August, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed 70 people, in­cluding civilians from Punjab and Pakistan Army officials, while they were travelling in Baluchistan. With the provincial government and sporadic military and po­lice actions failing to crush the insurgency, Pakistan launched a specific counterterrorism operation, Azm-e-Istehkam, targeting the BLA and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Pakistan is particularly impacted by the collaboration between the Indian and Afghan governments, which pro­vide ammunition, financial support, mil­itary training, and shelter to insurgents. India, emboldened by U.S. opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), views the project as a means for China to expand its influence in Asia. The goal is to encourage the BLA and TTP to escalate terrorist activities, dis­couraging potential investors and pre­venting economic growth in Pakistan.

This strategy is evident from a review of social media and public protests by various Baloch groups. Numerous vid­eos have surfaced in which the BLA and TTP threaten China and Pakistan with severe consequences if the Chinese gov­ernment does not withdraw from CPEC. By fostering instability in the tribal ar­eas, they aim to frighten Chinese inves­tors and depict the federal government as exploiting provincial resources at the expense of the local population. Notably, TTP and BLA suicide attacks have been reported for the first time in Pashtun ar­eas of Baluchistan. This campaign has had a significant impact on the internal political landscape of the province.

India has spread misinformation, claiming that due to security concerns for its workers on CPEC projects, Chi­na is reluctant to complete the second phase and has advised its nationals to slow down participation. To deter po­tential third-country investors, Indi­an vloggers based in the Middle East continue to propagate falsehoods. The second phase, crucial for indus­trialisation in CPEC Special Economic Zones (SEZs), is of particular concern to the government.

Pakistan finds itself in a difficult posi­tion. Despite repeated appeals, the Tal­iban government has done nothing to rein in the BLA and TTP terrorists oper­ating from Afghan territory. They have also refused to repatriate TTP activists involved in terrorist attacks on Chinese nationals. Pakistan presented a dossier with documentary evidence, including the names of TTP terrorists responsible for killing Chinese engineers in the Be­sham attack. Pakistan also raised the is­sue with the Taliban during recent UN talks in Doha, where press reports indi­cated an exchange of heated words be­tween representatives.

In June, Balochistan’s Home Minister, Ziaullah Langau, exposed India as the “single investor” in the TTP-BLA nexus. TTP’s Nasrullah, alias Maulvi Mansoor, captured in January 2024, confessed that India’s intelligence agency RAW aimed to form a nexus between the BLA and TTP, with TTP bases established in Khuzdar. RAW’s objectives in Balo­chistan are threefold: to sabotage CPEC projects, including targeting Chinese cit­izens; to carry out kidnappings for ran­som to highlight enforced disappearanc­es and discredit Pakistan’s intelligence agencies; and to spread anarchy by fuel­ling terrorist activities.

Previously, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take decisive action against terrorism origi­nating from Afghanistan, which allows terrorists to operate with impunity. In the last TTP attack in Bannu, eight Pak­istani soldiers were martyred. The De­fence Minister’s threat of retaliatory ac­tion did not yield results; instead, TTP and other Afghanistan-based splinter groups joined the BLA to further desta­bilise the region.

Insurgency in Baluchistan is not new, but the involvement of more countries and groups with the BLA and TTP, along with the extensive use of social me­dia to gain visibility, is. The province’s economic vulnerabilities are being ex­ploited through cyber-attacks, econom­ic espionage, and propaganda. Disinfor­mation and manipulation are used to exacerbate existing challenges. Ethnic divisions, exploited by these elements, hinder the government’s ability to main­tain law and order, eroding public trust and further complicating the situation.

Pakistan is grappling with an insur­gency, compounded by a proxy war with India and a Taliban-controlled Af­ghanistan. The security forces’ heavy-handed response often leads to alle­gations of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Such actions fuel resentment among the Baloch pop­ulation, providing further material for separatist propaganda.

India-sponsored and Afghan-based in­surgents have exploited ethnic and eco­nomic disparities, with CPEC projects becoming key targets of hybrid warfare. India’s strategy includes supporting sep­aratist groups, spreading disinformation, economic exploitation, cyber-attacks, false-flag operations, and legal manip­ulation. India’s portrayal of the Baloch people as oppressed and marginalised is amplified in media outlets to garner in­ternational sympathy for their cause. A former CIA director alleged that India pays the Taliban government to recruit TTP sympathisers and provides military and diplomatic support to the BLA.

Among CPEC projects, the Gwadar port is a prime target due to its vital geostra­tegic location for China’s supply chains. This has attracted foreign meddling, particularly from India, the U.S., Iran, and some Western countries, which por­tray the port as a Chinese military base threatening their interests. Pakistan fac­es growing difficulty in managing these complex threats. China is deeply con­cerned about the security of its nation­als working on CPEC projects and has reached out to the Taliban on the issue, but to no avail. India is unlikely to cease its interference in Baluchistan, even if dialogue between Pakistan and India re­sumes, leaving little hope for respite.

Sanaullah Karim
The writer is a former ambassador and is associated with the University of Sargodha. Can be reached at rahimmkarim@gmail.com