Two major US newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times, have published above-the-fold front-page articles speculating about the possibility of an anti-American colonels coup in Pakistan and painting a scary scenario that could result from it. They believe that the rank and file in the army are anti-American and feel great anger against COAS General Kayani for being too pro-US and that he is fighting to survive. Even the corps commanders, in a recent meeting, are supposed to have questioned the General about the Pak-US ties in a manner unheard of in this disciplined force. These write-ups are accompanied by several articles and reports raising the prospects of a fearful turn of events, should these relations come to a breaking point following such a coup. There seems to be a deliberate anti-Pakistan Army campaign going on in the US media, presenting certain legitimate actions it has taken, for instance, to curb the activities of the CIA in the country, as if they were anti-American moves and as if it had no right to prevent a foreign intelligence outfit from operating within Pakistan. The arrests of some suspect local agents, who had possibly been in contact with the CIA passing on information about the presence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, are cited as actions against the US. That communicating with a foreign intelligence agency is an offence is totally ignored; that they should rather have apprised Pakistani authorities that they have spotted bin Laden is not given any consideration. There is nothing extraordinary if, as mentioned by an anonymous writer, The army is enraged that the CIA has developed an independent spy network in the country. The secret Pentagon operation to target bin Laden, following the murder of two Pakistanis by trigger-happy CIA contractor Raymond Davis, are enough of an embarrassment for the security forces. And the Abbottabad episode humiliated the army for being caught napping. Instead of moaning about the growing strains in relations between the two countries and putting aid to Pakistan Army on hold, the US policymakers would do well to do a bit of soul-searching. Why after all, Pakistans military (with long association with the US army) is feeling wounded and why the whole of Pakistan, in fact, is seething with anger against the US treatment of it. Putting mounting pressure on it would prove counterproductive. Mere declarations that Islamabads cooperation is vital would not help either, while its core interests are ruthlessly damaged. Missiles thrown by drones might kill an odd Al-Qaeda operative, but they raise a storm against Pakistan, turning the entire tribe which loses its innocent kith and kin into its eternal enemy. Military campaigns in sensitive North Waziristan would neither help the US win the war in Afghanistan nor leave Pakistan in peace. Rather than finding scapegoats to blame its singular failure in defeating resistance, the US should be making a quick exit.