It wouldn’t be hyperbole to say that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decisions announced in the National Assembly on Wednesday left the nation in shell shock. To a country expecting a detailed strategy and an all-out war on militancy after being under siege for several months, not only the intent to ‘talk’ with the Taliban, but the choice of persons to do the job was no less than another powerful blast.
Names of two journalists from the Jang media group, Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai and Mr. Irfan Siddiqui, the ex-ambassador to Afghanistan during Taliban rule and member of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf now, Mr. Rustam Shah Mohmand, and the (in)famous Major (Retd) Amir of the ISI, one of two central protagonists in “Operation Midnight Jackal”, as the government’s representatives was perplexing to say the least. Both decisions, to talk, and to talk through the chosen four, appeared to reek of capitulation and lack of will to take the fight to the militants. And it may just be what it appears to be. However, if it turns out to be what it appears to be, Mian Sahib has almost certainly put the last nail in his political coffin, if not in the entire country’s.
Of the four committee members, Major Amir’s profile is the most alarming in the context of his being a negotiator representing the government. His “Operation Midnight Jackal” credentials pale beside his rich Taliban heritage. Shaheen Buneri, in ‘Swat Valley, The Metamorphosis’ writes: “The Swat conflict was also influenced by the Panjpirs of Swabi district, adjacent to the Malakand division of KPP. The Panjpirs follow a localized version of Saudi Wahahbism that was introduced in Pakistan by Maulana Tahir, father of Major Amir, an ISI operative who allegedly helped topple Benazir Bhutto’s first government. The madreassa at Panjpir, administered by Maulana Tayyab, Major Amir’s brother, is associated with a who’s who of Pakistan’s extremist leader, including TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad, Bajaur Taliban commander Maulvi Faqir Muhammad (who recently split from TTP), and the Khyber agency’s notorious militant leader Mangal Bagh. TNSM military chief Fazlullah also adhered to the Panjpir group. This madrassa was an important recruitment camp that also performed the role of a think tank for strategic planning during the Afghan war of the 1980s.” Further, it is said that both Fazlullah and Sufi Muhammad received their religious education from Major Amir’s father.
On the other hand, coming back to the Prime Minister’s decisions, it is not possible that he is willfully signing his own and the country’s death warrant (after all, the army is said to be straining at the leash). Thus, this handpicked dream team could be a stroke of genius. With Major Amir practically a Taliban proxy, Rustam Shah Mohmand a member and nominee of the PTI, the starry eyed talks-enamoured apologists of Taliban, and Irfan Siddiqui also a right of center conservative, Mian Sahib could not have picked more ‘open to Taliban viewpoint’ negotiators (OK, Ansar Abbasi got left out, but he can be sent a truckload of tissue boxes). However, it’s clear the team’s mandate remains, or ought to remain within the confines of the constitution of Pakistan, and Mian Sahib will be the ultimate decision maker on the give and take of the negotiations. Clearly, neither will he call the army out of FATA, nor hand over territory – it’s not his to hand over, nor commit treason and violate the constitution and agree to Sharia rule over Pakistan to replace democracy and institutions the constitution protects. Yet, these, essentially, are the demands of the militants. Somehow, I don’t think he’ll agree to the odd girls’ school to be blown up, or a few bazaars or convoys to be bombed from time to time to ‘give peace a chance’ either.
Then, what exactly will this round of ‘talks’ establish? A number of things, first of which will be the complete fallacy of the concept and ruse of negotiations, where non-negotiables are being asked for. Demand for hospitals, schools, roads, development funds, local elections, a local legislature etc. can conceivably be met. But Taliban hegemony with complete surrender by the state, cannot. As an aside, the droning of the drones about the drones is conspicuous by its absence these days – that particular argument in the shameful ruins it always belonged in (drones having stopped, the Taliban not) – with Mr. Imran Khan and his JamaatiTola rather quiet on the subject (Thank you, Mr. Obama, I was developing Continuing Trauma Syndrome with their day and night droning). Clearly, Mian Sahib’s dream team will return with empty hands, or maybe without hands.
The second ‘success’ of this stroke of genius will be continuing and horrific attacks by the Taliban, of course. Given how this ‘nation’ made a U-turn after whole heartedly standing with the government of the day on both the 2009 Swat operation and the 2007 Lal Masjid operation, I wouldn’t be surprised if Mian Sahib doesn’t want to agree to a premature all-out war on militancy before the masses in general, and the Taliban apologists in particular, first learn a thorough lesson. For a sensible peoples, overwhelming force to crush the militants would’ve been long overdue. But this is Pakistan, the land of Pied Pipers and theirrats. Clearly, whenever in the past the government has read the mood of the people and gone after Taliban militants, enough prior carnage had not been experienced to carry through long term clarity of mind. Or perhaps, amnesia caused the turnarounds. Or perhaps it was plain stupidity. This time, it seems, Mian Sahib is aiming for indelible marks left by yet unprecedented levels of violence on the national psyche before he goes forth with the only obvious solution to the problem. Or he’s creating longer lasting barriers to amnesia. Or to plain stupidity.
The writer is a human rights worker and freelance columnist.
Email:gulnbukhari@gmail.com
Tweets at:@gulbukhari
