ARIF AYUB After nearly 10 years in Afghanistan the US has finally realised that tribes play an important role in Pashtun society where almost all of the counter insurgency is concentrated. The Small Wars Journal therefore held a tribal engagement workshop at which nearly 50 papers were presented giving the pros and cons of a tribal policy. Some of the papers were of an exceptionally high quality and showed that the Americans were quick learners as they had analysed the problems and provided solutions within these 10 years which had taken the British nearly 50 years to formulate and implement. The difference is that the British planned to stay for a 100 years and constructed their institutions to deal with the tribes with this timeframe in view. By contrast the US is planning to leave by early next year and is implementing the tribal strategy through the army which is a particularly blunt instrument to deal with the complexities of tribal politics. The workshop had Major Jim Gants paper One Tribe at a Time as the basic working paper based on his experiences in the Kunar valley facing our Mohmand Agency. Major Gant was convinced that the US had to work with the tribes as they were the most important military, political, social and cultural unit and the Afghan government was not competent enough to deal with the threats facing Afghanistan and the Afghans always resented any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. Col Jeffrey A Sinclair presented the Tribal Configuration Matrix based on his experiences in Iraq and focused on tribal networks, tribal mapping, tribal leaders and their social network which were fed into a tribal database, which showed the nature of the balance of power in an area and the best way to go about developing local national security forces and economic and governance needs. Most participants were however convinced that the Iraqi situation was not comparable to the tribes of Afghanistan who were a unique social phenomenon. Col Ellen Harring presented Mobilising Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt emphasising that religious identity was being mobilised by one group for political power and ethnic identity was being inadvertently threatened by another group resulting in the resistance and increased violence. Jirgas were seen as providing a conflict resolution mechanism since the formal system was corrupt and inefficient. The Taliban supplemented the jirga system and tried to subordinate to Shariah Law. Initially tribal mullahs were subordinate to tribal elders and leaders. However, throughout history a number of mullahs had risen to challenge the Pashtunwali tribal code by attempting to gain power via religious fanaticism. In the seventies and eighties religious leaders were empowered with arms, ammunition and money by external actors who sought to assist the Afghans against Soviet occupation. External actors represented now by the US and the international community were attempting to impose control on all of Afghanistan through a centralised government apparatus. Pashtuns saw this as an attempt to takeaway their autonomy and impose laws and rules that did not reflect the Pashtunwali tribal codes and had therefore moved closer to the Taliban who were challenging the presence of the international community. Col Ellen has recommended avoiding threats to the Pashtun cultural practices and ethnic identity, returning power to tribal elders and resolving Pashtun grievances. The concept of mullah challenging the Pakhtunwali tribal code received particular attention in the workshop and was presented by a number of participants as a leader overcoming person based politics by using religion in order to overcome tribal constraints and kin based political economy. This had been shown in the triumph of the Taliban movement waging jihad against non-Muslim invaders. The state was seen as a means of enhancing local status and power and must therefore be effective without being disruptive. In 1978 the new communist state was perceived as an enemy of the people based on an alien ideology and working for an alien country. The revolt therefore took on an anti-state dimension. The US army in its Study of Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan based on the reports of its human terrain teams was of the opinion that the tribal system was weak in most parts of Afghanistan and could not provide alternatives to the Taliban or US control. The strategy in Iraq was not relevant since the tribes in Afghanistan did not act as unified groups. Instead it recommended local knowledge, cultural understanding and local contacts to influence policies. An example was given of the Kunar uprising of 1978 which began as a tribal revolt by the Safi Pashtuns but as the lashkars dissolved more disciplined and better funded parties stepped into this void e.g. Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbudin. Three decades of war had undermined centrality of the tribes as a source of identity. Most participants were of the view that Taliban strategists had a better feel for the complex social landscape and the various rival configurations of power in each region. The Taliban vanquished some groups entered into alliance relationships with others while some groups worked as their clients. The US Marine Corp also emphasised the complexity of the social matrix in Afghanistan where power was divided between the government, land holders/tribes and the mullahs and there was a constant power struggle between these three entities. The example of Mullah Powindah in the 1890s and the Faqir of Ipi in the 1930s were provided to show the power of the mullah to lead the insurgency against the might of the British empire. The ability of the mullah to call for jihad gives him the power to motivate the Pashtuns to fight outside his tribal allegiances. The workshop highlighted the importance of tribal identity in Afghanistan but at the same time emphasised on the complex social dynamics operating in the country over the last four decades which had obviously affected the tribal system both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. The situation was different in each province and agency and accordingly decisions would have to be made on interactions with the tribe or the Taliban. At times the situation is even more confused as the dividing line is not clear. For example Jallaludin Haqqani and Anwar Ul Haq Mujahid (son of Younis Khalis) are both religious and tribal leaders. Tribal policy therefore needs to be dealt with pragmatism and should be devoid of any preconceived ideas or ideology. The writer is a former ambassador.