For those who naively believed that with Sri Lankan Armys feat of over-running the last bastion of the feared Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in the early summer of 2009, the country had finally won the 30 years old bloody confrontation, there were some jarring news emerging from the floor of the Lankan Parliament. Sri Lankan Prime Minister D.M. Jayaratnes announcement that the LTTE was raising itself from the dead and had begun operating training centres in India sent shudders down the spine of analysts that have followed the rise and fall of the LTTE, since the late 70s, as one of the deadliest guerrilla force sustained by its deep-rooted connections with India. Mr Jayaratne said that a former Lanka rebel name Vinayagam had taken over the LTTE operations in India and that Indian trained cadres were planning operations to assassinate high profile political and military targets in Sri Lanka. Instead of taking the ironclad pronouncements from the highest levels of political authority in Sri Lanka seriously enough, the Indian Foreign Office establishment tried to deflect the charge rather nonchalantly. We have seen reports from Sri Lanka referring to the Sri Lankan Prime Ministers statement in their Parliament alluding to the presence of the LTTE training camps in Tamil Nadu. We categorically deny the existence of any such campsSuch a reference is indeed unfortunate and we urge Sri Lanka to desist from reacting to speculative and uncorroborated reports, official spokesperson in the Ministry of External Affairs said. Meant for consumption by Western observers, who may tend to gloss over Indias hegemonic designs with a wink and a nod, such statements hardly invoke any confidence or trust among Indias wary neighbours. Manifestly, most of them have lived through the cross-border terrorism phenomenon emanating from India and who should know it better than the Sri Lankans themselves. Lankan accusations of the LTTE camps on the Indian soil come in the wake of Indias arm-twisting of its small neighbour to allow it to open another Consulate in Jaffna, in addition to the one in Colombo. The highly sensitive area of the Jaffna, which had remained the Tigers stronghold for three decades, has traditionally remained the centre of espionage for the Indian external intelligence agency. The Jaffna Consulate was opened on November 27, 2010, by Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and the measure of Indian friendship is evident from the fact that violence has suddenly surged in the war-torn area, which with Tigers demise had just began limping back to normalcy. The Indians have a tradition of opening consulates in sensitive areas (they have four in Afghanistan, including one each at the Pak-Afghan and Iran-Afghan border, and make them hubs of clandestine operations by appointing intelligence operatives under the cover of being diplomats. There is no doubt that the LTTE cadres, who were scattered by the Sri Lankan Armys determined assault, will find the newly-opened Consulate in Jaffna a valuable rallying point to start rebuilding the LTTEs shattered organisational infrastructure in the coastal area as well as logistical lines with their Tamil kinsmen in the southern most Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The LTTE has an established history of maintaining a close relationship with the RAW, and for running training and administrative safe havens not only in Tamil Nadu, but also in the Indian hinterland. In fact, the three pillars of strength that made it into such a formidable disruptive force were the widely available ethnic support not only from the Tamils in Sri Lanka, but also from all over the world; the 'political, financial and military support from the Indian government dispensed through RAW; and patronage by the politicians and populace of the Tamil Nadu state in India. It was the Tamil Nadu factor that made supremo Prabhakaran, the prodigal son of India, the LTTE feared and prompted the Indian support throughout the period of confrontation between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. India has a long history of training the LTTE guerrillas. According to Rohan Gunaratna, an eminent scholar on the group, the Indian government agreed to start the training of LTTE cadres in the early 80s. The initial batches were trained in the Bangalore Cantonment area and in Uttar Pradesh. A total of 11 batches of varying numbers were trained in several military and paramilitary institutions run by RAW and by the LTTE with the formers support, throughout India. Training for special operations to LTTE insurgents was conducted in New Delhi, Bombay and Vishakhapatnam, while Chakarata super secret facilities, north of Dehra Dun, were used for training the middle ranking echelon of the LTTE leadership. In addition to the LTTE, RAW had frequently utilised the Dehra Dun area for imparting training to insurgents from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Tibet. By 1987, over 20,000 Sri Lankan insurgents had been provided sanctuary, finance, training and weapons either by the Indian government, the state government of Tamil Nadu or by the insurgent groups themselves. Affinity with Tamil Tigers runs deep among the Indian security as well as the political establishment, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Despite the short shrift given by the Indian government to Sri Lankan concerns, made from the podium of the National Assembly to wrap up LTTE training camps on the Indian soil, there is hardly any doubt about Indias culpability in resurrecting the spectre of Tamil Tigers. The warning note sounded by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister merits a close scrutiny by the international community to ensure that the Lankan victory over a much feared terrorist outfit does not go waste on account of Indias pursuit of its ambitions for regional dominance. The writer is a freelance columnist.