Nothing that US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen said at Islamabad on Wednesday about Pakistans role in the so-called war on terror in Afghanistan was new, except, perhaps, for the impatience he expressed at its failure to start a military operation in North Waziristan. And that, too perhaps, the terminology he employed in public, as he spoke to journalists, sounded as an unusual letting out of a feeling of exasperation. One can understand his reasons. The Pentagon, despite having deployed 100,000-odd soldiers in the country to curb the Afghan resistance to the foreign occupation, is making little headway; rather it is on the back foot, with defeat writ large across the entire spectrum, and which can be clearly seen by military strategists. The public faade of the US though, as the Admiral maintained, was that the war 'has definitely weakened the Taliban. However, a recent assessment, termed by Defence Officials as dated, of more than a dozen US intelligence agencies paints a gloomy picture saying that large swaths of the country are still at risk of falling to the Taliban. Interestingly, anyone knowing the history and population strength of Pakhtuns, who are called Taliban by the US, would testify that even if they were not controlling major part of the country today, they would do so once the foreign troops withdraw. The American dilemma becomes more complicated by the day, with the loss of military personnel constantly on the rise only early this week six GIs were killed by an Afghan resistance squad and the deadline for the beginning of a drawdown of the forces that the Obama administration has set fast approaching. The pressure to leave mounts when both the economic and human resources get drained and the home public turns against the continuation of the war. For an exit that does not carry the taint of defeat, some crucial agent has to be scapgoated, and Pakistan comes in for criticism and responsible for the setback. Thus, the admission that it is hard to bring round Pakistan to move into North Waziristan, and the argument that it should be doing more We are confident that General Kayani, who has received praise for his contribution to the war, would not be taken in, and start an operation in North Waziristan. Our national interests demand us to go in for a policy of reconciliation with out estranged citizens and not go after them with a dagger in hand to further alienate them. Washingtons double standards permit it to encourage dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan, while require pressuring Pakistan to hunt down its own people. The expectation is that the terrorists, who are bedevilling our lives, would lose their sting the moment the US packed up and went home. That is precisely it should be doing.