Mismanagement of public sector: Pakistan's energy sector ails from mismanagement and poor governance, starting from the various ministries to most of the state organisations and public sector utilities. The notable improvement in the petroleum, oil, gas sectors mentioned earlier, has been short lived. Notwithstanding the hurdles and issues, it is to be expected from the energy sector, public utilities and corporations to adhere to best business practices and the code of corporate governance, so as to meet their objectives of supply of safe, reliable and sustainable energy to the citizens. Unfortunately both the management and the boards in several organisations have been compromised by induction of "political management" and of government members who do not meet the corporate governance criteria and are essentially not qualified or suited to undertake the fiduciary and corporate responsibility required of board members under the law. In the power sector, there is a clear lack of comprehension on the part of MW&P, Wapda and Pepco managements regarding the issues in the power sector and confusion on how to implement the solutions. There is absence of policy, planning, effective leadership and competency at the senior management level. Various departments, act on their own, without coordination, often in a disjointed manner and the resultant confusion is well known. Further in contravention the GoP's power sector reform and restructuring programme, Wapda Chairman continued as Pepco Chairman from 1998 to 2007. Even subsequently on the separation of Wapda from Pepco per GoP policy, Wapda Chairman has continued to interfere in Pepco management, also M(F) and M(P) Wapda continued to hold offices of CFO and MD Pepco. Such a situation has obviously derailed the power sector reform programme and efforts to corporatise the sector per GoP policy and WB, ADB covenants have clearly been compromised. In the current scenario with diluted authority of Pepco, crisis, matters and issues are discussed only when faced and isolated ad-hoc solutions are resorted to, often at a high cost and with least benefit. On the operation side, stated distribution losses continue at a staggering level of about 22% (Theft 12% and technical losses 10%). The essential requisites of maintenance of power plants, EHV Switch Gear, power transformers etc, has been delayed (by as much as 10 years in some instances) by successive Wapda managements with the result that operations are under an alarming state of instability, which results in frequent breakdowns. On the financial management side, payments to IPP's have accumulated to above Rs. 110 billion and Rs 25 billion to oil/gas companies. Bank borrowing of Rs. 125 billion in the past 2 years and other debts of Rs. 40 billion has clearly put the sector in an insolvent mode. The obvious consequence of this financial crisis is the current shutdown of about 3,000 MW of existing capacity in IPPs, Rentals and GENCOs due to shortage of fuel and gas supplies. Non-implementation of projects: As a consequence of multiple issues of policy, planning, management etc, as elaborated earlier, the capacity of project planning and implementation by the various energy sector companies and organisations has been acutely immobilised. Numerous hydel and oil, gas development, LNG import, transnational gas pipelines, coal development, power plants and LPG etc projects appear to be grounded. A review of project implementation status of major projects in various sectors is outlined below. Natural gas sector: In this context the exception is the unique ability of project implementation of SSGC and SNGPL which can act as a model for other energy sector companies. Over the period 2003 - 2007 these companies under a comprehensive gas development programme, prepared by the author, undertook nearly a doubling of transmission and distribution capacity through complete in-house project engineering, planning and implementation for a combined project value of over $1 billion. This effort enabled SSGC and SNGPL to meet increased gas demands up to 2007 adequately. However, OGDC and MOL have failed to implement approved projects and the expected increase in supply from OGDC (350 MMcfd) and MOL (250 MMcfd) did not materialise in 2008, resulting in the current shortages of 600 MMcfd. Also associated LPG extraction plants which have been in the pipeline and which can provide about 600 tons per day of LPG, thus alleviating LPG supply position, have been held-up due to inability of OGDC to undertake requisite project development. Meanwhile, the SSGC Mashal LNG project (LNG 1 - 500 MMcfd and LNG II - 500 MMcfd) and the ISGSL, IPI transnational gas pipeline project (1000 MMcfd) which were required to meet the gas supply gap from 2009-2015, have been victims of flawed strategy and inability of the GOP / MP&NR to move the projects to implementation. No new firm project start or completion dates are available. Consequently, as per ISGSL projections the country will be facing the resultant gas shortages of 