As the US Strategy Re view on Afghanistan is nearing completion, divergent perceptions are being aired by statesmen, resistance leaders, think tanks, military organisations, eminent persons, lobbyists, well-wishers, spoilers, etc. President Hamid Karzai has recently spoken his heart out during an interview to The Washington Post. He has urged the United States to reduce the visibility and intensity of its military operations in Afghanistan, and end special operations forces raids. He pointed out that the highly visible presence of the US troops in Afghanistan is counterproductive and that Afghans have lost patience with the long-term presence of American soldiers. Karzai said: The time has come to reduce military operationsto reduce the intrusiveness into the daily Afghan life.The Afghan people dont like these raids. He wanted the US troops off the roads and out of Afghan homes, so that Afghan countryside is not so overwhelmed with the military presence. President Karzais views are, indeed, mirror reflection of the aspirations of the Afghan people. The President also voiced his opposition to US done attacks in Pakistan, and said that he now realises that the Pakistanis are suffering more than the Afghans due to terrorist violence afflicting the region. However, his frank talk has not gone down well with the American field commander in Kabul. General David Petraeus expressed astonishment and disappointment at the remarks and said they undermined the war effort. In contrast to President Karzais vision, some of the American officials are playing down the importance of July 2011, the time when the occupation forces will start to withdraw from Afghanistan; they are stressing for continuation of full combat mission till 2014. On the other hand, to make their 'final push, insurgents have stepped up their attacks to record levels. In the past two weeks or so, bombs have exploded in Kabul and other areas; fighters attacked a NATO observation post at the Jalalabad Airport. The attacked sparked a lengthy gun battle. There is no let up in the determination of the resistance forces, while the extent of their reach is expanding and audacity is on the rise. Mullah Mohammad Omar in his message on the eve of Eid-ul-Azha has ruled out talks as long as the forces continue to occupy Afghan soil. Nevertheless, leaving aside his declaratory position, there have been very high level negotiations between the Afghan government and all major factions of the Taliban. Now, as these parleys are entering a decisive phase, the Americans want to assume the overall control. The head of the British contingent in Afghanistan, General David Richards, has recently said that Al-Qaeda can never be completely beaten; he argued that outright victory is unnecessary. He also opined that the British military and the government had been guilty of not fully understanding what was at stake in Afghanistan. And that the Afghans were tired of NATOs inability to deliver on its promises. After the mid-term elections, the Bush era hawks are jumping into action. Richard Armitage is advocating the expansion of combat zone deep into Pakistan. In a study titled US Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, under the auspices of Council on Foreign Affairs, he has suggested: The US should use drones to target Lashkar-i-Taiba hideouts if Pakistan does not destroy them. Mr Armitage added: I would hope they would see the Haqqani network in the same way they see Pakistani Taliban, that this is ultimately a threat to them as well. The first thing that the Republicans are vying is to disrupt the policy of a gradual withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan beginning July next year. Congressman Buck McKeon, prospective head of the House Armed Services Committee, has said that one of the first priorities for his Committee will be to continue the war in Afghanistan and attack Obamas plan to start drawdown in July 2011. The US administrations plan that unfolded during the NATO Summit in Lisbon reflects a concrete vision for transition in Afghanistan. It may be taken as a prototype version of the forthcoming 'Strategy Review. This four-year programme aims at transferring security duties in selected Afghan areas to native security forces over the next 18 to 24 months with an eye toward concluding the US combat mission by the end of 2014. The plan caters for a gradual reduction of the foreign troops from the war-torn country, as it will not happen overnight, its not a single event, and it will not be a rush for the exit. The transition process will unfold based on local conditions in Afghanistan, it will not be remote-controlled from faraway capitals, and the criteria will include progress in proficiency level of the Afghan forces. During the transition, there will also be security assessments by the Afghan and international experts. Americas two-track approach of engaging the Taliban into processes of negotiations, while at the same time fighting them out on the pretext of weakening them is not leading towards a viable framework for transition. So, there is almost a consensus amongst the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote a meaningful dialogue process. There have also been reports that the Americans want to have direct negotiations with the Taliban. This is, indeed, a good omen, provided Afghanistan and Pakistan are part of the process; and a clear-cut policy is announced to effect a ceasefire. For any negotiation process to succeed, NATO/ISAF military operations have to recede to the background, and the use of force should be limited to self-defence only. Furthermore, Iran has to be a part of the process. Besides adjoining borders, Iran has substantial influence in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Americans will have to reach an understanding with Iran, as they had to, in case of recently formed government in Iraq. Ironically, the transition process hinges on the efforts to build up the Afghan forces so that they could contain a widening insurgency. But dependence on the Afghan security forces is fraught with serious flaws. Due to compositional inadequacies, these forces are viewed as alien in Pashtun majority areas. Moreover, from professional capacity perspective, these units are far below the satisfactory level. In this case, there is a need to think about stationing a UN peacekeeping mission, comprising around 50,000 soldiers, for about five to seven years, as a stabilising agent. This mission should replace NATO/ISAF forces in a phased programme starting from July 2011. For popular acceptance, this mission should be composed of contingents from Muslim countries, excluding this region. Hopefully, the strategy review to be unveiled next month by President Obama would strive to bridge the wide ranging conflicting perceptions into a concrete peace and stability plan for Afghanistan and, as a corollary, for Pakistan. The writer is a retired air commodore of Pakistan Air Force. Email: khalid3408@gmail.com