n Dr. Suhrab Aslam Khan The September 11, 2001, terrorist incidents in the US exercised a shocking influence across the world, and the question of evidence related to the incidents was inevitably to erupt. The critical aspects relevant to the evidence were its judicial standard in contrast to its political appraisal. In addition, the apportioning of responsibility connected with the terrorist attacks was an international concern as it was related to the implementation of then current as well as past UN resolutions. The issue of evidence in the attacks also involved a particular provision of the NATO treaty, whether the attacks arose from locations external to the US, or those materialised merely from within the US territorial confines, as it was only in the former case that the NATO treaty could be put into force. In brief, the requirement of an evidentiary support for corroboration of allegations made by the US, that is, assigning responsibility for the terrorist attacks to Al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan, demanded a judicial evaluation conducted within an international framework. Because such a framework alone would have accommodated the representation of the UN, NATO, OIC, Afghanistan and, of course, the US. The representation of the UN was required due to its various adopted resolutions on terrorism, and that of the OIC as the hijackers - and, as a critical distinction, whether the attacks - originated from different Muslim states. In contrast, the US adopted a course concerning the evidence in diametric contrariness to the obvious requirements outlined above. The US gathered the evidence unilaterally, and additionally presented the so finalised evidence to the individual countries preceding its invasion of Afghanistan. Amazingly, Islamabad accepted the evidence, whereas the same evidentiary material presented to Beijing afterwards was declined due to the reason that the evidence should bear an independent judicial authentication. In other words, the legal evidence gathered and relied upon by the US concerning the terrorist attacks during 9/11 remained anecdotal and presumptive, rather than authentic, lacking international judicial calibre. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have been universally censured. However, subsequent to these attacks and US invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, every single European state harbours an Al-Qaeda cell. It is interesting to note, prior to the US invasion no report of Al-Qaeda cell in Europe is available except, of course, in Hamburg, Germany, where the September attacks on the US were planned. The launching of 9/11 attacks, however, was done from the US soil itself by hijacking the commercial aircrafts. The two major contributory factors that have been instrumental in the proliferation of Al-Qaeda cells - and heightened incidents of terrorism in Europe and other parts of the world as well - are these: First, the safe escaping of Al-Qaeda leadership, and Osama bin Laden (OBL) included, from Tora Bora during the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. This was despite the unstinted collaboration of President Musharraf from Pakistan. Second, the US decision along with its NATO allies to extend the invasion of Afghanistan into its foreign military occupation. A purge of radical Islamist scholars was undertaken by the Saudi Arabian government. It followed the emergence of the Iranian Revolution in early 1979 and seizure of the Grand Mosque at Makkah in November. An influential Palestinian scholar and theologian, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, was expelled from the faculty of a university in Jeddah. In the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Azzam relocated to Pakistan. During 1981, OBL, a disciple of Azzam, also proceeded to Pakistan, to participate in the jihad on the recommendations of his former teacher. Azzam made influential ideational contributions towards the building of the jihadi movement in Afghanistan. The belief he promoted, that one hour of jihad is worth more than 70 years of praying at home, had its significant impact. In association with his other ideas, this belief was instrumental in the organisation of global jihad. Al-Qaeda was formally inaugurated on August 11, 1988, in a meeting attended by OBL, Azzam and Al-Zawahiri among others. The fundamental motif of the organisation was set, namely, devotion to strive on behalf of the oppressed Muslims worldwide. The divergence in viewpoints arose related to the global struggle against the far enemy as believed by Azzam and near enemy as upheld by some other Al-Qaeda operatives, including Al-Zawahiri. These two self-suggestive phrases, strategically significant, enacted a critical role in imparting future direction to the organisation. The operational programme of the organisation comprise these two approaches. The concept of takfir is central to the operative idea of near enemy as defined in theological terms and adhered to by the organisation. The concept refers to apostate Muslims - that is, those who abandon observational form of faith, cause, principles, etc. The acts of public violence, or terrorism, find sustenance in the programmes of the organisation on the grounds of the noted concept. The term terrorism is to be understood. It is a weapon of the excessively weak in means and willing to defend its rights, against the disproportionately strong in resources as an oppressor. The concept of takfir is in need of its creative reinterpretation so as to: i reduce its potential of causing fitna - that is, inducing discontent and schisms against the established hierarchy of faith or rule - and disunity among Muslim community; i and allow Al-Qaeda to improve upon its reputation and efficiency, or the avoidance of collateral damage. In the aftermath of OBLs extinction, the outcome of these outlined measures is anticipated. This is in spite of the fact that Osamas movements and contacts during the preceding several years were excessively circumscribed, and the recent US action to transform him into a martyr as an unintended consequence raises substantial questions. It is, more so, given the agenda of Al-Qaeda against Muslim oppression and exploitation, a non-violent conflict resolution that is needed, especially from the US side, which is deemed to be the causative factor. The additional implications of Osamas extinction for Pakistan are even more substantial. A matter that should kindle and flare the imagination of all, a firefight - along with the crash of a American helicopter - that continued for 40 long minutes during the US action against Osamas abode, failed to invite the security apparatus of the Pakistani state, despite the prominent location and most sensitive locality of action. The explanation of such an outcome is facilitated by the recollection of two more outstanding events in the history of Pakistan. In the aftermath of the assassination of Ms Benzair Bhutto on December 27, 2007, for three consecutive days chaos ruled over Karachi and some parts of interior Sindh. It is a matter of record that despite the grotesque mayhem there, the state security apparatus did not respond. Before this, and the most eventful occurrence in the history of Pakistan, is the dismemberment of former East Pakistan. The famous Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report contains a startling observation: Despite all the capabilities and necessary means available to the Pakistani military contingents in the eastern region to continue the war, the defence was abandoned Now a martial race that the Pakistanis are, for it to so abandon the pursuit of military challenge is a paradox that continues to beg the explanation, unless a metaphysical dimension is invoked. In the correct answer to this dilemma in Pakistan resides the future well being of the nation. And a quest to find the right solution to this sinister riddle is to be deemed as the most pronounced implication of Osamas extinction for Pakistan. n The writer is Chairman of the Pakistan Ideological Forum.