It has almost become a fashion statement these days to draw similarities between what recently transpired in Bangladesh and what could perhaps be waiting to happen in Pakistan. The real question however is whether are there truly any similarities between the situation on the ground in Pakistan to the one in Bangladesh that quickly transitioned from a motley frustration on quotas to an unstoppable anti-government movement taking down the strong and deep-rooted Hasina Wajid government of 16 years? Also, not too far back, the Arab Spring in a similar style was sparked by the self-immolation of a street vendor to protest the grotesque inequities of Tunisians in general; a tragedy that then quickly engulfed the entire North Africa like fire within days.

Back to Pakistan and Bangladesh, well, the answer may not be a straightforward one, since it takes more than mere figurative numbers or comparative data analysis to trigger movements, but a cursory look at some of the key areas instrumental in brewing public dissatisfaction and the commonalities in resemblance appear quite fascinating: First Inflation: Like Pakistan, Bangladesh had also of late been witnessing punishing inflation, which as we all know can be regarded as a single most factor for dissatisfaction with governance. The persistent inflation rate of +18% (which by the way the people believed to be much more, just like in Pakistan) post the IMF program had been back-breaking. To rub salt to the wounds, the Awami League had recently mounted a propaganda campaign that inflation had been tamed and was rapidly coming down; something that was not entirely bought by the general public and was also allured to by Dr Yunus in his initial address. Today, a similar debate also stands raised here in Pakistan on the accuracy of deceleration inflation. Second, discontent with the IMF: Although Bangladesh proactively went to the Fund by claiming that it is an endeavour to ensure that the ship remains stable in case the international economic headwinds turn to Bangladesh - in events like slowdown in exports or currency devaluation or energy hikes or supply-chain issues – the reality remains that IMF programs always come with strings attached that invariably lead to economic contraction, inflation and unemployment. This fall-out in developing and highly populated countries run the danger of protests and unrest and only need some kind of a catalyst to kick-start agitations. In Pakistan the situation today may also not be very different. Third: Rent-seeking, corruption, market distortions and inequitable distribution of wealth becomes a dangerous cocktail recipe even in the short-term, once the effects start reaching the common man quicker than anticipated. In times of rising unemployment and high inflation, the pain becomes a first-hand story rather than being one limited a neighbour or a distant acquaintance. The subsequent polarisation and anger become even more difficult to control if the country boasts a relatively young population mix. This is exactly what we saw in Bangladesh with youngsters taking matters into their hands while complaining about a stranglehold of an elite or an Awami League clique over the resources and the industry of Bangladesh. Today in Pakistan also, we need to be careful about this toxic mix, as the distinction between the private sector and public sectors domains gets murkier by the day. Fourth: Bangladesh was carved out of India in 1947 on religious grounds and then broke away from Pakistan in 1971 on linguistic and cultural grounds. Despite claims to the contrary, it seems that religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversities remain unaddressed.

For example, the Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami is said to have played a significant role in supporting the anti-government movement where to the government’s horror, the campuses were found to be much more politicised than originally thought – Dhaka University as we know stood out. The Pakistani prevalent ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious divisions and deeply politicised university campuses paint a very similar cum tricky picture. Something, the government needs to start working on poste-haste. Fifth: Devaluation. Bangladesh also of late went through a horrifying cycle of devaluation. Between January 2022 and June 2024, the Taka lost almost 36% against the US Dollar with expectations of further 10 to 15% devaluation to come (perhaps another fall-out of an IMF program). Currency devaluation not only inflicts severe pain on the investors and savers by eroding their life’s efforts in a single stroke, but it tends to be a kind of tax that tends to disconnect the common man from global access, making everything too dear to afford. Bangladeshis in general were feeling both the pressure and the pain from this, just like what we find today in an average Pakistani alienated through massive devaluation sprees due to a debt burden that he had no role to play in. Last but not least, sixth: One always thought that Bangladesh’s experience was distinctive in a unique way that needed to be fully appreciated from a broader development perspective. Essentially this aspect related to the state formation and capacity. Meaning, the defining characteristic of a modern state where it holds a monopoly on legitimate violence, legitimate extortion (namely, taxation), and the provision of essential services, albeit with the second monopoly – taxation – serving the objective of the third that even when the state is not directly providing due services in return, it still continues to dictate third-party terms. Ironically, in the end, this very lack of reciprocity and coerciveness became the government’s undoing, and this is exactly where it is about time that we also start to do some inner soul searching!

Dr Kamal Monnoo
The writer is an entrepreneur and economic analyst. Email: kamal.monnoo@gmail.com