Six months ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had put forth three cornerstones for American policy in Afghanistan: A strong military effort to defeat Al-Qaeda and support the Afghans as they secure their sovereignty; a civilian push to promote economic development and good governance; and a diplomatic surge to support the Afghan-led reconciliation process. To pursue these ends, the USA has been focusing its exit strategy on a triad of conflicting parameters: Attacking the resistance forces to decimate them, while, at the same time, putting up a facade of negotiations with breakaway factions, it has invested heavily in building the Afghan security forces for enabling them to take over the bulk of the 'dirty fighting assignments from the NATO and ISAF. However, these efforts have reached a dead end. The window of opportunity that propped up after the NATO and ISAF started handing over district wise control to the Afghan security forces appears to be shutting off fast by the reports about a dubious Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which the US is trying to impose on Afghanistan. It is aimed at allowing the US military presence in Afghanistan until 2024. An effort to secure six to eight military bases is also on, but in a hush hush manner. As a result, Afghanistan is back to the brink of disaster. The Afghan resistance elements no longer trust American administrations sincerity in the negotiations and consider it as a ploy to gain time to weaken them militarily. The multibillion dollar training of the Afghan national army and police force may at best be taken as a waste of money. This year alone, $12 billion will go down the drain in an effort to develop effective army and police forces in Afghanistan. Despite tremendous investment, the Afghan security forces are nowhere close to the mark. During poppy cultivation and harvesting seasons, the security personnel desert their units to participate in these better paying activities; however, return to their units during intervening periods The perception at senior levels of the Afghan intelligentsia has it that the USA wants to use Afghanistan indefinitely, as a springboard for power projection in Asia and the Middle East. An increasing number of Afghans consider the American counterterrorism operations, as a venture aimed at look busy do nothing. Independent analysts opine that America and its Western European followers are adamant at not letting Asia and the Far East benefit from the natural resources of Central Asia. And for this they are working hard to keep Afghanistan and Balochistan (including the Iranian portion) on boiling pot. Since the American advent in Afghanistan, a number of oil and gas pipelines have become functional connecting the Central Asian oil and gas to Europe and beyond. Contrary to the upbeat rhetoric about progress in counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the situation points toward a military and political deadlock. Afghanistan is in a deep perpetual crisis and its fragile democratic institutions are crumbling. In a desperate attempt to strengthen his constituency, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has recently dissolved the 'independent Election Commission that was looking into the frauds during the recent parliamentary election. Certainly, tainted parliamentarians would be more pliable for the approval of the upcoming SOFA. But the situation stays hazy as to what the US expects to achieve by simultaneously wanting to target and talk to the Taliban leaders. In this 'kill, capture or reconcile strategy, the US expects Pakistan to assist by facilitating contacts and, at the same time, take action against the Taliban leaders unwilling to oblige. Amid rapid deterioration in the law and order situation across the country, the recent spate of effective operations and high-profile assassinations by the Taliban indicates that the Western-backed government in Kabul may not be able to survive for long after the foreign withdrawal. These attacks look like an armed campaign with the tinge of a nationalist movement, directed against the foreign occupiers and their local extensions. The Afghan majority now believes that America is the part of problem and it no longer wants to be a part of the solution; lest the solution comes by. To come out of this impasse, however, the US needs to come clean about its objectives in Afghanistan, indicating a political track in synch with military strategy; it must support the countrys institutions and democratic forces. It should also employ its leverage more effectively to encourage political and economic reforms. Washingtons unwillingness to propose any confidence-building measures, like suspending night raids in return for the Talibans cessation of assassinations, reflects the continuing inconsistency in the American policymaking structures. Different components of the administration seem fixed to different ends. While the White House and State Department appear to support the reconciliation process, Pentagon still feels that talks with the Taliban amount to an admission of failure. Thanks to the internal dysfunctions in Washington, the military strategy is still at odds with its declared objective of seeking a negotiated end to the war. Escalating special operation missions prompts the Taliban to continue fighting and not abandon it, rather than go for talks. The notion that more fighting will force the Taliban into negotiations means pursuing elusive battlefield gains. Nevertheless, the historical record of peace processes suggests that they start with some form of an 'agreed to stand down approach leading to a negotiated ceasefire. Indeed, mutual reduction of violence will help create the political conditions for dialogue. Such a roadmap for an Afghan-led peace process could involve various phases, starting with a reciprocal de-escalation of violence to create the conditions for peace efforts. If America resorts to mutual cessation of violence, as a necessary starting point, a sustainable plan could be crafted for a peace process. Another American rhetoric about interlocking a trio of 'defence, diplomacy and development is equally lopsided. The Congress has allocated $1.3 trillion to the Defence Department for war spending through the fiscal year 2011, whereas the annual budget of the State Department is $27.4 billion. Unfortunately, Washington and Islamabad view the Afghan conflict through different prisms. While Pakistan is making an effort to work out an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political solution, which is also acceptable to its neighbouring states, America is attempting to coerce the Afghans to a militarily imposed solution, underwritten by the prolonged presence of its military in the war-torn country. It is not without reason that the ethnic composition of the Afghan army and police is quite similar to the Northern Alliance militia of yesteryears. The writer is a retired Air Commodore and former assistant chief of air staff of the Pakistan Air Force. At present, he is a member of the visiting faculty at the PAF Air War College, Naval War College and Quaid-i-Azam University. Email:khalid3408@gmail.com