The author – Nasim Zehra in her book “From Kargil to the Coup” at page 99, has sketched a totally false and malicious narrative against the Pakistan Army and me. In that it has been mentioned, “In 1990, Brigadier Sher Afgan occupied an Indian post in Forward Kahuta, in the Haji Pir area. The Indian hit back with a bloody offensive. They recaptured the post, leaving 150 people dead”. The notion is regrettably misplaced, as the facts are:-

Area Forward Kahuta falls within the operational boundaries of Punch Sector (Naza Pir - Sub Sector) and not Haji Pir.

Forward Kahuta lies at the foot hills of Pir Panjal Range. No post in the area has ever been vacated by the belligerents astride the Line of Control (LOC) in winter, what to talk of summer, the time that enemy attacked Pakistani Post - Mohri (in area Forward Khuta), in 1991. The question of occupying an Indian post is thus fabricated and fictitious.

The enemy attacked Mohri Post during the period August - September 1991 and not an enemy occupied post in 1990, as propounded in the narrative. Thus the place and period of enemy offensive is totally false.

The significance of Mohri Post can be fathomed from the fact that it acted as a base for Pakistani offensive against Punch/Mandi in 1971 war. This post may still be significant for the defense of the area.

The fatal casualty figure of 150, as reported by the author, to say the least can be termed as figment of an evil imagination. It is mentioned that an authenticated and confidential own casualty state (relating to the above mentioned incident) is available, as evidence with me.

If conduct of Pakistani troops was dismal, as expounded by the author, then how did the General Officer Commanding 12 Division (Major General Zia Ul Haq) initiate recommendation roll for military award (Tamgha-i-Basalat) in my respect, on 16 November 1991? Extract from the citation is reproduced here under.  

“Mohri Post dominated on three sides by the enemy position is---------------------------------------------------------------------------. The area around Mohri was being used as ---------------------by the Indians, ------------------------------------------------------. In May 1991, enemy started to indulge in dubious offensive military activities ---------------------------------------. On 23 August 1991, enemy --------------------------around Mohri Post, prior to their attacks aimed at its capture. The purpose of this action was to deter local population from (spread of uprising against Indian occupation in the Srinagar Valley to area) South of Pir Panjal”.

“--------------------------------Brigadier Sher Afgan correctly interpreting enemy moves reinforced Mohri Post--------------------------------------------------. On 26 August 1991, at about 0500 hours, the enemy launched ---------------- attack on Mohri Post----------------------------------------------- .On night 31 August /1 September, enemy -- -----------------------attack, which was defeated decisively, with heavy casualties”. 

“------------------------------------------------------- on 2 September 1991, -----------------------------------.This helped beating back enemy attack, yet again------------------“. 

“In defeating the enemy design, Brigadier Sher Afgan played a pivotal role and has set an inspiring example for all officers to emulate by leading from the front. In this action enemy reportedly suffered very heavy casualties and the Mujahids under Brigade Commander’s close supervision were able to retain post against enemy three successive ------ attacks”.

“For his outstanding leadership qualities, extraordinary courage, devotion to duty, personal example and display of professional expertise in handling the situation, Brigadier Sher Afgan is strongly recommended for the award of Tamgha-i-Basalat.” 

Thus assumption of occupying an Indian Post by Pakistani troops (me) and they hitting back with a bloody offensive,  recapturing the post and leaving 150 people dead is an engineered fabrication.

Immediately after the Indian failed offensive the Pakistani Headquarters 10 Corps while reporting on this enemy hostility, disseminated, “during the recent conflict in Punch Sector, Indians have reportedly suffered heavy losses/casualties, which has adversely affected the morale of troops. Immediately after the conflict, (Indian) Commander 16 Corps and General Officer Commanding 25 Infantry Division visited the Sector to motivate the troops. It is presumed that the Indians may try to avenge the Mohri Post incident to level the score and to give boost to the moral of their troops”. 

The above communication is a vivid depiction of conflict impact on the Indians and the result.

The fore mentioned evidence authenticate that exposition in the book is not only fallacious but an effort to malign and degrade the Army institution and me, for ulterior motives only. The reputed author without ascertaining the truth has reproduced the provided script by an intellectually dishonest and conspiring clique, which is not only unprofessional but regrettable as well. This also creates doubts about the credibility of remaining account that has been narrated in this book.

True to the lofty traditions of journalism, I expect Nasim Zehra to restitute the narrative and tender an apology for her dereliction, both to the Army and me.

 

he writer is a retired Brigadier from the Pakistan Army.