1400 MMcfd by 2012 and 2700 MMcfd by 2015 while no alternate planning to fill the gap has been undertaken. This is indeed a catastrophic scenario and requires alternate crises measures on fast track. Power sector: The power sector has been the worst culprit in the failure to implement major sector projects. Wapda is clearly responsible, starting from the eighties, for not taking effective steps and implementing alternate power and hydel projects, if some were held-up due to various issues. Non-implementation of Kalabagh dam has resulted in a gap of 3,000 MW which would have prevented the current crisis in the power sector. A review of Wapda's generation expansion plan issued in September 2004, shows that an addition of 1200 MW hydel capacity (Wapda) and 3,700 MW of gas/oil based thermal capacity (IPPs) was to come on-line by 2008-2009. If indeed this 4,900 MW had materialized, there would have been no electric power shortage. Failure to meet such stated and approved targets must not go unnoticed and accountability of concerned departments must be done. Of crucial concern also is the required upgrading of the National Power Control Centre (NPCC), which has been held-up for more than 15 years due to inability of Wapda management to move the project prepared by Pepco under this scribe's management in 2001 to implementation stage. The result is that the systems and technology in NPCC is totally obsolete and no spare parts are available. Such a fragile operations status of the power sector has resulted in system collapse and nationwide blackout on several occasions. A worst scenario is waiting to happen but again the current Wapda and Pepco management is in disconnect with the essential requisites of power system operations. Past governments as well as current are equally to blame including the WB and ADB for going up a blind alley and not reassessing the situation on a rolling basis, wherein the private sector has been unable to put-up the requisite new generation capacity. PPIB's and Wapda's own projections noted earlier and as envisioned in the National Power Plan (NPP) formulated by Acres of Canada under a CIDA funded programme in 1994 have all failed to be implemented. In the current scenario, there is again failure to establish medium and long-term demand supply projections with some confidence. In the primary fuel side alternate planning and contingency measures have not been undertaken to cover for natural gas and oil supply gaps. In the power sector, PPIB has not been able to identify the optimum generation, both in terms of size and locations to bridge the gap on a least cost basis, keeping in view the demand centers, fuel supply chain and the transmission and distribution requirements. As a consequence IPP and rental projects awarded by PPIB are not at optimum location and their costs are much excessive then the $1m per MW thumb rule. PPIB process is clearly flawed and would not meet cost and transparency criteria. Coal sector: Thar coal resource development and implementation of mining projects and associated gasification and power plant projects has also been the victim of delays, hold-ups etc, now for eighteen (18) years. Other coal field and power projects planned for Lakhra, Sonda-Jharak etc and Punjab have also not moved. In the 25-year National Energy Plan framework (2005-2030), approved in 2005, it was projected that coal percentage in the energy mix would increase from 6% to about 15%. This translates to a production level of only 34 mt /year in 2020 and 74 mt /year in 2030 from the current volume of about 10 mtons/year (4 mt local and 6 mt import). As a comparison India's coal production is 450 mt per year, while China produces 1.7b tones per year. Surely the sector can gear-up to produce at least 100m tons per year by 2020, which would be a solution to the energy gap. Unfortunately the essential requisites of project planning, arrangement of financing, and start of mining operations etc, all have been caught-up in the bureaucratic muddle of the Planning Commission, MP&NR and government of Sindh. Now, the newly set-up of Thar Coal and Energy Board (TCEB) has also not been fully operationalised nor funds provided in spite of approval of GoP at the highest level. It is thus self-evident that the past record of mismanagement and failure of implementation of energy projects, is likely to be overshadowed by the current faulty planning, lack of contingency measures in the face of financing difficulties and obvious hurdles and expected failures in project implementation. Robust and integrated planning, programmed and timely implementation of energy projects would have not only prevented the current crisis but would have also enabled a measured control over electricity and gas tariffs. Alas, such is not the case and the citizens can only hope and pray for timely action and alleviation of the energy crisis by the government as promised to the people. (The writer is CEO - EMR-Consult and former MD PEPCO and SSGC. This article is the fourth of a five-part series.)