Terrorism is again raising its head. Besides, the multifaceted challenges of terrorism and extremism, it is about time to look into the regulation of the educational institutions across Pakistan, which directly or indirectly, are linked with the above challenges.
A famous name in the Neo-Traditionalist Movement in the USA, Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, writes about the description and importance of the madrassah. ‘The madrassah is the heart of Islamic civilization, where the sciences of religion and the sciences of the world are integrated and harmonized.’ To him, the madrassah is an all-encompassing educational umbrella that prepares scholars, students, and youth not only for religious contests and research but also inculcates modern scientific and technological acumen in the disciples. 
Many people restrict the concept of the madrassah to the mere rote reading of the Quran without any other goals, such as understanding the Quran in light of the important and validated teachings of our Prophet (PBUH), as well as with reference to the notable work of theologians, scientific, and religious experts? To my surprise, this archaic and conservative description is only applied in most regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Beyond that, in most other Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and others, the context, concept, structure, and description of madrassah are completely different and relatively more productive and positive. 
One major challenge is the concept of Madrassah and the narrative built around it by the Media, directly or indirectly. Post 9/11, the concept of madrassahs has been stigmatized more than post-cold post-war success. It is mostly pictured as a hub and cradle of extremism, violence, radicalism, and terrorism, especially in the case of Pakistan. This perception has evolved and is etched in public memory by local, national, and international media outlets. Unfortunately, this build-up generic concept has maligned even the efforts and struggles of the positive madrassah systems. As a result, madrassahs have been marginalized and detached from the mainstream educational institutions.
Let us start with the existing statistics, research, and updates about the number of madrassahs. According to the online data and from other resources, such as Brookings and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, the number of madaris in Pakistan is around 12,000 to 40,000 to 55,000 in 2023. The exact number of madrassahs is not known due to multiple reasons, the most important being that the number of unregistered and categorized madrassahs is not known. In addition to that, according to the recent study taken up by the Islamabad Capital Police (ICTP), the number of madrassahs in a relatively small territory and the capital of Pakistan is surveyed to be around 502. After thorough categorization, it was observed that out of the total, around 250 madrassahs were reported to be unregistered. In addition to that, more than half of the reported number had merely 50 or fewer young disciples, who attended madrassahs for learning Qaida and the Quran. These are no more than a modest tuition class for reciting of Quran, almost a mandatory requirement in every Muslim household in the country as a foundation class of religion. How do we categorize them as a madrassah? How it is counted or discounted? Who permits the opening and who checks their timings, curriculum, faculty, and source of funding? All these questions are basic yet remain unanswered. 
The first point to ponder here is that in the capital territory, the number of madrassahs exceeding the needs and demands of the total population is just adding fuel to the fire of growing governance and administrative problems. With this large number of smaller madrassahs, registered or unregistered, the problems of management, security, monitoring, and administration increase. Now, if we consider the most highlighted challenges associated with unregistered madrassahs and other educational centers/ schools in Pakistan, the foremost challenge is that of security and social environment. Such institutions mostly train, educate, and groom young children in their early years, starting from as early as the age of 4 or 5 years. These children are pushed into the habit of gathering finance and support in the form of regular “Chanda” (charity in support of the madrassah’s talibs/ disciples). In addition to that, they visit door-to-door across the streets and ask for clothing, food, and sustenance funds for the masjid and madrassahs. So opening a madrassah results in some activities on a daily basis in that locality which has an impact on its overall social environment.
Secondly, there is no monitoring system in place to check and monitor the learning and educational curriculum of these madrassahs or “schools”. The other alarming problem here is about the self-proclaimed “Qari Sahban” or “Teachers” in these mostly unregistered small madrassahs. There is no check on their credibility and capability to teach. There is no minimum qualification assessment that can certify and allow such Qaris to take tons of young children into their studentships under the guise of madrassah’s teaching. Recent moves by the Prevention of Violent Extremism unit in ICTP are a modest beginning but its impact has yet to be seen in a larger context depending upon its relationship with other stakeholders. For example, the role of the Directorate of Religious Education (DRE) under the Federal Ministry for Education, Training, and Skill Development remains a dormant entity most of the time.
Thirdly, talking about DRE another significant associated challenge is the implementation of madrassah’s reforms. There is a huge gap between religious and political leaders of the country regarding consensus building on the implementation of madrassah’s reforms that have been coming through from different institutions; the recent recommendations from NACTA as well as Single National Curriculum have not been practically implemented across the board. Cross-interaction with religious Madaris and other learning institutes was recommended by NACTA in its Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) policy, which has been pending approval of the government since 2022. It shows that PVE is not on the priority list of the apex committees for the much-talked-about National Action Plan.
Lastly, in the current situation, the biggest challenge is the lack of funds and government-supported and monitored infrastructure. In this regard, we can learn from the reformations done by Indonesia, Bangladesh, Morocco, and Turkey. In the case of Morocco, because of the successful implementation of reforms in letters and meanings, the madrassah system across the country has become more inclusive, modernized, and diversified. In addition to that, the annual number of graduates has increased from 5,000 to 30,000 post-reformation. Such an impact can only be possible if other major stakeholders, including security agencies and civil society, come to a common consensus for the greater good of the state.  The economy is on agenda number 1 of the caretaking government but it is yet to be determined where comes the prevention of violent extremism which is directly linked with revamping of the education system in the country at gross root level. There is a need to take small but effective steps to prevent the proliferation of madrassahs in nook and corner of the country. The same applies to unauthorized schools in the name of free or cheap education. State institutions must work in tandem to regulate the education sector so that only capable and authorized persons can claim to be the teachers we will keep on producing unguided human beings, generation after generation.