INDIA'S military leadership has once again raised the issue of Limited War being a viable option within the overarching nuclear environment. This is part of a renewed belligerency on the part of the Indians, being orchestrated both at the diplomatic-political level and as well as the military. In fact the new pronouncements by the Indian Army Chief, General Kapoor, on Monday was a dangerously destabilising military doctrine whereby India has claimed the right to go for a limited war against a threat from anywhere in the world, including by a subnational group. India has been searching for a way of rationalising war fighting in the post-nuclear strategic environment and had spun the ColdStart Doctrine earlier of a rapid ground/air assault to achieve a limited objective and then assume the international community would intervene to prevent the other side (Pakistan) from responding in nuclear terms. Of course, in principle limited war is always an option for countries; but keeping the war limited is a major problem and within a nuclear environment the danger is far greater. Mutual nuclear deterrence in South Asia has created an interesting and dichotomous security scenario between Pakistan and India. That is, on the one hand the mutuality of the nuclear deterrence has made both sides realise the futility of engaging in an all-out traditional war with each other for territorial gains. But the same logic has allowed both sides a greater freedom to intervene covertly in existing conflicts. Both sides also see a greater flexibility of fighting limited military engagements which they know they must keep limited because of the overall nuclear deterrence. And hence the danger of either of these states playing a game of brinkmanship that can go out of control unintentionally and result in catastrophic unintended consequences. Both Pakistan and India need to realise that nuclear antagonists cannot be locked in a zero sum game environment. Their survival is linked together now. So nuclear deterrence requires the prevalence of conflict and common interest between the two sides. This can push in either of two directions: First, compel the stronger side to take advantage by taking calculated risks knowing the nuclear-related concerns that prevail. This course is dangerous and potentially fatal. Second, move both actors towards cooperation -without the smaller state being overwhelmed by the larger one - and away from risk-ridden policies like limited war and first strike. Finally, it has to be remembered that within the context of South Asia, it is not technology denial that will address the issue of nuclear stability, but political will. Clearly India is still lacking that needed political will to move out of its spirit of adventurism into a mode of behaving like a responsible nuclear state.