EVEN before the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) commenced, suspicious noises are coming out of Washington that should put Pakistan on alert. First, there has been the usual deliberately-timed US think-tanks chorus of Pakistans nuclear weapons being under threat from non-state actors with Bruce Reidel, who seems to have a psychological issue with Pakistan in general, again in the lead claiming that Lashkar-i-Taiba will grab Pakistans nukes, despite his own acknowledgement of Pakistans extensive nuclear security set-up. Accompanying this has been a strange statement coming from Secretary of State Clinton that the US is seeking to limit Pakistan and Indias nukes in terms of numbers as well as ensuring that the nuclear stockpiles of the two countries are well tended to Now, given how the US itself is directly aiding Indias increased nuclear weapons production through the 123 Agreement which liberates a substantial amount of unsafeguarded fissile material from Indias civilian reactors to be used in weapons production, clearly Clinton must be intending to focus on Pakistan. As for the whole security issue, again the record shows that while India has had a few problems with missing fissile material and nuclear radiation leaks, Pakistans record on these fronts has been absolutely untarnished. Unfortunately, one of the worst records in terms of nuclear safety and missing fissile material has been that of the US itself, so perhaps at the NSS Pakistan and others can raise these concerns with President Obama and hope that he takes measures to improve US nuclear security. Finally, there has been the whole drama of the White House actually seeking to explain why it has invited Pakistan to the NSS given its so-called proliferation record Undoubtedly all this is to put Pakistan on the defensive - and we have reacted predictably with the Foreign Office unnecessarily having to declare once again that Pakistans nuclear assets are absolutely safe when we should have been exposing the expansive Indian and US proliferation records. Unfortunately, while all these dramas are being enacted to have a defensive Pakistan at the NSS, the Pakistani leadership cannot see beyond the ridiculous and stale mantra of wanting a civilian nuclear deal with the US - which we neither need nor should seek. There is expected to be an effort to get a commitment from all NSS participants to secure their nuclear materials within four years as part of the final document commitment; and the US intends to use this to demand that Pakistan allow it to undertake the security of Pakistans nukes. One hopes that on this count our leadership will not make any fatal compromise. Obama has achieved none of his nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation goals so far and we need to ensure that his only success does not come at Pakistans expense.