GOING by the views that the various US officials have been expressing after Pakistan's successful operation in Swat, President's Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke's agenda for his forthcoming visit to Islamabad would prominently figure the demand for pressing ahead with the military campaign to cover South Waziristan. But, strangely at the same time, the US shies away from appreciating its implications for Pakistan and its own and its Western allies' responsibilities to an extent that one gets the impression that the US is not quite clear about its strategic objective concerning militancy. On the one hand, eliminating it is characterised as a major initiative of Washington's policy; on the other, it hums and haws at delivering on its commitments that should help achieve that objective. For example, necessary financial assistance, particularly when Islamabad's straitened circumstances are taken into account, is of vital significance in this regard. Yet, the Congress adjourned for summer recess before giving approval to the much-bandied-about $7.5 billion aid to be given to Pakistan over a period of five years, and one is not too sure how soon it gives approval after reconvening. Besides, for all its influence over the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, it has failed to persuade them to come out with the expected monetary help. The result: Islamabad has done more than it could do with its own resources but remains under undue pressure to do more. For Pakistan as well as the US, it is important that the varied consequences of stretching the military operation to South Waziristan before consolidating the gains in Malakand Division are thoroughly weighed. If the aim is to put an end to militancy from the area once for all, the threat in Swat has to be totally removed and the local population properly rehabilitated. Only then could the common people beyond the valley, who are not favour of the TTP, feel confident that the authorities are serious in their objective and come forward with their help.