In a recent writing, titled The deal for Pakistan that appeared in a national daily, Michael OHanlon, associated with the Brookings Institution, relies upon a central motivating concern: the US-Pakistan relationship to help win this [Afghanistan] war, due to the apprehension that Pakistani policy may ultimately contribute to our losing the war in Afghanistan. A couple of aspects in this writing are brought under review in relevance to the discourse here. One, some worthy actions against the extremists in the northwestern area by Pakistan, and recognition of the so-called Pakistani Taliban as a mortal threat to the Pakistani state, are emphasised by O Hanlon. As the obverse, or main, side of the same issue, the shutting down of the Afghan Taliban sanctuaries on the Pakistani soil is also underscored. Now, the fact of basic and far-reaching significance remains that these delineated problems are essentially two sides of the same coin, the common conundrum, that have sprouted from the US policy of continuing military occupation of Afghanistan. After a lapse of almost a decade since the invasion, the US has not succeeded in resolving the problem confronting it. Once this problem is assessed with the aid of US declared war objectives in Afghanistan, a paradoxical opinion concerning US involvement in the country materialises. The US is not so much unable to contain and resolve this conundrum of militancy in Afghanistan - and the manifestations of terrorism in northwest and mainland Pakistan are merely its obvious extension. For it is more likely, the US is unwilling to resolve this menace of terrorism as it desired to witness its proliferation and prolongation to realise some of its policy objectives in the geostrategic region bordering upon Afghanistan. For once, the following US war objectives declared during 2001 are kept in sight, the issue of continuing terrorism in the southwestern Asia acquires a realistic significance. i Elimination of the militant training camps under Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; i Capture or elimination of Al-Qaeda leadership; i Change of Taliban regime. It is to be noted that these objectives were easily realised, subsequent to its invasion of Afghanistan, by the end of 2001. To transform the invasion into military occupation was a fateful decision. And Musharrafs regime, to an extent, supported this occupation by providing land and air routes for the logistical supplies meant for the US-led occupation forces. Al-Qaeda operatives, who had to abandon Afghanistan and seek shelter in various cities and places in Pakistan, in consequence of the invasion, were apprehended in sizable numbers by the Musharraf regime and handed over to the US. Musharraf graphically narrated these facts, outlining the financial remunerations he - or supposedly his government - received for the transfer of each Al-Qaeda captive, in his autobiographical account, In the Line of Fire. These and such other measures were to invite Al-Qaedas hostility against the state of Pakistan. The US, subsequent to the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2901, invited India that landed with its Embassy staff in Kabul on November 23, even before the issue of the interim government in Afghanistan was settled. This haste and diplomatic persuasion in inviting India, a recognised rival of Pakistan, even disregarding the diplomatic nicety of transferring the responsibility for such an invitation at least upon the interim government in Kabul was an index of acts and happenings to follow. The establishment of a host of insurgent-recruitment centres by India, along the eastern and southern borders of Afghanistan, was one of the prominent measures directed against the national security of Pakistan. The hostility that the inept Musharraf regime invited from Al-Qaeda, and intervention by regular Pakistan army contingents in significant numbers in FATA, in disregard of the historical precedent - even the Britishers abstained from introducing and stationing the military formations in the tribal areas - inviting the Pakistani Talibans retaliation, these shortcomings in policy were to prove adequate framework for the introduction of insurgents recruited by India under the US patronage. The terrorist acts of these agents were admixed with, and disguised as, Al-Qaeda operations as well as retaliatory measures by the Pakistani Taliban. The Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Kerry, is expected to arrive in Islamabad during the third week of this month. His purpose is to sort out aspects relevant to OBLs abode. A widespread impression is allowed to persist that the US action against Osama on May 2, presumably conducted in total secrecy from the Pakistani authorities, has constrained relations between the two countries. Even the argument that information about the operation, if given to Islamabad, it might have allowed Osama to escape is worked into the allegation that there existed a support network for Osama, with the implication that Pakistan houses the militant groups and parts of state structure are protective of such groups. This line of thought is meant to converge upon the allegation of harbouring terrorism against Pakistan as an expression of US realpolitik, that is, policy independent from principles. At least two approaches can be adopted to address this US stance vis--vis Islamabad in the post-Osama period. First, repeated US pronouncements that Pakistan is its frontline ally in war against terrorism, are in striking contrast with the more recently surfaced US position. The persuasive way in this approach is to view the recent stance as a product of afterthought, that is, a later addition. President Obama, during his announcement about Osamas demise, or martyrdom, expressed his gratitude for due support from the Pakistan government. And Secretary of State Clinton extended her personal thanks to the ISI. In addition, for several months preceding the US Special Forces action against OBL, the CIA kept surveillance upon his abode. Therefore, the argument that the US conducted the Osama affair on its own, without any assistance from Pakistan, is untenable. The circumstances under which the US forces carried out their action, and the absence of response from local security forces indicates - nay, it is a tell-tale sign - that Islamabad was not altogether aloof in this episode. As an added thought, if the radar evading technology is available for the helicopters, then sound-proofing is yet unheard of. And the noise of landing helicopters in OBLs compound at 1:00am could not but have reverberated around town, inviting the attention of at least a local police setup. And, secondly, a survey of the history of militancy in the region of south and west Asia makes it evident that it is the 'response militancy. And to lay the blame of 'cause terrorism upon Pakistan, is an exercise in double jeopardy against this resilient nation. A matter that demands clear comprehension, terrorism is a challenge that is confronting the people of Pakistan. The two commonplace maxims regarding terrorism are that terrorism begets terrorism, and freedom-fighter of one side is the terrorist of another. All the leading Al-Qaeda and (Afghan) Taliban leaders - and OBL included - of today were at one time involved in the freedom struggle in Afghanistan against the then Soviet Union between 1979-89. These mujahideen were famously characterised by President Reagan to be the moral equivalent of our founding fathers. Ironically, the times changed, the roles were reversed, however, the contending grounds between the newly arisen adversaries remained basically unchanged. If the US was recalcitrant to alter its imperialist designs related to the Muslim and Arab world, then the mujahideen were inclined to complete the remaining circle of political and economic emancipation that was initiated subsequent to the struggle during the Afghanistan freedom. n The writer is Chairman, Pakistan Ideological Forum. Email: suhrabaslam@hotmail.com