Prime Minister Mian Nawaz sharif completed his visit to the White House without having made any concessions on the nuclear programme, and without obtaining a civilian nuclear accord. Though Mian Nawaz avoided the chits that bedevillled his last visit, getting a promise of eight F-16s allowed him some claim of having looked after the military.

The US newspaper report that Pakistan had developed tactical nuclear weapons was confirmed by its Foreign Secretary, but he denied that there was to be any deal involving Pakistan giving up these weapons in exchange for a civilian nuclear accord, as well as entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which involve accepting IAEA safeguards. These weapons were developed because of a military need not out of some whim. They do not play any great-power role, and are strictly for battlefield use. They represent an attempt to restrict the use of nuclear weapons, and prevent them having a strategic application. At first sight, this is achieved, because they are meant to be used if India applies its Cold Start Doctrine, which involves attacking Pakistan with a reduced mobilisation time, by a series of armoured thrusts from Punjab and Rajasthan. Pakistan would counter by using tactical nuclear weapons on concentrations of armour before they attacked.

However, there are disadvantages to this. First, there is no preventing radioactive material from a nuclear explosion spreading, though it is not likely to cause nuclear winter. However, second, once nuclear weapons are used, no one can predict the reaction of the victim; it might well be to use strategic nuclear weapons, in which case it is possible that nuclear winter might be precipitated. Therefore, there is a certain logic to American nonproliferation efforts.

However, the logic apparently breaks down due to the USA’s lopsided approach, where India is given a civilian nuclear deal which more or less seals its entry into the club of nuclear powers, but with the continued exclusion of Pakistan. India has been given so many excessive favours for two reasons. The first, was that it was to be won away from Russia, which inherited the alliance from the old USSR, whose collapse had driven India to ally with the USA. Second, and perhaps more important, there is an Indian diaspora in the USA, which is growing both numerically and monetarily. Though there has been some effort, the Pakistani counterpart has not developed the same clout.

One result is that while Mian Nawaz is a foreign leader in Washington, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to President Obama someone with a domestic political constituency. While Mian Nawaz was treated as someone who affected US interests, Modi would be treated as someone affecting the interests of the Democratic Party. Therefore, though Mian Nawaz made it a point to raise the Kashmir issue, President Obama would only have listened as far as it would be convenient for him to have done, which is to say not at all.

The only lever Pakistan has, is the one provided by India. India, under the BJP in a mood to throw its weight around, has heated up the Line of Control, shooting up Pakistani villages and attacking Pakistani posts. The result is that the two countries edge loser to war. Such a war might turn nuclear. That is not something anyone wants, including the USA. From the Indian perspective, the ideal solution would be for the USA to force Pakistan to give up its own nuclear weapon, and then submit to the sort of bullying that was on display when in 1998, India had exploded a nuclear device, and Pakistan had not yet tested its own. The USA is falling in with this.

Another subject which Mian Nawaz and President Obama spoke about was Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not yet in any sort of end-game. The USA may have left a residual force behind, and its response to the fall of Kunduz has been to keep that force in Afghanistan. It is worrying for the future of the region’s peace and stability that there is no timeline indicating when it would be withdrawn. Kunduz fell, but after it was taken back, Ghazni almost did, though it was saved from doing so. After almost 16 years in the country, the USA has not pacified it enough to let the regime it established survive on its own. The Taliban insurgency is strong enough that the USA wants to bring it to the negotiating table. For that it needs the help of Pakistan. Perhaps crucially, apart from counter-terrorism being mentioned, there was no further mention of what assurances or promises on this topic were made by either side.

The obtaining of the F16s was perhaps more related to the chit issue that is normally thought. As a major non-NATO ally, Pakistan had a right to expect the F16s it was given. However, the F16s have continuously been used as a political bargaining chip ever since they were first introduced to the PAF about three decades ago. The first thing they represent is the shortfall in PAF pilot satisfaction with the JF17

Thunder, in whose development the PAF had a role. The JF17 has been inducted into the PAF, but is apparently seen as a substitute not for the F16, or else further F16s would not be inducted. The F17 is apparently meant as a substitute for the F6, which has been the mainstay off the PAF for decades. However, by getting more F16s, the military has received a gesture. It should be noted that along with the troops actually holding ground taken, it is the PAF which has been used extensively against the militants in the mountainous terrain of Waziristan.

Therefore, the PAF’s abilities translate into the Army’s ability to fight the USA. While it is often argued that it is actually Pakistan’s war, it is undeniable that it is the USA’s war. It is also India’s war, because the militants have been used by the Pakistan military in Kashmir. Thus it is also India’s war, not because of some general anti-terror principle, but because of a very specific desire to remain undisturbed in illegal occupation of Kashmir.

Just as the Army is seen as behind the PAF, it is also seen as being behind the overall foreign policy. It is significant that the politician Sartaj Aziz, while retaining the Foreign Affairs portfolio, was replaced as PM’s National Security Adviser by a retired general for this visit.

There is already speculation about COAS Gen Raheel Sharif’s impending visit to the USA as the ‘real’ one, which will seal the agreements made during this one. This visit accompanies speculation that General Raheel was to have his term (ending next September) extended. In his last visit, Mian Nawaz is supposed to have used notes provided by the Army on a sheet of paper. He did not use such a ‘cheat-sheet’ again, but he did not say anything to President Obama that the Army did not want him to hear.

One problem that the Pak-US relationship has, and which Mian Nawaz is experiencing again, is that without Afghanistan, the focus will be on Pakistan. Especially now, when the USA is increasingly seeing India as the solution to its problems in the region, it will narrow in on those areas where Pakistan wants to defy the USA which does not brook defiance.