The unravelling of the current political structure in Iraq under the weight of an insurgency spearheaded by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and supported by the vast majority of the Sunnis in the country carries important lessons for the handling of Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario. There are several similarities between the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq which need to be analyzed carefully by our policy makers and others so as to avoid the mistakes committed in Iraq and to adopt policies aimed at ushering in an era of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan free of foreign interference.
Both Afghanistan and Iraq were invaded by the US and the incumbent governments in these countries were replaced by new political structures grounded in unrealistic assumptions and neglect of ground realities. In the case of Iraq, the government left behind by the Americans after their military withdrawal in 2011 was dominated by the Shias resulting in the alienation of the Sunnis who had ruled the country earlier. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s dictatorial rule and suppression of the Sunnis provided the political space for ISIS to gain strength. As a result, there is an acute danger now of the country splitting into three parts—-a Kurdish state in the north, a Sunni- dominated and ISIS-controlled state in the centre of Iraq and the eastern parts of Syria, and a Shia-dominated state in the south. This would amount to redrawing the map of the Middle East worked out after World War I.
The similarities of the Iraqi situation with the state of affairs in Afghanistan are striking. The government established by the Americans in Afghanistan in pursuance of the Bonn Agreement after the overthrow of the Taliban regime was dominated by the Northern Alliance to the exclusion of most of the Pashtuns. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was the President of the country under the new set-up but the real power lay mostly in the hands of the Northern Alliance elements. That is why Jaswant Singh, former Indian foreign minister, describes the new Afghan government, installed on 22 December, 2001, in his latest book as “the Northern Alliance government”.
It was, therefore, only a matter of time before the Afghan Taliban, who are overwhelmingly Pashtuns, would regroup and launch their struggle against the US occupation of Afghanistan and the government installed by Washington in Kabul. This is precisely what happened following the diversion of the US attention to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 providing the Afghan Taliban the political space and the military opening for launching their insurgency. While the alienation of the Sunnis has provided the fuel for the insurgency in Iraq, it is the disaffection of the Pashtuns which has been the main motivating force behind the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 barring perhaps a residual force of about 10,000 troops, there is a strong likelihood that the Taliban insurgency would gather further momentum with the passage of time, posing a grave threat to the stability and survival of the government in Kabul.
If necessary pre-emptive steps are not taken, the regional countries may be sucked into the Afghan civil war in the post-2014 scenario as is happening now in Iraq and as happened in the case of Afghanistan in the 1990’s when Pakistan supported the Taliban and Iran together with other regional countries extended support to the Northern Alliance. The re-ignition of a full-fledged civil war in Afghanistan therefore, also carries the risk of a wider armed conflict and regional instability. Battle-lines in the case of Afghanistan would be drawn mainly on ethnic lines. It is worth remembering that in Afghanistan, ethnic and tribal links supersede loyalty to the state and the country as a whole.
Perhaps the most important lesson of Afghanistan’s history and Iraq’s experience is that artificial political structures which ignore political and cultural realities on the ground have a destabilizing effect and rarely succeed in bringing about durable peace and stability. The present political structure in Afghanistan has alienated most of the Pashtuns in the country. Unless it is reformed by giving due share in power to various ethnic communities in Afghanistan, be they Pashtuns, Tajiks or Hazaras, the country will remain embroiled in a civil war and the goal of durable peace and stability will remain elusive. An intra-Afghan dialogue leading to national reconciliation and a broad-based government, therefore, is a must.
It is equally imperative that in encouraging the peace moves in Afghanistan, the regional countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, resist the temptation to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and allow the Afghan people to decide their destiny. Further, it is not in Afghanistan’s interest or in the interests of the region that the Afghan government be under the exclusive control of the Taliban or the Northern Alliance as that would guarantee continued unrest in the country. From Pakistan’s point of view, an exclusively Taliban-controlled government in Afghanistan would be fraught with particularly grave risks because of the possibility of the fallout of its obscurantist ideology in Pakistan. A broad-based and neutral Afghan government is the only answer to the predicament which Afghanistan and the region currently face.
Finally, it is essential that Afghanistan’s affairs are managed in such a way that Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist organizations are not able to strike roots in the country or elsewhere in the region. The elimination of these terrorist outfits is an indispensable condition for regional peace and stability. The decision to combat terrorism would also be necessary to attract the support of the international community, particularly the major powers, to the peace settlement in Afghanistan. However, in the pursuit of the anti-terrorism policy, we must distinguish between the Afghan Taliban, who are struggling for their legitimate political rights, and Al Qaeda and its affiliates who are engaged in terrorism, pure and simple.
As the situation stands currently in Afghanistan, there is little likelihood of the initiation and success of an intra-Afghan dialogue producing a broad-based government before the end of 2014. Instead, the chances of the intensification of the internal armed conflict in Afghanistan are much greater. If this indeed happens, the regional countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, should not yield to the temptation to fish in troubled waters as they did in the 90’s to their mutual detriment. In the face of such a scenario they would be better advised to coordinate their Afghan policies guided by the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and aimed at encouraging moves by the Afghan parties towards durable peace in the country. The ground-work for such coordination must be laid now rather than later when a full-blown civil war ignites in Afghanistan.

 The writer is a retired ambassador and the president of the Lahore Council for World Affairs.

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