The Election and Middle East

Trump, on the other hand, is Trump. I expect his administ-ration would be as unconven-tional and unpredic-table as it was the last time.

The Middle East conflict and this year’s US presidential election are impacting one another in important ways. Within the Democratic Party an internal debate is unfolding, while on the Republican side there’s a hardening of views. As a result, whoever wins, there’s little hope of any significant change in US policy toward the Middle East region.

Israel’s war in Gaza has caused a rift within the Democratic coalition. During the last decade, several mass movements have arisen in the US in response to women’s rights, “black lives matter,” immigration, and gun control—all partisan issues pitting Democrats against Republicans. The latest mass movement, supporting Palestinian rights and a ceasefire in Gaza, is made up of the same progressive constituent groups, but instead of being a strictly partisan effort, it’s been an intra-party affair pitting key elements of the Democratic coalition against the party’s leadership.

Polling shows that for the first time, more Democrats sympathize with Palestinians over Israelis, want an immediate ceasefire, and support the suspension of military aid to Israel. They are also disinclined to see the US militarily involved in conflicts in the Middle East and the world. These attitudes are especially pronounced among young voters and non-white voters—key components of the Democratic coalition. This real tension within the Democratic Party may cost the party votes in some states.

While changing Democratic attitudes resulting from the war have caused some alienation from the party’s historic ties with Israel, this shift is also beginning to have an impact on policy. Record numbers of Democratic members of Congress have signed on to bills and letters urging a ceasefire or calling for limits on US arms shipments to Israel.

Republicans, on the other hand, remain dominated by the Christian right and remnants of the neoconservative movement both of which share a Manichaeistic worldview that is uncritically supportive of Israel’s role in the region and the world. Despite the costs in US lives, treasure, and prestige resulting from the disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, these two ideological currents continue to see the US as the driving force for good in the world.

Regardless of the outcome of the election, the rift will continue to grow—both within the Democratic Party and between the two parties.

I don’t expect that a Harris administration would make any immediate or dramatic shift in its approach. The still-dominant Democratic foreign policy and political consultant establishments are cautious and out of touch with the electorate’s changing dynamics and the diminished capacity of the US in the world. But I do expect the party will eventually recognize and make some accommodation to the political pressures building from below.

Trump, on the other hand, is Trump. I expect his administration would be as unconventional and unpredictable as it was the last time. That said, despite his desire to avoid entanglement in foreign wars, he would not deviate from, nor challenge, his supporters’ beliefs in US primacy and the righteousness of Israel’s behaviors. But the extent of the complex tensions roiling the Middle East region would require him to make some accommodations.

I’m not sure that either he or, for that matter, the Democratic foreign policy establishment, is up to the task. They will need to think bigger than playing “whack-a-mole” with Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. They will need to recognize that the US can’t make change without addressing historic grievances and that new realities transforming the region must be addressed.

New thinking and creative leadership is needed. It appears to be developing more in the Middle East than in the US, which is maintaining the old post-Cold War view of the US as the “indispensable nation” and “beacon of freedom.”

While a heated debate on the Democratic side over the US’s role in the region and the world will likely continue, I’m not confident that the GOP can engage in requisite self-criticism to make change possible. A consequence will be partisan tension and gridlock, preventing the US from meaningfully contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East. This has resulted in many key US allies moving independently to both secure themselves and ease regional tensions.

Dr. James J. Zogby
The writer is the President of Arab American Institute.

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