The declaration by President Obama that USA would delay the withdrawal in Afghanistan to give security cover to an ill-trained Afghan Army against Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIS is an admission that its 14 year war to rout these elements failed. It is not by chance that military garrisons chosen for deployments will stare down Pakistan’s throat.
Iraq’s logic is somewhat different. Having failed to provide a similar cover to the Iraqi government, the attainment of US objectives is debatable and elusive. Rather, following a withdrawal that lacked military or political logic, the presence of both Al Qaeda and ISIS has swelled manifold. The treatment of soldiers and intelligence operatives in Iraqi prison camps contributed to the rise of ISIS that was selectively used by Arab Monarchies and Turkey to settle scores. The same is likely to repeat in Afghanistan. The short and facile siege of Kanduz by Taliban on the heels of a withdrawal, Russian intervention in Syria and Pakistan cozying to Russia and China forced a US declaration that had long ago lost its steam in ethics of conflict.
The transition from peace to war is premised on an ends-means relationship seeking equilibrium; usually peace on terms. A total defeat is never sought. Diplomacy demands leaving space for an honourable exit, lest it end like the Treaty of Versailles. With multi party negotiations involving Afghan Taliban, this has made little progress primarily because of predisposed US terms. Since these terms will never be met, stay of USA in Afghanistan is indefinite; and this is the purpose. Like a sidewinder that hides itself, US intentions are not what they appear in this declaration.
The rationale for war is never built on emotive factors. The reasoning is built around cool and calculated political logic. It is always easy to begin a conflict, but very difficult to extricate. National honour and ego are at stake. However, the point at which the conflict must trade violence for peace remains a bitter pill, especially when the objectives achieved fall short of the declared policy and when hidden intentions are different.
In long drawn conflicts like Iraq, Afghanistan and now Syria, emotional impulses diffuse strategic and military logic. To the contrary, the minimalist adversary equipped with an ideology and cause usually outlives a bad policy. This is a lesson US is not heeding in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria more so because the stated objectives are mere fillers. The reason why USA attacked Afghanistan was geopolitical and certainly not bringing democracy to a largely primordial culture. USA is prepared to extend this war indefinitely to checkmate China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan in guise of moral rhetoric. Pakistan’s strong conventional and nuclear capabilities shift the nature of conflict to peripheries like terrorism, bad governance, political instability and economic dependency.
The politics from Afghanistan to Syria are intertwined at multiple layers and Pakistan is being sucked from multiple directions and levels. Afghan Taliban enjoy a good relationship with Pakistan but also have direct or indirect communications with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, USA, Russia and China, sometimes running counter to the interests of many actors. Similarly warlords in Afghanistan choose to take sides where their advantage lies. The run amok and almost defeated Pakistani Taliban have handlers in foreign countries and work against the interests of Pakistan. They have sanctuaries in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Yet they maintain good working relations with Afghan Taliban, Afghan Government and India. Many religious organisations (some banned) politically engage the Pakistani government but also maintain contacts with TTP, Arab monarchies and even ISIS. Pakistan on its part has the good and bad theory.
The case of Syria is no different. Nowhere in the world have interests of diverse groups within a country, neighbours, regional actors and global powers intertwined the way they do in Middle East, South Asia and Eastern Europe. Because of the commonality, diversity and divergence of interests, small powers vying for their share of the flesh go unchecked. Hence the entire situation within the devil’s triangle (Ukraine-Syria–Afghanistan) is complicated and dangerous. In future, this triangle will be a fiercely contested zone of instability and anarchy where proxy wars at multiple levels will be the currency. With a begging bowl in hand, Pakistan will have to walk the razor’s edge in what to choose and what to reject. This is the next phase of Pakistan’s war.
This calls to question Pakistan’s success in Zarb-e-Azb. Emotively, it has united the nation, reduced internal vulnerabilities to terrorism and added to the prestige of the law enforcement agencies. The fact that it never had a well thought and articulated political plan now stands exposed. In Pakistan’s vibrant media, debates still focus on nonproductive and disruptive political rivalries. National interests and Pakistan’s survival in multi layered complexities is seldom discussed. The country still does not have a full time foreign or defence minister. The minister of finance is not an economist. The political economy of the conflict is in utter neglect. On the scales, the military plan at micro management of counter terrorism was brilliant but each day is being twined in the apathy of macro management.
The major challenge for General Raheel and his successor will be the impact macro management and high politics will have on Pakistan. My worst fear is that the entire effort will be diluted by rising poverty, economic mismanagement, debt trap, tied aid and trade, bad foreign policy and compromises. This disconnect strengthens interests of countries that aim to keep Pakistan destabilised, discredited and dependent.
The first matching policy to Zarb-e-Azb should have been self-reliance. In an interdependent world, self-reliance is not restricted to making nuclear weapons and JF Thunders. It means an economy led by domestic growth, reduction in import led consumerism and reliance on internal resources for production that includes energy and value addition. A trickledown effect of the Chicago School will only give rise to very narrow richness and dangerously broad pockets of poverty and social deprivation leading to chaos and proliferation of competing ideologies. Money needs to be invested to kick start the grass roots rather than have cosmetic white elephants surviving on subsidies. Agriculture, oil & gas, water management and lignite coal need immediate attention. Substituting domestically realisable capabilities with expensive imports will suck Pakistan deeper into economic uncertainty. Hence in agglomeration, it could be back to square one.
The mere slogan of CPEC will never lead Pakistan to economic reliance. The energy and trade corridor must be flooded by Pakistani produce. With nothing in sight, Pakistan is fast moving towards a state whose strings will be pulled by outside actors. That will be sweet revenge for Zarb-e-Azb.
The writer is a retired officer of Pakistan Army and a political economist.
samson.sharaf@gmail.com
