With great fanfare, President Obama laid out his AfPak strategy on March 27. While the strategy does have some positive points, it suffers from serious flaws which make its success highly unlikely unless it is fundamentally modified. The strategy seeks to triple US economic assistance to Pakistan to the tune of US$1.5 billion per annum over the next five years and promises to send 4,000 troops to train Afghan security forces besides the 17,000 additional troops authorised earlier in February for Afghanistan. This would raise the total US aid to Pakistan to US$2 billion per annum including US$500 million in the form of military assistance. In addition, Obama called upon the Congress to pass the bill for creating reconstruction opportunity zones in Pakistan's border region to develop the economy. The increase in aid to Pakistan was not unconditional as Pakistan would be expected to "demonstrate its commitment to rooting out Al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders." As President Obama put it, the US did not want to provide a "blank cheque" any more. It would "insist action be taken one way or the other when we have intelligence about high level targets." The strategy would also increase the US military expenditure in Afghanistan by 60 percent from the current level of US$2 billion a month. Obama called upon the US allies to join a major new civilian effort to stabilise Afghanistan and warned the Afghan leaders that he would not turn a blind eye towards government corruption. Explaining the rationale of the new strategy, Obama stressed: "Al-Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the US homeland from its safe havens in Pakistan." Therefore, the clear and focused US goal was "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future." He added that Afghanistan and Pakistan were inextricably linked. As for the Taliban, Obama distinguished between "an uncompromising core of the Taliban", which must be defeated militarily, and other opposition forces in Afghanistan who must be drawn back into the fold. The US president stressed the commonality of Pakistani and American peace and security goals in terms of their desire to get rid of the terrorist threat and vowed a "lasting partnership with the Pakistani people." He expressed the view that the "single greatest threat" to the future of the Pakistani people came from Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies and that was why the US and Pakistan must stand together. In recognition of the need for broad regional support for a lasting peace and security in Afghanistan and for the struggle against Al-Qaeda, President Obama announced his intention to seek together with the UN the formation of a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan including the US-NATO allies, Central Asian states, the Gulf nations, Iran, Russia, India and China. He also gave the assurance of the US constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan for easing strains between the two countries over their disputes. Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in many ways is an improvement over the approach which the Bush Administration had adopted in dealing with these two countries and the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. For instance, it rightly commits the US support to a democratic Pakistan with the much-needed economic and military assistance. Its emphasis on the enhancement of Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation must be welcomed as peace in Afghanistan is not attainable without such cooperation. It also correctly recognises the need for regional support to efforts for the restoration of peace and security in Afghanistan. One can question the wisdom of including India in the Contact Group for Afghanistan because India's main purpose is to fish in troubled waters as our experience of its expanding presence in Afghanistan so far has shown. But the main blame for this misjudgement lies with the Musharraf government and the leadership of the Foreign Office at that time for having facilitated the entry of Afghanistan into the SAARC. If Afghanistan is a part of South Asia, which it is not, it stands to reason that India should be included in the Contact Group for Afghanistan whether we like it or not. Obama has sensibly ruled out sending ground troops for operations in Pakistan in pursuance of its strategic goals against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. He also rightly recognises that the campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. Finally, the Obama Administration is right in distinguishing between Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation and the Taliban in Afghanistan who are essentially a political force, howsoever retrogressive they may be, fighting for regaining power after they were forcibly overthrown by the Americans and their allies. The Obama strategy has left open the possibility of reaching an understanding with the relatively moderate Taliban with a view to drawing them away from fighting and back into the political process. But the central thesis on which Obama's AfPak strategy is based is deeply flawed. Obama like his predecessor has reversed the cause and effect relationship between the situation in Afghanistan and FATA in the formulation of his strategy. It was the US invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban government which had forced the Taliban in Afghanistan and their sympathisers to take up arms against the coalition forces. It was this development which had sucked the tribesmen from our tribal areas into the fighting in Afghanistan because of close tribal ties, despite the best efforts of the government of Pakistan. It is thus the continued fighting and turmoil in Afghanistan which have embroiled our tribal areas and virtually set them on fire with dire consequences for Pakistan. To pretend otherwise as President Obama appears to be doing can only lead to defective analysis and erroneous conclusions. Obama's emphasis on Pakistan taking steps to "root out Al-Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders" while conveniently overlooking the imperative of a new political settlement enjoying widespread support in Afghanistan amounts to putting the cart before the horse. His insistence on this course of action will merely destabilise Pakistan as the US policy did in Cambodia in the course of the war in Vietnam, without any notable success in Afghanistan. This is not to deny the need for the government and the people of Pakistan to take steps in their own interest to eradicate terrorism and overcome extremism through a judicious combination of political, developmental, educational and administrative steps and the use of force when unavoidable. Even under the best of circumstances, the measures required of us by the Obama Administration will not restore peace and normalcy in Afghanistan unless the US takes the lead in bringing about a new broad-based political settlement in that country. The mere increased use of force will not enable Washington to achieve its stated goals in Afghanistan. The fundamental problem in Afghanistan is the absence of a political dispensation which enjoys widespread support among its masses. Such a political dispensation must take into account the cultural and tribal characteristics of the Afghan people and the conservative character of the Afghan society. The fundamental need of Afghanistan is national reconciliation between the Pakhtuns and the non-Pakhtuns to put an end to the fighting between the various political forces in the country. This objective can be achieved only through a political process by engaging the different political forces in Afghanistan including, amongst others, the Taliban who are mostly Pakhtuns rather than by bombing them into submission as the Bush Administration unsuccessfully tried to do and as the Obama Administration seems to be planning to do. The new political dispensation in Afghanistan must be endorsed by great powers and its neighbours, particularly Pakistan and Iran without whose support durable peace in Afghanistan will remain elusive. It is in this context that a bilateral understanding between Pakistan and Iran on Afghanistan is of the utmost importance. The writer is a retired ambassador E-mail: javid.husain@gmail.com