The resource curse, a global phenomenon, seemingly impacts instability in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. There is a history of military operations by the Pakistani State in its resource-rich yet impoverished province of Balochistan.
All these grand-scale military operations starting from the 1970s failed to achieve the desired results and further alienated the Baloch people. The insecurities of the Baloch people arising out of their lack of confidence in the State allowed Pakistan’s arch-rival India to capitalise and exploit the situation.
The Pakistani State blames the Baloch sardars, who used state resources and military operations to settle their own tribal rivalries. This in turn led to serious misgivings between the State and the Baloch population.
It is true that the tribal sardars did use their position within governments to extract personal benefits and settle scores. They all took their turns in power and manipulated the State in their own respective ways, however the ultimate price was paid by the civilians. State officials are also to be blamed for involving themselves in corruption, earning fortunes from the lucrative smuggling routes and illegal trading of the mineral resources.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with its multibillion-dollar investment, particularly in Balochistan, came with a multitude of opportunities as well as challenges for the Pakistani State. On one hand it brought in much-needed foreign investment but on the other, it made Pakistan the centrestage of a superpower rivalry once again.
CPEC is designed in and around the province of Balochistan and its port of Gwadar. It’s in the interest of both India and the US to sabotage the project and Balochistan is the primary target of their clandestine operations. The recruitment of Baloch insurgents is quite easy, with the jobless youth of the province brainwashed with insurgent propaganda which is easily accepted due to the circumstances mentioned earlier.
The recently killed and captured Baloch insurgents had expensive advanced American armaments and equipment. The Indian media also openly supports terrorism in Balochistan. This only proves the Pakistani State’s claim of Indian sponsorship of the insurgents.
High-ranking Indian intelligence officer Commander Kulbushan Jhadav, in Pakistani custody, is also living proof of the Indian involvement, which cannot be possible without their so-called strategic partner the US, even though the US has proscribed the major Baloch insurgent outfit as a terrorist organisation. The dirty work is assumed to be left for the Indian intelligence agencies who have cultivated sources in Afghanistan, in a decade long presence there, alongside US/NATO forces.
Iran is also in competition with the port of Gwadar because of its port at Chabahar. Indian intelligence agencies have been found to be operating out of Chabahar, which was the base of Commander Kulbushan Jhadav before being caught.
He openly confessed to his crimes as part of his job for the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). On the other side, the Taliban are also not cooperating with Pakistan in culling down the Indian sources operating out of Afghanistan against Pakistan.
Afghanistan has never really taken this task seriously in the past or now. Syed Ali Zia, in his recent piece published by the Atlantic Council on February 3, 2022, raised concerns about this unfortunate conundrum in the following words:
“While Islamabad remains committed to helping its troubled neighbour navigate its problems, Kabul, under the Taliban, appears to be unwilling and noncommittal when it comes to addressing the former’s core security concerns. Not only have Taliban commanders vociferously objected to fencing the Pak-Afghan border, but they have also physically tried to stop the Pakistan Army from working on the project.”
It must be added that the Taliban officials claimed it to be a misunderstanding and there remains the unresolved critical issue of the divided tribes on either side of Pak-Afghan border for the project to go forward. But in the case of the Indian sponsored mercenaries operating out of Afghanistan, the Taliban have no excuse but are still unable to cooperate.
The demands of a large-scale military operation in Balochistan is like reinventing the wheel which failed to take us to the desired destination in the first place. PM Z A Bhutto and later Gen Pervez Musharraf both tried that and failed at it, while promoting a sense of deprivation among the Baloch people. A large-scale military operation will only play at the hands of the enemies of Pakistan as propaganda material.
Pakistani security forces championed the art of counterinsurgency over the last couple of decades and are now teaching the same to foreign armies—smartly planned intelligence-based operations (IBOs), driven by the latest technology and coupled with the deployment of special forces. As well as these operations, the local community-based development projects brought necessities of life to the people at their doorstep. This is how Pakistan won the ‘war within’ in the North-West. The same time-tested approach is the need of the hour for Balochistan.
An extensive dialogue with the locals at each the Tehsil and District levels, combined with development projects while the IBOs are at play, is the only way to move ahead. This will be a difficult, time-consuming, but highly effective stratagem.
The Pakistani security forces are undoubtedly superior in size and strength versus foreign-funded insurgents. However, we are fighting a war within which requires pragmatism rather than ferocity.
Concluding in the words of James G Stavridis on the same lines:
“You can’t kill your way to success in a counterinsurgency effort. You have to protect the people, get the civil-military balance right, train the locals, and practise effective strategic communications.”