As militancy and negotiations move in tandem, a recently surfaced splinter group of the Taliban hit the headlines through its lethal attack on district courts’ complex in the heart of Islamabad. Fizza Malik, a young Pakistani lawyer was amongst those killed. Young Fizza is being seen by many as the face of the latest tragedy in Pakistan’s conflict. It appears that terrorists are ahead of state and government. However, one must be aware that the Taliban alone have not transformed this country into its present state of disorder, but an equal hand is played by the criminals within the country, and foreign intelligence agencies that exploit the situation.
Some analyst argue that the TTP may have let loose a number of its offshoot outfits to act as they please, while the core of the TTP leadership maintains its state of denial whilst continuing to claim continuity of the ceasefire. However, this pattern does not suit the TTP, as this would discredit its prowess as the sole controlling organ, and hence reduce its bargaining position on the negotiation table. Already, there are hard questions regarding the futility of talking to the TTP if it is unable to effectively and comprehensively halt the terrorist acts.  From another perspective, one could argue that a process of unravelling has been triggered within the Taliban rank and file.  Strategy options on how to deal with the Taliban throw up two approaches: by force of arms and by negotiating. If negotiations don’t work, then by employing military force. If the Americans want to talk with the Taliban to ensure peace, why should we not do the same in Pakistan? This is a widespread mindset.
The new government’s policy has been cautious. One can argue about whether this is correct and to what degree. The government is being criticised for lack of resolve in launching and sustaining decisive action to tackle and defeat or at least, contain the Taliban within FATA. There are a number of reasons behind this caution. Strenuous effort is on to keep the dialogue on track despite provocative events.  The military too, is conscious of the need for political and public consensus to back the use of force, as was forthcoming a few years ago when the military operation was launched in Swat. Now, there is no political consensus for fighting before giving negotiations a fair chance to succeed. An argument that is gaining strength, is that the option of ‘military action alone’ has been given sufficient time, but it has not been able to curb militancy and acts of terrorism.
The government’s immediate counterinsurgency objectives are to differentiate between reconcilable and irreconcilable Taliban. The new negotiation teams are expected to be larger in size and include more influential people, though the inclusion of military representatives in the government team has let loose an unnecessary point of discussion. It should hardly matter, because ultimately it will be a political decision with regard to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Though the military has, in the past, concluded a number of tactical level agreements with the local commanders of various militancy affected areas, this time the expanse of the dialogue is wholesome with strategic implications. The opposition leader in the National Assembly has opposed the induction of the army personnel on the ground that armed forces are meant to obey the government and their involvement in talks with the terrorists would indicate that the institution still acts as an independent and parallel decision making body. On the other hand, the Information Minister has said that, armed forces have to be included in talks to discuss specific matters. The military itself would rather take a supporting role, and be available in the role of facilitator. The government must not insist on including military representatives in the team. Perhaps, middle ground can be found by roping in a high ranking retired officer with sufficient knowledge on the subject who is acceptable to all sides. In any scenario, in the long run, whether or not military representatives are present, will make no material difference.
It is certain that patchwork and an isolated approach won’t do here, and that Pakistan needs a counter terrorism policy based on a visionary and integrated approach. Crafting such a policy constitutes a challenge in a political environment where non-state actors appear to occupy a position of near parity. The policies of the past need reversal and this will be possible only when the elected civilian leadership reserves the driving seat for itself.
With regards to tackling terrorists, strategists are divided, with some recommending the single-minded policy of Sri Lanka in defeating the long-standing LTTE insurgency, rather than accepting ceasefires. Others argue to the contrary, stressing that Pakistan is not an island and the flanks of the insurgency lie along a long and porous border with Afghanistan, supported by traditionally hostile powers. Wherever military action has been taken, they argue, the civilian authority has been unable to assume control and restore government services. Hence, they recommend that the political process be in the lead, and the military maintain a supportive role.
While pondering over the issue of terrorism in the national context, it is worthwhile to take a look at the broader pattern of terrorist activities in our region. The latest data from the Indian National Bomb Data Centre (NBDC) shows that India suffered 212 bomb blasts in 2013; this is more than double of what Afghanistan suffered (108 blasts). Along with Pakistan and Iraq, India accounts for almost 75% of bomb blasts in the world, and Jammu and Kashmir witnessed a 50% rise in bomb blasts last year as compared to 2012.
From the international counter terrorism perspective, the international focus is on bracing for post 2014 Afghanistan. There is fear that after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, a civil war might break out which would have a serious impact on Pakistan’s security— especially in the tribal areas. Given the ongoing transition in Afghanistan and the continued terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets throughout Pakistan, a sense of urgency has propped up in Pakistan to evolve a comprehensive contingency plan for tackling post-2014 Pakistan. It is not appropriate to indulge in dooms day scenarios, but we must be mindful of impending risks.
On its part, the US plans to give $280 million of military aid to Pakistan under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) category during 2015, while it intends to cut civilian aid. “The USD 280 million Pakistan requests will enhance the Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps, Air Force, and  the Navy’s ability to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) and counter terrorism (CT) operations against militants throughout its borders, and will improve Pakistan’s ability to deter threats emanating from those areas,” the State Department said.
Overall, terrorism and counter terrorism patterns are quite complex and betray any quick solutions. Pakistan is on the receiving end of various developments, over whose dynamics it has little control; hence, there is a need to follow a proactive approach. Pakistan has to counter terrorism of multiple types and on multiple fronts, without falling victim to tunnel vision and attributing everything to the Taliban.  It is encouraging that the Government is striving hard to chart out its course; however it does not have the luxury of unlimited time for the gestation phase.

The writer is a freelance columnist.

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