Efforts to curb the spread of nuclear material and technology began soon after the invention of the nuclear bomb. However, these efforts only began after five states including the United States, the United Kingdom, the ex-USSR, France, and China carried out their nuclear tests and became recognized states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signed in July 1967, the NPT is the first major step which aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without impeding peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Over the years, states have agreed and proposed initiatives to stem the spread of nuclear weapons technology. However, the challenge lies in the fact that states tend to support or negotiate treaties only when they align with their interests, often at the expense of broader regional and global peace and stability. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is one such proposed initiative.
The FMCT is a proposed treaty which seeks to address the increasing concerns over nuclear proliferation and control fissile materials which are the key components of nuclear weapons. The FMCT aims to place new restrictions on the recognized nuclear weapon states and on the four states that are not members of the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). Recurrently, it started with the UN resolution 78/57 L, passed unanimously in 1993, calling for a “non-discriminatory, multi-lateral and internationally and effectively verifiable” treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In 1995, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva established a committee to discuss the FMCT. In 2000, during the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties agreed to begin negotiations to complete an FMCT within five years. However, progress has remained stalled due to disagreements over verification and parallel negotiations on outer space arms control. The treaty is subject to debate and faces serious challenges. One of the most critical issues is addressing the existing stockpile of fissile materials; without which, the FMCT cannot achieve its principal goal. The treaty fails to ensure that there is no discrimination among nuclear-armed states.
Discriminatory and ineffective practices raise concerns about the integrity of global non-proliferation efforts, as they can create disparities that undermine the objectives of global security and stability. Over the years, the NPT, which serves as a cornerstone of global non-proliferation, has experienced upheavals mainly due to the geopolitical interests of a few states. Notably, the AUKUS security pact has been the subject of debate and criticism and is one such example which dents the non-proliferation efforts. One more case is the discriminatory policies of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which provides fissile material to India. India, despite being outside the NPT, benefits from the waiver provided by the US. These violations highlight the challenges inherent in enforcing compliance and the need for robust verification mechanisms in any new treaty.
Curtailing the production of new fissile material and ignoring the existing stockpile would exacerbate security concerns by creating strategic imbalances and intensifying threat perceptions as countries with larger stockpiles would seek strategic advantages, potentially undermining the goal of promoting disarmament. States that feel threatened by these imbalances would not engage or support such disarmament initiatives, fearing that their security is compromised. Notably, Pakistan has been the strongest advocate for requiring an agreement to include existing stocks in any fissile materials treaty as a prerequisite for commencing formal negotiations on an FMCT. Certainly, it is a manifestation of Pakistan`s concerns emanating from India`s much larger stockpile of weapon-grade nuclear material which the country is receiving through a nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. Under the agreement, India is importing fissile material for energy purposes, thereby freeing up fissile material produced indigenously to potentially use for military purposes.
To sum up, a comprehensive and unbiased approach is needed to promote global non-proliferation goals. Without addressing the asymmetries, any initiative would create an environment of mistrust and uncertainty, eventually failing to ensure global security. Any self-serving approach undermines collective efforts to achieve disarmament as it leads to strategic imbalances and intensifies existing tensions and rivalries, ultimately hindering meaningful progress toward global security. The international community should prioritize resolving long-standing territorial disputes, prevent arms races, and promote nuclear restraint. Finally, only through sincere and non-discriminatory efforts the goal of global security and stability can be achieved.
Sher Ali Kakar
The writer is working as an Acting Associate Director in Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta.