail: khalid3408@gmail.com