FOR once two senior US military officials, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Commander Army Intelligence Maj-General John Custer, have spoken out against their successive governments' wrong policies towards Pakistan, thus touching the right chord in underlying the reasons of public resentment in the country against the US. Although they talked only of the feelings of Pakistan's junior military officers, there is little doubt that the people across the board equally share these feelings. The two US officials pointed to Pressler Amendment and the cutting of military and economic aid to the country. Admiral Mullen admitted that these policies created widespread resentment among junior officers and he had been amazed to note in his contacts with them that these policies - Pressler Amendment, for instance - had left deep imprints on their minds though these officers had not even been born at the time they were devised and implemented. And this fact, both the Admiral and Maj-General believed, had a marked impact on the attitude of Pakistan Army towards the War On Terror. Another reason of their not fully cooperating with the US armed forces against terrorism, Admiral noted in his interview with The Washington Times, is the Americans' tilt towards India and the invasion of Iraq. He also quotes some Pakistanis as saying that the US befriended Islamabad when it needed its services but then cold-shouldered and abandoned it. The Americans have known all along that it was because of these experiences that the Pakistani people refused to buy the overtures of long-lasting friendship they repeatedly made after 9/11. The subsequent US behaviour has not brought about any change in their outlook; rather it has reinforced the sentiment that Washington does not wish to see their country develop and grow. Its point blank refusal to treat Islamabad on the same level as New Delhi for which it went out of the way to break the international nuclear non-proliferation regime it had worked hard to enforce and favoured it with the so-called civilian nuclear technology is a case in point. It ignored Pakistan's urgent need for energy simply because a strengthened India was perceived to be serving its interests vis--vis China. The US would do well to note Admiral Mullen's observation that Pakistan worked sincerely to help it, like for instance in Somalia. The question is would Washington's strategists draw any lesson from their army commanders' assessment? Merely expanding contacts between the two armies would not serve the purpose. They would have to look at the needs of the country as a whole.