Just last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin directed members of his Security Council to consider possible amendments to the country’s nuclear doctrine.

In his address at the biannual standing conference on nuclear deterrence on Sept. 25, Putin emphasized the urgency of revising the document, which currently designates the use of nuclear forces as a “last resort” to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty.

He pointed to the “rapidly changing military-political landscape” and the “emergence of new military threats and risks” as primary reasons for the reassessment.

Putin outlined several key areas he believes should be adjusted, including broadening the list of states and military alliances subject to Russia’s nuclear deterrence and expanding the scope of military threats that could be countered by nuclear measures.

Among his suggestions was a recommendation to consider any attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear power, as a joint assault.

Additionally, he proposed that the revised doctrine should allow the use of nuclear weapons if confirmed intelligence reveals a large-scale launch of air- or space-based attack systems, including hypersonic aircraft, cruise missiles or drones crossing into Russian territory.

“We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression against Russia and Belarus, as part of the Union State, especially in cases where conventional weapons pose a critical threat to our sovereignty,” he concluded, adding that the position has been coordinated with Belarus.

West’s reaction to possible changes

The West’s reaction to Putin’s comments has been largely critical, with the announcement perceived as a direct attempt to dissuade countries from supplying Ukraine with longer-range weapons, which could potentially hit deeper into Russian territory.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken condemned the statements as “totally irresponsible,” especially in light of discussions about disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN General Assembly.

Blinken emphasized that such rhetoric plays poorly internationally, particularly while global leaders are gathered to discuss peace initiatives.

The EU also criticized the move, describing it as another instance of Putin’s irresponsible behavior, warning of the danger of continuously using nuclear threats as a political tool.

From the Western perspective, the proposed changes in Russia's doctrine, particularly the potential for a nuclear response to non-nuclear attacks if they involve nuclear-armed allies, are seen as lowering the threshold for nuclear use, which escalates global tensions.

‘A lowering of Russia’s nuclear threshold’

Igor Korotchenko, the General Director of the Caspian Institute for Strategic Studies, said the most important change is the stance on responding to attacks with conventional weapons using either a tactical or strategic nuclear strike.

“This is a fundamental change, and it primarily concerns the countries of the Western coalition, including both NATO members and non-members,” he told Anadolu.

He said several non-NATO countries fall under the scope of this revised doctrine, including South Korea, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, which Russia views as non-nuclear states relying on the support of nuclear-armed allies.

Korotchenko emphasized that Putin’s remarks were primarily of a “military-political nature,” noting that the precise operational details will be formulated by the Russian General Staff.

He characterized the changes as “very serious,” emphasizing that for the first time, the doctrine includes provisions for a nuclear response to a conventional strike.

“The US has developed a concept of a ‘rapid global strike,’ which entails a non-nuclear large-scale assault on Russia using cruise missiles, primarily sea- and air-launched Tomahawks,” he said.

“Similar cruise missiles -- Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG и TAURUS -- are also in service in countries like France, Britain and Germany. Additionally, several other NATO countries have access to British, American or French long-range cruise missiles. This means a potentially unlimited number of countries could target Russia.”

If the new nuclear doctrine is adopted, said Korotchenko, “the status of tactical nuclear weapons will be elevated.”

“Currently, tactical nuclear warheads are stored in the Defense Ministry’s special warehouses, but with the approval of this new policy, part of the tactical arsenal could be deployed on delivery systems,” he explained.

“This indicates a lowering of the threshold for employing nuclear weapons in response to perceived threats or strikes against Russia.”

He said that tactical nuclear weapons are designed for use on the battlefield, “but if tactical nuclear weapons are used, which theoretically should not lead to an exchange of global nuclear strikes, it is still a prelude to World War III, which is very dangerous.”

“Russia finds itself in a situation where the West’s actions, heightening tensions and disregarding Russia’s established red lines, have effectively compelled the Kremlin to revise its military doctrine,” Korotchenko asserted.

The revised doctrine does not exclude the possibility of Moscow using nuclear weapons if Ukraine strikes targets deep in Russia with long-range missiles provided by the West, according to Korotchenko.

“Theoretically speaking, if we follow the provisions of the new edition of the military doctrine, this is not excluded. Roughly speaking, the doctrine allows it. Whether this will be done in practice will be decided by President Putin as the supreme commander-in-chief in each particular case,” he explained.

Russia ‘equalizing conditions’ with US

Sergey Markov, a former adviser to President Putin, told Anadolu that Russia’s nuclear doctrine has “fairly high” requirements when it comes to the use of these weapons.

“The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in Western countries is lower than in Russia,” Markov, director of the Moscow-based Russian Institute of Political Studies, told Anadolu.

“The most classic example is related to the fact that the US nuclear doctrine allows the use of nuclear weapons to protect allies, while Russia has not yet said anything in the nuclear doctrine about protecting allies.”

While both Russia and the US have said they would not use nuclear weapons first, Moscow has gone a step further by pledging to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while there is no such provision in the US nuclear doctrine, he said.

“It turns out that the US can use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, but Russia cannot. Now these voluntary restrictions are going to be adjusted, and Russia is equalizing conditions with the US,” said Markov.

Political analyst Viktor Kozyrev believes the changes are a result of a situation where the West is ramping up pressure on Russia in all spheres.

“Modern challenges require a more flexible and adaptive approach to the use of nuclear weapons. Russia must be ready for an asymmetric and decisive response to any attempts by the West to cause unacceptable damage to the vital interests of the country,” Kozyrev told Anadolu.

“Expanding the possibilities of using nuclear potential is a necessary measure aimed at strengthening strategic stability and preventing the escalation of conflict,” he said.

However, he added, Russia remains interested in working closely with Türkiye and other regional players to reduce the risks of escalation.

“We are open to dialogue and ready to take into account the concerns of our partners in the field of nuclear non-proliferation,” he said.

History of Russia’s nuclear doctrine changes

Russian authorities amended the nation’s nuclear doctrine several times after the first formal document following the dissolution of the Soviet Union was adopted in 1993.

The first version was highly reliant on nuclear weapons, viewing them as a critical tool to compensate for the weakening of its conventional military forces. The doctrine allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack or to a large-scale conventional attack.

In 2000, in response to NATO’s expansion and new security threats, Russia's doctrine was updated to allow for first-use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations when Russia's sovereignty is under threat, including large-scale conventional warfare. The doctrine emphasized nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

In 2010, Russian authorities slightly shifted emphasis, stressing the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and a “last resort” but still allowed for their use in response to both nuclear and non-nuclear aggression that threatens Russia’s existence.

The doctrine also introduced the concept of using “de-escalatory” nuclear strikes, a tactic where nuclear weapons could be used in a limited capacity to de-escalate a conventional conflict.

The most recent changes were made in a document called Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence in 2020, which designated four scenarios when Russia could use nuclear weapons – an attack with nuclear or weapons of mass destruction on Russia or its allies; a conventional attack that threatens the state’s existence; a detection of a ballistic missile attack targeting Russia; and an attack on critical government or military sites that undermine Russia’s nuclear capabilities.