The recent move against President Musharraf's impeachment by the coalition is a watershed decision for the removal of a person having entered political corridors from back door and legitimised himself against all odds at the cost of political and economic chaos the country has been plunged since February 18. Playing a weak innings on a weak pitch, the president is left broadly with three options: to resign before an impeachment bill is passed; succeeds in surviving the motion; or use his 58-2(b) option to dissolve the assemblies. The first option, nevertheless, though late, is still the only better option left for the president and country. He seems to have lost political ground as he tried to make a strong innings after taking over in October 1999. As a coup maker he entered power with guns to reform the doomed society and sham democracy with identical words and actions as his predecessors in 1958 and 1977. Under the Doctrine of Necessity the Supreme Court allowed him to rule. The removal of corruption and strengthening of economy with the growing role of the military in important institutions saw a reversal after the Hobson's Choice referendum which elected him as president. The formation of the PML-Q and political support he garnered inside the parliament to pass the 17th Amendment was the success he made by carrot and stick policies, the major support for which came from the GHQ and the US. His wicket had been weakened long before he shed his uniform, and especially after the removal of the CJ. The final blow to him was the February elections which mobilised a humiliating defeat for his Party and policies. As promised he should have resigned, but least is expected from military rulers having ignored all political and constitutional moralities to only strengthen himself. PML-Q is hard to save him from the motion, as the party with the exception of counted MNAs/senators, paying allegiance to him for personal whims and ego, does not enjoy support for him. As evident of Crown Parties formed to exercise supportive function for military rulers, the parties are in tact as long as the founder is strong. He is no more stronger to manoeuvre with PML-Q. If the PML-Q had been a strong political party it would have formed government in Balochistan as it had majority of MPAs, but it crumbled like the house of cards. The use of 58-2(b) is a force in the hands of the president to save his office but the exercise is not that easy. The president needs the support of the army. Under General Kiyani the army has played an excellent role by not interfering in the February 18 elections. Originally, the major justification for the use of the Article against the civilian government was to get rid of the political nepotism and misuse of power which under the present circumstances is not justified. Furthermore, it will make the president's position and army more awkward and alien in the eyes of public. In my opinion, the army will not allow him to go through the process of impeachment. It is high time the army plays the role of moderator for the broader interests of the nation. The US State Department's statement that the impeachment is the internal matter of Pakistan seems to have thwarted the chances of the president's political options. America does not want a sincere leadership with greater public support in any of the Islamic countries as it is contrary to their interests, a factor accountable for supporting unconstitutional regimes. However, in the wake of the tabling of the impeachment motion the best option for the president seems to opt for a resignation. The writer is an academic