Basharat Hussain Qizilbash Popular leaders often become victims of unnecessary controversies: the bigger the leader, the bigger the controversy. The person and politics of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, is just one example. Much has been written about him by the Muslim, Hindu and British writers but, being directly affected by the outcome of the partition in 1947, they have either written eulogies or elegies on his role in this historic event, lacking balance and imp-artiality expected of historians. A few days ago, I came across a newly published research on the Quaid which can be categorised as an impartial account of his political life. Incidentally, the scholar is an American, William Stafford Metz, who wrote his doctoral dissertation, The political career of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at the University of Pennsylvania in 1952. This was probably the first dissertation on Jinnah. The scholar was able to write an impartial account because neither did he visit the subcontinent nor did he interview the friends and foes of the Quaid which could have coloured his work. In fact, his was a unique position to analyse the role of Pakistans creator from long distance without being personally embroiled in the cross-currents of partition. Till today, Quaids critics accuse him of being a communalist - a charge Jinnah vehemently denied. Metz agrees with Jinnah by stating that his actions had not only borne his denials out, but had continued to justify his title as the Ambassador of Unity. Thus, he was universally regarded as an outstanding leader of the Congress, the Muslim League, the Home Rule League and the Imperial Legislative Council. Actually, it was he who raised voice against communal politics in the Legislative Assembly, by stating: I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Mussalman or a Hindu, for Gods sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House and degrade this Assembly which we desire should become a real national Parliament. Set an example to the outside world and our people. Leaders whom he thought he could deal with passed away one after the other. Jinnah remained on the political scene and hoped that the next crop of the Hindu leaders, in particular Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru would live up to the class of their predecessors but he was to be utterly disappointed. In 1937, when he appealed to Gandhi to use his influence to bring about a Hindu-Muslim settlement, Gandhi despairingly replied: I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless.I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light. Nehrus reply was childish: To talk about the rights and interests of the minorities and their safeguards was utter nonsense. Jinnah did not lose hope. As a last resort, he appealed to the Hindu public to use their collective wisdom to reach an agreement with the Muslims before the British withdrawal: Even nations who have killed millions of each other - which we have not yet done - who may be the bitterest enemies today may become friends tomorrow. This is politics. If your leaders are on this path, as I say they are, and if you do not approve of it, it is your responsibility, the responsibility of the Hindu public, to come forward and say 'stop this internecine war; declare a truce; let us sit as equals and come to a settlement. A question that can be raised at this juncture is, as to who could be blamed for starting communal disharmony in the subcontinent? Metz lays the blame on those Hindu political groups who started aggressive religious revivalist movements. Once the seeds of communal disorder were sown, it became the responsibility of the Hindu majority community to go more than half way to meet the demands of the Muslim minority to make them feel secure. To achieve communal harmony, Jinnah offered to tour the whole of India in the company of top Hindu leaders such as Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Madan Mohan Malaviya but the whole plan was torpedoed, when first Malaviya, the leader of Hindu Mahasabha declined to accompany him and later the other Hindu leaders also rejected his proposals, Lala Lajpat Rai being the chief rejecter. Jinnah felt disgusted. Metz rightly records that his method of compromise and 'give and take after being spurned by the Hindus made the Muslims more defensive and more suspicious of Hindus than ever. The Hindu insistence on the representative form of government was looked upon by Jinnah as a mean to tie the 70 million Muslims hand and foot to the tyranny of the Hindus. He was duly exasperated: I can tell you honestly that the Hindus are foolish.The bulk of the Hindus has lost their heads and their mentality, perhaps you may not know, but I know it. I assure you that unless Hindus will have the courage and confidence - they are afraid of Muslims - this India will never get Swaraj. It is not the joint or separate electorates or five of ten seats. Hindus have not the necessary courage and Hindus are afraid of Muslims. Metzs study has established that the Quaid made repeated attempts to keep the Hindus and Muslims united in their struggle for freedom but when he was left with no option, he regarded partition as the best possible solution of the communal problem for all the peoples of India. Email: qizilbash2000@yahoo.com