The agreement signed between Iran and P5+1 on 24 November is essentially an interim arrangement envisaging some constraints on Iran’s nuclear programme for a period of six months in return for some easing of sanctions against Tehran. The two sides are expected to work out a long-term comprehensive solution during this period. The deal was undoubtedly a major breakthrough in the on-again and off-again negotiations which had been going for about a decade since the disclosure of Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz by the Iranian opposition in 2002. This disclosure caused international concern because highly enriched uranium can be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Last month’s deal has major implications for Iran’s nuclear programme and its role in the region, NPT, Israel, the Middle East, and Pakistan. It is important for us to understand these implications clearly to adjust our regional and international policies accordingly.
The main objective of the West in its negotiations with Iran initially was to persuade it to give up its uranium enrichment programme and stop work on its heavy water reactor at Arak as the latter could theoretically enable Iran to extract plutonium from the spent fuel for the production of nuclear weapons. Iran agreed to open its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz together with other nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections to remove international concerns in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). But it refused to dismantle its uranium enrichment programme or stop work on its heavy water reactor at Arak claiming that under NPT, it was entitled to develop these facilities for peaceful purposes. This difference of position between the West and Iran has been the main bone of contention between the two sides in the negotiations over the past decade.
Iran’s refusal to give up its right to undertake uranium enrichment under IAEA safeguards resulted in the dragging of the negotiations between P5+1 and Tehran for over a decade without finding a satisfactory solution. In the process, Iran was subjected to binding UN Security Council sanctions and hard-hitting sanctions by the US and the EU. Despite these sanctions and threats of use of force by the US and Israel, Iran’s uranium enrichment programme has made progress both quantitatively and qualitatively. Iran was also able to establish a new underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow equipped with more advanced centrifuges than those at Natanz. Iran has by now accumulated about 200kg of uranium enriched up to 20% level besides about 7,200kg of uranium enriched up to 5% level. However, Iran’s oil exports and economy have suffered badly over the past year and a half because of the hard-hitting sanctions imposed by the US and the EU over its oil exports and the banking sector generating domestic political pressure for reaching an agreement with the West on the issue.
It was against this background that after the election of Hasan Rouhani, who has the reputation of being a moderate and a pragmatist, as the new President of Iran earlier this year, the negotiations between Iran and P5+1 received a new impetus leading to the conclusion of the interim agreement. As a part of this deal, Iran has agreed to get rid of its stock of 20% enriched uranium by diluting it to less than 5%. It will also freeze its enrichment capabilities at the current level, will not increase its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and refrain from most of the work on the Arak heavy water reactor. Iran has also agreed to an extremely intrusive inspection regime on its nuclear facilities. In return, Iran will get access to about $4.2 billion in frozen bank accounts and some easing of sanctions on its trade in petrochemical and other products worth about $7 billion spread over six months.
During this period, the two sides will negotiate a long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful and would involve a reciprocal and step-by-step lifting of UN Security Council as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme. This comprehensive solution significantly “would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme.”
From Iran’s point of view, the most important achievement under the interim agreement is the recognition of its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes albeit under stringent safeguards and strict limits. Indirectly, this also means that Iran would retain nuclear-weapon capability. From the point of view of the West, the strict restrictions placed upon Iran’s nuclear programme would minimize the risk of the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and stretch the period it would need for a nuclear breakout, thus giving sufficient time to the international community for launching a response. This would be particularly the case if the two sides are able to work out a long-term comprehensive solution.
The conclusion of the long-term solution envisaged in the interim agreement would also enable Iran to increase its oil and gas exports, regain economic strength, and accelerate its economic growth because of the lifting of UN, multilateral and national sanctions. This would open up new avenues of Pakistan-Iran economic and commercial cooperation both bilaterally and within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization. It would also revive the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. It is heartening to note that a Pakistani delegation led by the Minister for Petroleum is already in Tehran to renegotiate the terms of the gas pipeline project.
Israel, perhaps, is the unhappiest state because of the interim agreement between P5+1 and Iran. It is now faced with the grim prospect of an Iran enjoying economic strength and nuclear-weapon capability. It has, therefore, launched an intense political campaign in the US, both in the Congress and outside, to create hurdles in the successful conclusion of the long-term comprehensive solution. Its target would be to subject Iran’s nuclear programme to such stringent conditions as to remove any possibility of deviation by it from the peaceful path.
President Obama can take credit for minimizing the possibility of a nuclear breakout by Iran through negotiations instead of the use of force which might have embroiled the US into a third war in the greater Middle East since 9/11. From the US point of view, this is a welcome development since it is in no position to assume the burden of such a war because of war-weariness among its people, the fragility of its economic recovery, the high level of its national debt, and its huge budgetary and external account deficits.
From the international point of view, the interim agreement carries several important implications. It has driven home once again the limitations of the US power as it has lost its unipolar moment due to the rise of China and the assertiveness of Russia. At the regional level, there would be realignment of alliances in the Middle East because of the emergence of Iran as a dominant power in the region because of the size of its population, its huge natural resources, and the high level of education of its people. This prospect has caused concern among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region, particularly Saudi Arabia. Hopefully, major countries of the Persian Gulf region would work out a new security structure for ensuring regional peace and stability. Pakistan’s interest lies in encouraging the evolution of such a regional security structure and in keeping its options open so as to take full advantage of the opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation offered by an Iran free of debilitating sanctions.

The writer is a retired ambassador and the president of the Lahore Council for World Affairs.

Email:javid.husain@gmail.com