Pakistan's current energy shortfall is of strategic dimension. Indeed, it is biting for domestic consumers and crippling for industrial consumers. Pakistan is definitely exploring all possible sources to get over the crisis. The two ongoing efforts are: the import of gas from Iran and procurement of two nuclear power plants from China. In addition, the Iranian gas is to be used for thermal power plants. It is interesting to see how our self-proclaimed strategic partner is making all-out efforts to scuttle both these agreements. It is unlucky for the Americans that whenever they have a chance to accrue goodwill of the people of Pakistan, some of their high-ranking officials get entangled in side issues in such a way that even their prevalent popularity level goes for a dip. The first round of Strategic Dialogue had hardly managed the damage done by the Kerry-Lugar fiasco, that now the issue of these two vital power generation projects is all set to reinforce America's anti-Pakistan image. While visiting Pakistan in a run-up to the forthcoming second round of strategic dialogue next month, Richard Holbrooke got embroiled in the pipeline controversy, and stirred up the controversy. He cautioned Pakistan against "over committing" itself to the gas pipeline project with Iran, claiming that the new US legislation was in the offing and could target this project as well. These comments were a volte-face to his remarks a day earlier. At the same time, the Pak-Iran gas pipeline agreement is not an ordinary project; its implications are of vital importance for our economic well being. Pakistan's economy is under heavy pressure due to energy shortfall. As a corollary, both domestic and foreign investments are headed for a nosedive. In the present circumstances, any attempt to hit this project will deal a severe blow to the Pak-US relations. Besides, Holbrooke's statement is an eye-opener in the context of shallowness of this relationship. The gas pipeline project is a commercial venture which does not fall within the purview of the latest curbs on Iran that mainly relate to military aspects and refined petroleum. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 does not even mention the gas sector. Hopefully, all follow up legislations would remain within the parameters of this resolution, and no country would venture into interpreting the sanctions in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the resolution. US Senator Joseph Lieberman said last week that he "expects the Congress to shortly finish legislation tightening US sanctions on Iran that will include provisions affecting the supply of refined petroleum products to Tehran, and add to sanctions on its financial sector." Meanwhile, a House-Senate committee of negotiators is working on the final details of the bill that could pass by early July. However, this legislation could take a twist to have "major implications for Pakistani companies" slated for executing the pipeline project. In a concurrent effort, Pakistan has been urging the US to consider an India-like civilian nuclear deal but Washington has been evading such discussions. To top it all, the US is even opposing Pakistan-China cooperation in the field of nuclear energy despite the fact that this is fully under the safeguards of the IAEA. In keeping with its discriminatory policy of selective application of Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US has decided to object to the Sino-Pak civilian nuclear arrangement during the meeting of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). NSG is an international cartel of nuclear technology suppliers and was not created by an international treaty. Regulations of NSG are non-binding. China joined the cartel voluntarily. It is interesting to recall that the NSG was created in 1975 as a reaction to India's testing of a nuclear explosive device. Ironically the same NSG was pressurized by America, Russia and France to make country specific exemption to kickstart the US-India nuclear deal (Agreement 123) in 2008. IAEA also buckled under pressure to make country specific exception to enable India's access to nuclear material and know how. India continues to be a non-signatory of NPT. Nevertheless, in a typical twist of hypocrisy, an erratic perception is being generated that the Pak-China arrangement appears to be violating international guidelines forbidding nuclear exports to the countries that have not signed the NPT or do not have international safeguards on reactors. Contrasting it with Agreement 123 reveals that the Pak-China arrangement is purely for power generation under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, whereas Agreement 123 exempts the eight Indian nuclear reactors from IAEA safeguards allowing sufficient fissile material to make around 280 warheads per year. This is in addition to India's ongoing programme of 13 fast breeder reactors. As such it is a misnomer to call Agreement 123 as US-India Civil Nuclear Deal. It is indeed US-India collusion toward nuclear weapons proliferation programme. As a follow on to Agreement 123, the US and India have recently signed a nuclear fuel reprocessing agreement to further augment their dubious bilateral nuclear cooperation that would open venues for India to recycle American spent nuclear fuel. This would undoubtedly facilitate participation by the US firms in India's rapidly expanding civil nuclear energy sector. Thus, it is amazing to see how floodgates of nuclear facilitation have been opened for India, a non-signatory to NPT, and at the same time how Iran, a member of NPT, is being denied access to peaceful levels of fuel cycle. Likewise, America is now bent upon blocking legitimate access of nuclear energy to Pakistan, even under IAEA safeguards. The US has communicated to China that it "expects Beijing to cooperate with Pakistan in ways consistent with Chinese non-proliferation obligations." Furthermore, the western and Indian media has gone into top gear to create a perception that this bilateral cooperation would breach international protocol about the trade of nuclear equipment and material. Though India is not a member of NSG, it is lobbying hard with its (NSG) members to block the agreement. China and Pakistan have rightly rejected the unfounded US concerns. Moreover, Beijing has defended its nuclear cooperation with Islamabad. China has indicated that it would work with Pakistan to promote a strategic partnership to deepen bilateral cooperation. Similarly from Pakistan's perspective, the Pak-China civilian nuclear cooperation is under IAEA safeguards; therefore concerns, if any, are misplaced. China is likely to exercise its sovereign right and ignore the guidelines, which are voluntary and non-binding. It might also argue that the exports could be justified by the need for regional balance in South Asia in the aftermath of the NSG's facilitation of India. Notwithstanding the stumbling blocks, both these projects (Iran-Pak gas pipeline project and nuclear power plants from China) of vital national interest would materialise in due course. However, this double squeeze by the Americans exposes, yet for another time, the hollowness with which the US handles Pakistan's sensitivities. The US needs to realise that only tall claims do not make strategic partners. Meaningful actions are the essential glue to sustain such bonds. The writer is a retired Air Commodore of Pakistan Air Force. Email: khalid3408@gmail.com