Pakistan is again crippled by the rising tide of terrorism. Although the incumbent government has executed the Azm-e-Istehkam operation, the absence of comprehensive, effective, and efficient planning allows terrorists to succeed in carrying out attacks. Amid such a situation, the Colombian approach offers insights into combating terrorism.

Although the context of terrorism in Colombia differs due to its distinct causes, the weaknesses that paved the way for terrorism in Colombia bear a close resemblance to the current state of Pakistan.

Prior to the militancy, Colombia was plagued by issues similar to those in Pakistan today. Political instability created a vacuum filled by unscrupulous elements. Corruption was another significant problem, severely impacting Colombia. Institutional capacity was declining, making these institutions ineffective. Additionally, burgeoning socioeconomic inequality, porous and unregulated borders, historical conflicts, and external interference weakened the country.

Consequently, in the 1980s and 90s, terrorism escalated dramatically in Colombia. Drug cartels like the Medellin Cartel and infamous figures such as Pablo Escobar unleashed terror. Violence and bombings became routine occurrences. Leftist guerrilla groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), initially aimed at political change but soon became involved in drug trafficking and criminal activities, attacking both military and civilians. Right-wing paramilitary groups like the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were also responsible for massacres. Terrorism in Colombia surged to a level where abating it seemed like a Herculean task.

Nevertheless, in 2000, Colombia, with the backing of the US, devised a plan known as Plan Colombia. This plan consisted of four pillars. The first pillar was to fight terrorism, narcotics, and international organised crime. Colombian agencies began gathering intelligence to map the entire network and chain of command of terrorists. The Jungla Commando Battalion, formed specifically for this purpose, conducted joint operations with US military and intelligence agencies, such as the US Southern Command and the DEA. The core idea was a “Clear, hold, and build” strategy to secure territory and establish government authority.

The second pillar was to strengthen governmental institutions and the judicial system. Judicial independence was substantially increased, and the system was largely decentralised, coupled with constitutional reforms. The capacity of institutions was enhanced through restructuring, decentralisation, deployment of technology, and emphasis on human resources. Further, police reforms, accountability, and transparency were ensured.

The third pillar was economic and social revitalisation. Incentives were extended to the agriculture sector to rejuvenate it and shift the production away from drugs. Microfinance programmes were provided to stimulate economic activities. Conditional social safety nets prioritised education and effectively addressed social challenges, revitalising society. The final and most crucial pillar was the process for peace and reintegration. Temporary normalisation zones were created to invite combatants to disarm, followed by reintegration programmes that provided education, jobs, and social safety nets to reintegrate combatants into society. The Truth, Justice, and Reparation Commission was established to investigate human rights violations and provide reparations to victims. Former combatants were encouraged to participate in the political process.

However, in recent years, inconsistency in the implementation of Plan Colombia has diminished its effectiveness. Despite this, during its initial years, Plan Colombia showed significant progress. Representative Elton Gallegly, during a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, stated, “Plan Colombia is not riding on Firestone tires,” indicating that it was not vulnerable and had a strong foundation.

Similarly, Colombia has served as a model for other countries seeking to resolve terrorism. The United Nations has recognised Colombia’s peace process as an example for others to follow. Additionally, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia has worked closely with the Colombian government and former combatants to promote progress in reintegration and security-related issues, providing a model for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in other countries.

The earlier state of Colombia deeply resonates with the current situation in Pakistan. In response to growing terrorism, the Pakistani government has demonstrated some courage by executing the Azm-e-Istehkam operation and requesting US support against terrorism. However, many experts have expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of the operation, calling it “elusive.”

To turn the tide against terrorism, the Pakistani government needs to consider a similar, comprehensive plan. Decision-makers can incorporate elements from Plan Colombia into their main operation or tailor it accordingly.

Imad Ali
The writer is a student of economics.