Once again Pakistan-India talks have become the victim of a deadlock as is quite apparent from the result of our foreign secretarys visit to India last week. A deadlock in Pakistan-India talks is nothing extraordinary. In fact, if one looks at the history of Pakistan-India relations, it has been a common feature of this complex and difficult relationship. The only thing which is different this time is that the bilateral talks in substantive terms have been deadlocked even before they could begin. This speaks volumes about the current status of Pakistan-India relations mired as they are in mutual mistrust, grievances and animosity. It was quite clear after the three-hour talks between the two foreign secretaries in New Delhi on February 25 that the positions of the two countries were far apart. In fact, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir, while talking to the Pakistani media after the talks, remarked that the gap between the two countries was widening. Indias focus during the talks was on the issue of terrorism on which it handed over two dossiers to the Pakistani foreign secretary demanding the arrest and handing over by Pakistan of the founder of Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hafiz Saeed, and seven other operatives besides some Indian mujah-ideen and Khalistan militants. India expressed its inability to recommence the composite dialogue without the unravelling of the full conspiracy behind the Mumbai terrorist attack. Even before the talks began, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao told his Pakistani counterpart in front of the media that her mandate was to tell you that the territory of Pakistan must not be used for terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, called for the recommencement of the composite dialogue and stressed that the issue of terrorism should not be allowed to make bilateral talks a hostage. The Pakistani side also called for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir issue, besides conveying to India its concerns over Indian activities aimed at supplying weapons to militants and terrorists in Balochistan from Afghanistan. Pakistan also handed over to India a paper on the water issue and expressed the hope that India would agree to resolve the issue under the Indus Basin Waters Treaty. As for the issue of terrorism, Salman Bash-ir pointed out to the media that Pakistan had already taken steps against the suspects of Mumbai attacks and would look into the dossiers handed over by India during the talks. The net result of the foreign secretary-level talks was mer-ely the agreement to remain in touch with each other. The position remained unchanged even after Salman Bashirs courtesy call on the Indian Foreign Minister Krishna who remarked that future engagement with Pakistan would be predicated on Pakistans response to our core concern on terrorism. This was not entirely surprising considering the high level of anti-Pakistan sentiment in India, especially after the Mumbai tragedy, and the criticism by some Indian opposition leaders of New Delhis move to invite the Pakistani foreign secretary for talks. It was a measure of the gulf between the two sides that the Pakistani foreign secretary did not invite his Indian counterpart for a return visit to Islama-bad. In fact, he remarked after the talks that there was no need for secretary-level talks if India remained stuck to its stand on outstanding issues. The best interpretation that can be given is that the talks in New Delhi were exploratory in nature aimed at gauging each others position and that they marked the first step towards a gradual process of rebuilding mutual trust leading hopefully to the resumption of the composite dialogue. Obviously, the next SAARC Summit in Bhutan in April would provide a valuable opportunity to the prime ministers of Pakistan and India to carry forward the process of bilateral talks. But in view of the many ifs and buts involved, it is anybodys guess as to the timeframe in which substantive dialogue on the outstanding issues of concern to the two sides would be resumed. The future prospects of Pakistan-India relations remain uncertain considering the high level of mutual mistrust, the historical baggage of mutual grievances, the complexity of the outstanding issues like Kashmir and the clash of the strategic interests of the two countries in South Asia. According to well-known Indian analysts such as C Raja Mohan, India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers. Indias quest for hegemony in South Asia is in direct clash with Pakistans strategic objective of preserving its independence and maintaining its ability to deal with India on the basis of sovereign equality. Until India changes its mindset in dealing with Pakistan and agrees to resolve outstanding issues including the Kashmir issue through peaceful means, Pakistan-India relations will continue to suffer from tensions preventing the two countries from realising their full potential politically and economically. Peace between Pakistan and India is a strategic imperative particularly in view of the possession of nuclear weapons by them. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the two countries to defuse tensions in their relations, build up mutual trust through CBMs, try to resolve their disputes through peaceful means, and promote mutually beneficial cooperation in economic, commercial, technical and cultural fields. The strengthening of the peace process would also enable the two countries to limit their military expenditures and divert resources to the urgent tasks of accelerating economic development and eradicating widespread poverty from which the people of the two countries suffer. Thus, the resumption of the composite dialogue is in the mutual interest of Pakistan and India. By engaging in it or resuming it, neither of the two countries would do any favour to the other. It would also be an unproductive approach by either side to predicate the resumption of substantive talks on the prior settlement of one issue or the other as India has done because talks are meant to pave the way for the resolution of mutual differences and disputes. Pakistans past policy concerning India in the past has suffered from oscillations between the hardline position of the hawks who did not desist from risking war with India, as in the case of Kargil, and the meek approach of the doves who are prepared to go so far as to endanger the very existence of Pakistan, as a sovereign country enjoying political and economic independence, as reflected by the proposal to form an economic union with India. We should instead pursue a long-term approach towards India based on a realistic assessment of each others strategic objectives and potential, as well as of the international security environment, which rules out resort to violence by non-state actors. Above all, we should adopt a low-risk and non-adventurous approach towards India while combating extremism and terrorism internally and accelerating our economic development. The writer is a retired ambassador. Email: javid.husain@gmail.com