Once again, before the visit of Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif to US, various Pakistani platforms are buzzing with debates surrounding the Western proposals for Pakistan’s nuclear mainstreaming. Similar reports were revolving before the Pakistani PM’s visit that asserted that the US will be exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan in order to put limits on its nuclear program. Notwithstanding several official statements that no deal would come out of these visits, the recurring denials have generated an impression that something is afoot. Eyebrows have been raised by the many over the recent revelations in newspapers that “Pakistan will not discuss the issue of its nuclear weapons and even if the US side brought up this issue Pakistan will politely remind them that it was India’s so-called cold-start doctrine that created the current situation”. The statement hints at the possibility of dialogue over Pakistan’s nuclear program during the visit. Pakistan, as being quoted to not discuss the issue of nukes, will probably not be the one to gear the agenda of dialogue. It would rather be in an ‘act in response’ position when the issue comes up. The military’s public relations authority also stated that Army Chief will meet civil and military authorities of US and ‘security’ will be the main agenda of the visit, indicating that ‘nuclear security’ won’t likely be ignored by the US.

 Recently, many debates have been conducted by country’s leading think-tanks and media houses to discuss the US proposals about mainstreaming Pakistan in the global nuclear order after accepting ‘brackets’ on its nuclear programme. It surprisingly remained an issue over which the wide consensus prevails. About the possibility of civil nuclear accord explored by US, many experts in Pakistan are of the view that ‘regional security paradigm has been manipulated in a manner that intends to maximize India’s conventional and strategic security as pivot to the US Asia-Pacific strategy, while minimizing Pakistan’s security at the same time. It is illogical to ask Pakistan to revert from Full-Spectrum Deterrence to Strategic Deterrence and unilaterally sign the CTBT that the US itself had not ratified whereas India was not only left free to augment its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities but in fact was being offered advanced nuclear technologies and systems like BMD that would undermine strategic stability in the region.’

Pragmatically, Pakistan’s treatment of full-spectrum deterrence is different from what others perceive. Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) was clear on this that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term rather than quantitative response to entire threat spectrum, was to fill the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions. Pakistan was confronted with a credible threat from India, which was pursuing “dangerous, provocative and irresponsible doctrines like Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and Proactive Strategy and whose conventional military build-up was Pakistan specific”. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment thus argues that CSD would provide India the space for conventional or limited conflict in a nuclearized region. For an appropriate reactionary response to CSD, which excludes massive nuclear retaliation, Pakistan developed the low-yield, short range, tactical battlefield ‘Nasr nuclear missiles’. These tactical nuclear weapons were part of our full spectrum deterrence, which provides a qualitative response to the conventional threats and asymmetry perceived by India. Moreover, it offers a range of options since Pakistan will not be forced to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons as a first response to conventional force.

Another hypothetical statement that has been largely rejected by Pakistan’s nuclear experts is about Pakistan’s nuclear programme being the fastest growing in the world. Such statements were said to be ‘aimed at diverting attention from the exponential increase in India’s fissile material stockpiles as a result of nuclear deals with a growing number of NSG countries and its destabilizing consequences for the region as the reports take into account the potential of Pakistani facilities while declaring it to be the fastest growing in the world, but in case of India they consider the current production of warheads instead of following uniform criteria in both cases.’

It has been widely viewed that experts in these discussions declare Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as weapons of deterrence and India’s nuclear arsenal as weapons of prestige. Consequently, many regret that the discriminatory nuclear cooperation agreements being signed by NSG member countries with India and the waivers being granted to it are undermining strategic stability in South Asia.  The country’s nuclear establishment firmly rejects any deal that restricts Pakistan’s nuclear program and insists that international community must understand Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. Moreover, US should adopt a comprehensive non-discriminatory approach towards the region and bring Pakistan in nuclear mainstream. Eventually the hot debate before army chief’s visit to US and over potential nuclear accord concludes that ‘Pakistan desires to be a member of all international export control regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement. However, it is not ready to compromise on its nuclear posture by accepting unrealistic conditions on its nuclear weapon programme because Pakistan’s nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment instead of idealistic norms of nuclear pessimists’. Accordingly, it seems that as any negotiations between Pakistan and US on mainstreaming would take a long time before any agreement is reached. No matter whether a deal is likely to come to fruition through these visits or not, but the voices in country pronounce that ‘Pakistan should continue behaving like a confident nuclear-power’.