Strategic Waters

The Indian Ocean’s strategic importance is reshaping global power dynamics, with rising Chinese influence challenging American dominance and India forging pivotal alliances.

“The Indian Ocean is key to the seven oceans; whoever controls it will dominate Asia, and in the 21st century, the world’s destiny will be decided by its waters,” prophesied Alfred Thayer Mahan, a renowned American naval strategist of the 19th century, reflecting the significance of the Indian Ocean. India is the third-largest ocean in the world, comprising 20% of the world’s water surface, with a water mass of 70.56 million km², touching the borders of 16 African and 18 Asian countries. It is the warmest ocean in the world, making it ideal for trade, commercial, and naval activities, as trade volume via the Indian Ocean exceeds $7 trillion, according to the Indian Ocean Rim report (2024).

Given the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean, a new great game has emerged among great powers to maximise their influence, leverage, and power. Traditionally, the USA is considered a Pacific Ocean power due to its hegemonic influence and military bases across the Pacific, stationing American military power in pro-American states such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia for domination of the Pacific Ocean for strategic and commercial reasons to serve American interests.

However, with the dawn of the 21st century, China’s spectacular economic rise has made its economy the second-largest in the world ($17 trillion). This economic ascent has also led to the modernisation, advancement, and expansion of the Chinese military, with China’s defence budget now around $240 billion.

This development serves as an alarm for American interests, which fear that Chinese naval capabilities could potentially dominate Asia-Pacific and jeopardise American interests in the region. Remarkably, the Chinese navy now has a clear advantage over American naval capabilities in the region, with concerns that China might take Taiwan and establish its hegemony in the area; similar to how the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 allowed the USA to establish its hegemony in the Northern Hemisphere.

Since 2010, the American policy of “Pivot to Asia” under President Obama and “Indo-Pacific Policy” under Trump aimed to escalate American presence in the Indian Ocean, coordinate with American allies in the region, modernise naval capabilities, and deter any threat from hostile powers (such as China) to American and its allies’ interests in the region. The formation of QUAD and AUKUS also projected the same vision of increasing American influence and involvement in the Indian Ocean by building a network of American allies. The latter defence pact involves the transfer and coordination of nuclear-powered submarines to the non-nuclear country of Australia.

Unsurprisingly, the shifting geopolitics of the 21st century have made India a natural and strategic partner for America in the mission to contain China, although both India and China have robust trade and commercial ties. However, a border dispute with China, the geopolitical significance of India, its market and economy, and its 7,516 km coastline make India a key security provider for the Indian Ocean. In this context, India has pursued an aggressive maritime policy involving rapid modernisation of its navy, deployment of nuclear submarines, aircraft, and ballistic missiles, and the sharing of intelligence and transfer of advanced naval and military technology from the West to deter and contain Chinese naval influence and power.

Meanwhile, China, through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the modernisation of its navy, has enhanced its power, influence, and control over trade and naval routes in the Indian Ocean. Various American intelligence reports suggest that China could establish a series of maritime bases across the Indian Ocean by 2030. Furthermore, China has already circumvented the prospect of blocking the “Strait of Malacca” by adopting alternative routes for its oil, gas, and other essential commodities through the Gwadar seaport of CPEC.

In this context, China and Pakistan have become natural and strategic partners, serving their strategic and commercial interests. Various American think tanks reportedly view Pakistan as China’s most reliable partner in the region; therefore, China has invested billions into CPEC and the development and modernisation of the Gwadar seaport for strategic reasons, maintaining Chinese power, presence, and influence in the Indian Ocean while engaging Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia in BRI/CPEC projects to build a pro-Chinese alliance in the region and counter American hegemonic plans. However, Pakistan must safeguard Chinese workers, projects, and assets in CPEC to maintain Chinese trust.

At the same time, Pakistan should not provoke American hostility over its strategic partnership with China, as American goodwill remains crucial for Pakistan’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the region. However, the Indo-US alliance and India’s aggressive non-engagement policy leave Pakistan with few options but to strengthen Pak-China ties to counter India’s hegemonic behaviour in the region.

All these developments in the Indian Ocean and the great game suggest that Pakistan should devise a coherent national maritime security policy to deter any external threat from India’s growing naval power. With a coastline of 1,046 km and an Extended Continental Shelf of 350 nautical miles, Pakistan’s geopolitical and geo-economic significance in the Indian Ocean cannot be ignored and requires special attention, policy-making, and implementation to protect Pakistan’s interests in the Indian Ocean’s geopolitics.

Sher Ali Bukhari
The writer is a UET alumni with keen interest in Pakistan’s foreign policy.

Sher Ali Bukhari
The writer is a UET alumni with keen interest in Pakistan’s foreign policy.

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