Nawaz Sharif’s preference for negotiating with Taliban militants gathered momentum in July this year, when a gathering of key politicians from Pakistan’s main political parties gathered in Islamabad, formally supported the move. Yet, this initiative is riddled with multiple challenges. While Sharif insists that any future peace talks must take place within the framework of the constitution, the Taliban may not necessarily accept that pre-condition.[Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s chief Hakimullah Mehsud’s assassination by a US drone strike on Friday in North Waziristan is likely to impede any government led peace initiative.]
They have already demanded the imposition of their style of Sharia, and have refused to consider conciliatory gestures such as a ceasefire while the talks are on. On the contrary, the Taliban have carried out bloody terrorist attacks with a vengeance ever since the announcement by the government seeking peace talks. Clearly, this marks a blatant defiance of the spirit that must precede any peace process.
Pakistanis have a right to demand that their elected political representatives must discuss, debate and decide if they are indeed in favour of the peace talks, and if so, the manner in which they will be held.a
Bypassing parliament while Sharif and his political comrades take pride in Pakistan’s emerging democratic framework only defeats the role of an essential pillar of democracy. Perhaps more vitally, the other downside of Sharif’s move has indeed been his government’s failure to take Pakistan’s mainstream society on board. More than a decade after the country joined the US-led so-called war on terror, there remains an ever growing list of casualties among ordinary Pakistanis.
Unlike politicians, many of whom are armed with enough affluence to maintain a second residence if needed in a foreign destination of choice, ordinary Pakistanis have to live with the fallout from the ongoing conflict. For Sharif too, the degree of risk has increased given the manner he has overseen the initiation of peace talks.
By choosing to bypass parliament and the mainstream, at least for consultative purposes, Sharif has now completely assumed the onus of responsibility. If things go wrong, he alone will have to bear the brunt.
Meanwhile, there are many precedents around the world which deeply dictate against the state being seen to negotiate from a position of weakness, with militants placed on the other side of the table. There is practically no precedent where a state has successfully negotiated with separatist groups, where the latter seems to be coming from a position of strength while the final outcome has favoured the former.
Pakistan too faces a similar dilemma. The loss of authority by the state over parts of Pakistan’s territory clearly presents Islamabad with a monumental challenge. At the very least, the Pakistani state must first establish its ability to take charge of its own territory before initiating a peace process, which bears even a remote chance of succeeding.
There are indeed many risks from an outcome where the initiative now being unleashed begins to fail in defending Pakistan’s interests. The implications for Pakistan’s internal stability and foreign relations are far too serious to be ignored.
If Sharif is unable to eventually convince the Taliban to lay down arms, Pakistan risks witnessing more bloody violence. Next year, as the US begins to draw down its troops from Afghanistan, at least part of that movement involving hardware and personnel will conceivably take place through Pakistan’s soil.
The targeting of those withdrawing US-led troops in fresh Taliban militant attacks risks provoking uneasy questions in western capitals over the extent to which the Pakistani government simply has no control over its own territory.
Less than two years after ousting Sharif in an October 1999 military coup, former president Pervez Musharraf received a curt phone call from former US president George W. Bush. That moment came shortly after the 9/11 attacks marked the biggest terrorist incident in America’s history. Left with practically no choice between becoming a friend or foe of Washington, Musharraf promptly agreed to disrupt all ties with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers and join the US-led war on terror.
Clearly, little attention was paid by Musharraf to the need for a broader consultation as parliament remained packed at the time while Sharif was in custody. Years later, Pakistan lives not only with a continuing fallout from the conflict, but Musharraf remains the target of much criticism as the leader who led Pakistan into the longest conflict in its history.
For Sharif, the case of his former nemesis may ironically offer a useful lesson.

Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters. Gulf News