It was expected that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani would address the nation in a telecast about the Swat situation, and the resumption of the army operation there, but what no one expected was that the second military operation there would lead to the War on Terror producing yet another result, that of the greatest refugee crisis since the Partition. The Partition itself generated the worst refugee crisis ever seen in this part of the world, as about 15 million people went in opposing directions, eight million Muslims going east, and seven million Hindus and Sikhs west, as the Punjab and Bengal were partitioned, while the central provinces disgorged a large number of Muslims anxious to make the new country a success. Part of the trauma of Partition was the reception the refugees on both sides received, in the camps of their respective countries, where even the prosperous and powerful found that they were reduced to nothing. It was only when they were given the evacuee properties that they were restored to something approaching their old prosperity (and in some cases exceeding it). However, the Partition example will only serve to help form an idea of the magnitude of the problem. The refugees of Swat do not have evacuee properties to look towards. They only have their own homes, lands and businesses to go back to. Unlike the refugees of 1947, they are not prepared to abandon everything they had, and have something to go back to. More than the refugees of 1947, they expect to go back soon to their properties and livelihoods. The best example will be that of the Afghan refugees of the 1980s, many of whom did not go back, instead remaining in Pakistan, with a minority seeking refuge in the West that fuelled the struggle against the Soviets. But again, the Swati refugees do not expect as much change or rather turbulence in their lives as the Afghans. So far, there has not been any offer of refuge abroad. Some of the migration will be permanent, with the ANP likely to help Pashtuns from Swat stay in Karachi. So far, its cadres seem to have done nothing to encourage Swatis to settle there, but they have been very helpful towards those who have arrived. It will not change the demography of the city, but it will help modify it if the temporary settlement became permanent. And any change in Karachi's demography can only be to the benefit of the ANP, and the loss of the MQM, in what has become a zero-sum game. However, the vast majority of the Displaced Persons have gone to refugee camps in their own province, and it would serve the interests of the political parties if the refugees went back to their homes. What also made the operation suspect to so many Pakistanis was its timing. It was launched after a prime ministerial address to the nation, but the electronic media also carried reports of the PM's meeting with the COAS, and the corps commander's meeting. But the absence of the president, and his presence in the USA, being on his first visit there, turned the whole effort from one of saving Pakistan into one of making him look good in US eyes. However, the refugee problem is something that the West, which under US leadership is busy waging the War on Terror, had not foreseen. The refugees can be added to the cost of the War, for if the War had not been fought, there would probably not have been a refugee problem. Indeed, a refugee problem on such a scale had not occurred in previous military operations, not the one brought to what appears to have been a premature end in Swat, but the earlier ones, especially up to the 1970s. It is because there has been no precedent, except that of natural disasters, that apparently the government had not been able to organise a response. It is probably because the disaster that has struck Swat has been manmade rather than natural that the response to the refugees in the unaffected areas, which is most of the country, has not been anything like the response to the 2005 earthquake, when the people of Pakistan responded spontaneously, and practically, to help the victims themselves, as far as possible, until the government got involved. The public response has at best been like previous responses to government appeals: more lukewarm than anything else, and almost non-existent. This shows that the government's version of events has not convinced the general public, even if there is a strong perception that the militants had gone too far in Swat. The underlying core of support for the 'wrong' side, or rather the anti-American, in the War is apparently still widespread, and the situation in Swat is seen as having gone out of hand because the War on Terror created the refugee problem. In short, it is seen as part of the problem, not the solution. Another problem that has been faced is that of insufficient support for the military. First of all, the military can only expect maximum support when it is fighting in a popular cause, not necessarily the right cause. While it might be right to establish the writ of the state, it has to be done by fighting in the War on Terror on the wrong side, that of the Americans. Therefore, the military probably does not even expect popular support for this conflict, especially since both sides are Pakistani. This lack of support also recognises that, while Pakistan's battle might be being fought, so is America's. The refugee problem is providing Islamabad officials with another opportunity for a cash handout. The last occasion was the 2005 earthquake, but now the refugee problem is being seen as an opportunity to ask the countries fighting the War to shell out. To their credit, or rather to the credit of Pakistani diplomacy, they are apparently lining up to bear this unforeseen cost of the War. However, it is probably easier for the Western countries to throw money at the problem and go on with the main fighting, in Afghanistan, where they have their troops, than for Pakistan to handle the problem. It may be counted by the government as yet another sacrifice in the War by Pakistan, but it is still a major headache.